In February 1953, President Eisenhower told Congress and the world that the United States would continue to defend Taiwan against invasion from Communist China but would give Nationalist China freedom to take aggressive action against the mainland. After this so-called “unleash” declaration, the Administration told Nationalist China not to act without concurrence of the US, and at the same time began to reassess China policy to make a new hard-line. Planning of new policy was finished in NSC166 and NSC146 in 1953 and revised in NSC5429 in next year.
The objective of new policy was to “reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking war”. Obviously, the new policy was more agreesive than that of Truman Administration. For reducing the power of Communist China, Eisenhower Administration decided to encourage and assist Nationalist China to raid the mainland and attack its merchant shipping. To justify this action the Administration thought it would be wise and declared that the Nationalist Government is the only Chinese Government and the war between the Nationalist and the Communist being a civil war, was not a threat to international peace. This meant the new policy was aggressive but a ‘one China’ policy.
But as the first Taiwan Strait crisis occured in autumn 1954, Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles found they were in a difficult situation. If they continue to assist the Nationalist aggressively, they would have to enter the war against Communist China. If not, they should admit that Nationalist China is actually a government of China but not the only government. Dulles said to NSC it is unwise to go into the war for some small islands, the ‘two Chinas’ policy would be better than the hard-line, because with this policy the US can commit itself only to Taiwan and the Pescadores and not to small islands near to the mainland. Taiwan is not a part of China, Dulles said, an ultimate outcome would be the independence of Taiwan and the Communist China might agree to it in the future. Dulles suggested and the NSC agreed that the US take the situation to the UN Security Council, on the ground that the war between Communist China and Nationalist China was not purely a civil war, Communist China's action being a threat to international peace. At the same time, NSC decided to conclude a mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China that would be applicable only to Taiwan and Pescadores.
Nationalist China welcomed the mutual defense treaty. Actually they had asked the US to conclude such a treaty many times before even after Dulles had rejected their suggestion. But when they asked for the treaty they did not forget that they were ‘Nationalists’, they stressed that they were the government of China and against any ‘two Chinas’ policy.
The US-Nationalist mutual defense treaty was concluded in December 1954. Dulles thought the treaty was a step to divide Taiwan from China and independence of Taiwan which would be in the interest of the US.
The traditional China policy of the US was not to divide China. In the Cold War the US decided to divide China because they believed it was the best method to prevent Taiwan from falling into the Communist's hands. But ‘two Chinas’ policy was not confined to the Cold War. Even after the Cold War ended, ‘one China or two Chinas’ is and will continue to be the most difficult problem in Sino-American relations.

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Syunkinsyo, one of Tanizaki’s masterpieces, has several Chinese versions. However, its translation was rarely mentioned in northeastern China. From 1939 to 1940, Mu Rugai translated the novel into a serial story and published it in Shengjing Times. In 1942, the translated version was published in book form by YiWen Publishing House. Mu’s two versions mainly differ in notes. Thus this article analyzes the relation between different types of media and notes by comparing the notes in the two Chinese versions, and aims to discuss the effects of translator’s notes on the acceptance of the novel.

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This paper discusses norms of interpreters’ awareness working for Japanese companies in China, focusing specifically on their responses to communication conflicts. Based on a questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews, the study analyzes the interpreters’ behaviors when communication conflicts occur, by applying Chesterman’s (1997) theory. The survey and interviews results reveal that interpreters make efforts to avoid conflicts and make the communication smooth under the influence of “the communication norm” (strongly) and “the accountability norm”. Meanwhile, “the relation norm” has less effect. The study suggests that interpreters’ action is partly governed by norms, though their identity as an interpreter as well as an employee of a company, also influence their interpreting behaviors.

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According to Gideon Toury’s Descriptive Translation Studies, this paper based on society and literature system of target culture focuses on translation strategies and translation norms explored in two different Chinese versions of Tanizaki Junichiro’s Syunkinsyo. One of them is Mu rugai’s work (1939) published in the Manchuria which was occupied and controlled in Japanese Assimilationism Policies and Thought. Another was translated by Zheng minqin (2007) under the background of globalization including well-balanced development in society, culture and economy, and frequent intercourse between China and Japan. In conclusion, different translation strategies and translation norms have used in two Chinese versions through comparing Chinese characters and locutions. Mu rugai’s work employs literal translation and accord with source norms. Zheng minqin’s translation makes use of free translation which is subscription to norms originating in the target culture.

