The aim of the present article is to reexamine Japan's policy regarding international investment loans to China made during the premiership of Terauchi Masatake (1916-18), by focusing the analysis on the approach proposed by Finance Minister Shoda Kazue and the relationship between the Terauchi Cabinet and the China investment consortium. The research to date has tended to focus attention on the aspect of the imperialistic international financial aspect of the eight loans totalling 145 million yen lent to the Duan Qirui (段祺端) government through Terauchi's personal secretary Nishihara Kamezo, the united front put up by Terauchi, Shoda and Nishihara, known as the "Korean Group" (朝鮮組), and the role played by the "unofficial" Sino-Japanese network formed by Nishihara. In particular, the work focusing on the historical development of Japanese capitalism has pointed to the Nishihara loans as the event marking a transition from a unified Korean-Manchurian monetary policy to the formation of a Japan-Manchuria-China monetary bloc (the gold-backed yen bloc), but has yet to 1) sufficiently analyze Shoda's specific ideas regarding investment loans to China and 2) place the funds earmarked to finance the second wave of Chinese political reforms within the Terauchi Cabinet's overall investment loan policy. The author's reexamination brings to light three new facts. First, while emphasizing the "unification of Korean-Manchurian monetary affairs", Shoda also promoted a policy of investment lending on the "Chine proper" involving not only existing institutions there, but also the founding of a new Japan-China joint venture bank. Secondly, the large scale loans that the Terauchi Cabinet began granting beginning in March 1918 should be considered as part of a two-pronged policy for regulating domestic specie combined with strengthening and expanding Japanese interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and the Shandong Peninsula. Finally, Shoda was by no means critical of China's August 1918 gold certificate regulations promoted by Nishihara; however, he was not enthusiastic about the necessity of having to export domestic specie. The author also identifies differences in the policy approaches taken by Shoda and Nishihara. Nishihara's refusal to recognize a Chinese fiscal management mechanism based on the international investment consortium in favor of a Chinese government enjoying "amicable relations with Japan" contrasted with Shoda's official position as Finance Minister emphasizing the necessity of "Sino-Japanese friendship" in combination with "US-Japanese cooperation". Because Shoda believed in the existence of investment loan contracts that would not contradict "US-Japanese cooperation", the contracts concluded during its administration were bound to follow the precedents set by the preceding Hara Takashi Cabinet. Consequently, Shoda Kazue's policy approach can be characterized as aiming at 1) the unification of Korean-Manchurian monetary affairs, 2) solving domestic Japanese economic issues and 3) strengthening and expanding Japanese interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shandong, all based on the assumption that economic cooperation with China was critical to the development of Japan's post-World War I economy. The "Korean Group" notwithstanding, the author argues, there were significant differences among its members regarding what was to be done concerning the "Chine proper".

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本稿の目的は,1912年の北京政府成立から1935年の幣制改革に至るまでの時期を対象に,天津の市中銀行の銀行券の発行がどのように展開されていたかを分析することを通して,幣制改革の全国的な成功の要因を再考することである。北京政府期の銀行券の統一は,中央銀行としての機能が期待された中国銀行,交通銀行の銀行券が2度の大きな取り付けにあったことで頓挫し,多数の市中銀行が独自の銀行券を発行するようになる。その中で華北最大の市中銀行である北四行は,合同で四行準備庫を形成,法律よりもはるかに堅実な独自の規定に従って中南銀行券を発行し,天津の市中銀行の銀行券の大部分を占めるようになった。四行準備庫は,1927年11月に独自に保証準備を取り入れて後,上海での発行額が大幅に増加し,幣制改革を主導した上海の動向の及びやすい状態が形成されることとなった。四行準備庫のこれらの動向は,国民政府の統治や金融政策,アメリカの銀購買政策などの外部要因とは異なる局面で,幣制改革の全国的な成功の素地が出来ていたことを示唆するものである。

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The end of this paper is the examination of the capital exporting activities of the Taiwan Bank to China from 1900 to 1916. The loans made by Taiwan Bank with its own funds were paid special attention. Because it makes what the Taiwan Bank itself was seeking clearer. The individual loans of the Taiwan Bank for that period were characterized by the "locality" that focussed on Fukien province and Kwangtung province and the "politicality" that concentrated on the political loan. That is to say, the Taiwan Bank intended to engage the finance of local governments by means of the political loans and to expand the zone of circulation for Yen-GinQapanese silver coin)and D/D that reserved by it, and finally to establish the hegemony of the financial control of the south China. But the activities of capital export of the Taiwan Bank were a little earlier on account of the role of the special bank, so it had weakness of financing capacity. As a result, the Taiwan Bank had followed the national policy to control the China in some cases, but had given priority to the management of it in other cases. And the shortage of economic rationality of its loans caused bad debts influenced by Hsin-hai ko-ming(Hsin-hai revolution). Consequently the Taiwan Bank could not establish the financial control of the south China though it had intended to at first. And the strategy to expand of the political and economic control to the south China was unsuccessful at the first stage.

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