This study aims to shed light on the reality of economic statecraft under the Trump administration by examining the formation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018. For effective economic statecraft, the state as a unitary actor need to set a clear goal and pursue it in a concerted manner. Does this assumption hold in economic policymaking, where conflicting interests often collide?

FIRRMA is primarily aimed to restrict China’s access to U.S. technology in order to contain the country’s rapid technological development. It is an effort to use American economic power to maintain US hegemony by limiting the operation of Chinese companies on the US soil, especially in the high-tech industries. At first glance, the bill seems to have been passed smoothly with a bipartisan support in Congress and with the full approval of the legislative branch, both of which came to take increasingly hardline stance toward China. They did so without being pushed by the public opinion or economic interests of their constituencies. This can be interpreted as a case in which policymakers came together to exercise economic statecraft in order to protect “national interest” in the face of the rising China threat, as Neorealism predicts.

However, a close examination of the preferences and motives of each actor involved in the policymaking process reveals that the U.S. hardline policy toward China on inward investment was based on a combination of various motives and conditions. As there exists no firm consensus within the U.S. authority on detailed goals, it is highly likely that China’s actions or changes in the U.S. economic situation will lead to a loss of policy unity. It also shows the fundamental weakness of the foundation of economic statecraft, as economic policies usually involve a wide range of interests and preferences.

In the long run, the strengthening of regulations on foreign investment could weaken the U.S. economic power, which is the base of its hegemony. Therefore, the case of regulations on inward investment also highlights such double-edged nature of economic statecraft: overuse of economic power can undermine the very source of power.

　Recently in China, it has often occurred that nationalism grows in the internet space. It was found in not only anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005 but also patriotism movements of the United States and France. It is said that factors on the linkage between collective memories and the identity is explained with three perspectives of primitive, constructivism and instrumental. However, the internet nationalism in China cannot be fully explained by that. In this paper, the internet nationalism of China is demonstrated from the socio-psychological aspect, covering the cases of “Yellow Ribbon” Campaign, “Hongke” the hacker collective and the anti-Japan sentiment.

Ever since the end of Cold War, the US administration has selected the trade policies that place importance on “engagement” rather than “containment” in terms of economic relations toward China, while having a number of problems with China. However, the Trump Administration sees China as growing threats to the US, as a result, it shifted policy from “engagement” to containment”. In particular, the US–China trade friction was escalated following the announcement of the launch of sanctions against China under Article 301 of the U.S. Trade Law on March 2018, which approves imposing tariffs on Chinese products. Based on the policy making process of trade policy in the US, this paper try to analyze about how has the US trade policy changed and what was the factor for explaining this change. This article concluded the actors involved in the policy making processes has had a major impact on the shift of trade policy toward China.

This article is an attempt to discuss and explore the evolution and transformation of American foreign policy over the last 120 years while illustrating the unfolding of America-led open-democratic international order.

Emerging from the Spanish-American War as a world power, the United States chose to embrace Woodrow Wilson’s conception of internationalism over Theodore Roosevelt’s internationalist perspective as the fundamental tenet of foreign policy. Wilson put forward a set of ideas which came to be called American liberal internationalism, and successfully led the US into war to make the world safe for democracy. Although Wilson failed to convince the Senate to agree on his plan for a League of Nations, he bequeathed an enduring legacy for generations to come. Next to Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt was the most pivotal figure in promoting the liberal international order. He was politically and diplomatically skillful in crafting many of the core institutions such as the UN, IMF, and the World Bank. In doing so, importantly, Roosevelt won the bipartisan cooperation. Following the end of World War II, Soviet-American rivalry gave way to the start of the cold war. This new international situation deepened the Wilsonian diplomatic impulse to construct a liberal international order. The US embarked on the containment policy of providing its allies in Europe and Asia-Pacific with massive economic aid as well as military protection, thus breaking the tradition of avoiding the foreign military entanglement. While sporadically voices were raised against containment either by prominent Republicans or Democrats, the two parties were in broad agreement on maintaining and advancing the US-led international order.

With the end of the cold war, however, the American people decisively turned inward and grew disinterested in foreign affairs; the post-cold war recession had only strengthened an isolationist inclination. Bill Clinton, prioritizing economic interests over geopolitical interests, actively pursued a policy of economic globalization, The two major wars in the Middle East which the US conducted in the wake of 9/11 turned out a costly distraction for American foreign policy; without them, the US could have harnessed more resources to confront an increasingly aggressive Russia and an assertive China. Donald Trump’s successful run in 2016 and his America First agenda exploited rising political anger and economic frustration among voters who felt disconnected with the policy elites. Although Trump was denied a second term, his foreign policy undermined the Western alliance, America’s standing abroad and the liberal international order. Before Joe Biden who assumed office in 2021 could reaffirm the international leadership, he faces an uphill battle at home in rebuilding broad support of internationalism. When the US has its hands full taking care of its own domestic problems, the prospect for the liberal international order which has relied so much on American role of global leadership is daunting.