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The Japanese Formula is a diplomatic framework conceived in the Cold War era to solve the “two-China Dilemma.” The aim was to create a framework that would permit substantial relations with a derecognized China, in addition to a formal diplomatic relationship with a recognized China. In relations with the derecognized China, actors were non-governmental and could only develop economic, cultural, and other private relations within a non-political sphere. In order to cultivate non-governmental relations with the derecognized China, nations mutually exchanged permanent “unofficial” offices, an alternative to consular posts. This system was first explored hypothetically within the Sino-Japanese relations of the 1960s, and actually formulated during the 1972 Japan-PRC normalization, when Japan chose to recognize the PRC instead of the ROC and switched its diplomatic partnerships accordingly.
Within today's international community, this formula seems to be a sort of universal policy to solve the cross-strait controversy. It was not institutionally agreed upon nor produced at one specific stage in time. Instead, as it became more successful it propagated itself until it was generally accepted throughout the international community. Therefore, the Japanese Formula can be regarded as a long-term solution that allowed the creation of a new yet widely acceptable international habit, which has since become the convention in terms of conducting relations with the PRC and Taiwan. More importantly, also it creates a sub-rule which supports norms such as “One China” or “peace in the cross strait.” Either way, the Japanese Formula has realistically secured the existence of Taiwan through the use of a universally applicable diplomatic technique.
This article first explains the concept of the Japanese Formula with theoretical interpretations and historical backgrounds. Then it traces the spread of the “Japanese formula” among Asia-Pacific nations in the 1970s. Additionally, it introduces several case studies of Asia-Pacific countries which adapted the Japanese Formula. Each case differs as to which actor or actors initiated the Japanese Formula. Japan invented the formula as part of the controversial Japan-ROC-PRC relations, and the PRC later demanded that the US adopt the formula. Three ASEAN nations (Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand) adopt the same formula as a result of the silent cooperation or the unconscious division of labor by both PRC and Taiwan. Finally, in contrast to the usual pattern of propagation, the PRC initially refused to adopt the formula with Australia, which eventually came to adopt it after undertaking long-term practical efforts with Taiwan.

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Regardless of its English translation “overseas Chinese,” this research note tackles the term “Kakyō,” by analysing the narratives of Chinese and Taiwanese residents in post-war Japan to re-examine the shifting categorisations and labels of “Kakyō.” These shifting categorisations and labels of the so-called “Kakyō” are manifestly flimsy and incoherent in the pre-existing academic writings or works, when it comes to associations supporting the Taiwanese authorities or the peoples from Taiwan. This is because the researchers or writers tend to use “Kakyō” to refer to the Taiwanese people they coped with despite the recent growth of “Taiwanese identity” or the changing recognition of Taiwan’s independence. Undoubtedly, there is an increase of the researches that reposition Taiwan. However, to proclaim that these researches have shared a similar recognition under the Japanese context is far from being satisfactory, and it has turned out to be a convolution. Hence, being conscious of this convolution, this research note is an attempt to retrieve the narratives of “Kakyō,” especially by looking at how Taiwanese residents have been represented as varied categorisations and labels of “Kakyō” in post-war Japan.

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Translation and reception of literary works are generally influenced and restricted by the socio-cultural background and literary norms existing in the target language country. Literary works are usually translated in conformance to the ideology of target language country. Meanwhile there also has been different evaluations in accordance with the socio-cultural background of target language country even if it is the same author or the same work. Tanizaki is a typical Japanese writer of the Aesthetic movement whose works have been translated and accepted in China during three periods. During 1928-1941, under the Shanghai Concession circumstances, much attention was given to the idiosyncrasy of Satanism that had a considerable influence on modern Chinese literature. After 1980, under the influence of left wing’s thought and disputes between politics and literature, Tanizaki was actually accepted as an antiwar writer; his aestheticism was analyzed because of its practical and pedagogical significance. After 1994, as China’s politics became relatively open, Tanizaki’s works were appreciated more favorably and the objective and literary concept of aestheticism was approved.

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This article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC).
In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (US), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s.
The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania.
After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle.
The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments. The PRC, based on its evaluation of the negotiations with France, decided not to adopt the same approach with other Western governments. Due to the influence of the US the PRC could not break through other Western governments' policies toward the PRC and the ROC. However, the leaders of the PRC strategically approached Western governments regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations. They could not make any careless concessions concerning the “One-China” principle, because each negotiation would influence future negotiations with the US, which were most important.

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Views on the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy have dramatically changed in a decade. In the field of the Sino-American relationship, many scholars explored voluminous materials and revealed that Eisenhower-Dulles's China policy was, contrary to our common understanding, not so obstinate or stubborn. Such scholars are now called the Eisenhower revisionists.
The Eisenhower revisionists indicate various facts which exemplify the administration's flexibility on its China policy. Their remarks can be summarized into two points: despite the Korean War or the Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles continued to pursue the Sino-Soviet split: Dulles also tried to work out the “Two China” formula and even conceived of Beijing's entrance into the United Nations. However, the Eisenhower revisionists do not succeed in explaining why the U. S. -Chinese relationship was not improved during this period, which is the major problem of their arguments.
The revisionists tend to regard the Sino-Soviet split as premise of the Sino-American accommodation, which seems somewhat naive. If the Sino-American relationship was a dependent variable of the U. S. -Soviet relations, the Sino-Soviet split may cause the Sino-American rapprochement, but this was not true. The relationship between the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American accommodation is not so self explanatory as the revisionists' assumption. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Dulles had a flexible policy on China, because he had a sophisticated view on the Sino-Soviet relations.
The other problem is that Dulles might consider some sort of the “Two China” formula, but he never thought of this scheme as a means of negotiation. His basic China policy remained to keep the maximum pressure on China in order to change its course. Once he said, “the U. S. could possibly recognize Communist China at some future time, but as long as Communist China is so bitterly hostile to us, we do not want to enhance its prestige”. Even if he had such a novel idea as the “Two China” policy in mind, the circumstances did not allow him to carry it out.
After the Geneva Conference of 1954, China enhanced its position in international society, especially in Asia. In this situation, the United States feared not only the expansion of communism but also the spreading of anti-Western sentiment in Asia. The U. S. thought China could strengthen this feeling through its anti-impelialist rhetoric. China became a regional threat to the U. S., which was, to some extent, independent of the Soviet or the communist threat. This was one of the main reasons why the U. S. -Cheinese relationship remained hostile, while detente between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. was in progress.

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