Among the numerous historical conflicts in the middle of the 20th century in East Asian societies, the present study focuses on the Battle of Okinawa (Japan) and the Jeju April 3 Events (South Korea) as two representatives of slaughter and infringementof human rights committed by national governments. Given the massive number of abnormal deaths in the two cases - in particular the deaths of civilians who did not have any relation with the nation - this study discusses how their deaths have actually been dealt with. As a strategy to overcome the past, the governments of Japan and South Korea established laws such as the ‘Act for the Relief of War Victims and Survivors’ (Japan), and the ‘The Special Act for Investigation of the Jeju April 3Incident and Recovering the Honor of Victims’ (South Korea), and then applied them respectively to the case of Okinawa and to that of Jeju. In accordance with these laws and institutions, the Japanese and South Korean national governments judged the dead, and pronounced selected people to be ‘officially-recognized dead’. In the case of Japan, only those civilians who were recognized as actively involved in combat in Okinawa were pronounced, under the ‘Act on the Relief of War Victims and Survivors’, to be combat participants, while in the case of South Korea, only those civilians on Jeju Island who, so to speak, did not discredit the national identity were regarded as victims under the ‘4/3Special Act’.　Meanwhile, apart from those processes in the public sphere, ascription of meaning to death is also carried out in the life-world. It is conducted according to the convenience, needs, and initiative of people who at times accept or resist the enforcement power and order that attempt to integrate the meaning of death into the justification of the nation in the post-conflict society. It means that through the logic of the life-world, they redefine the dead who are related to them.

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For a long time, a majority of people have thought that the military would attempt a coup d'etat in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea due to the widespread economic deterioration in the past, and the fact that the domestic economy has seen some recent improvement makes this event more unlikely at present.
Why haven't a group of officers within the Korean People's Army attempted a coup d'etat? In this research, I provide three key reasons that explain why, even during three crisis periods involving major politico-military purges, this has not happened.
Chiefly these were: entrenched clique competition in the military; the existence of an organization that can oppose the armed forces; and a systemic and purposeful division of the military. I have confirmed through this research that the system that has divided the military still exists in the army, a system controlled effectively by a senior commissar. Therefore, this research concludes that the possibility of a coup d'etat occurring is low even in the present D. P. R. K.

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This paper studies the movement to institute the “Democratic Base” in North Korea under the Soviet Forces after World War II. It intends to show that this movement was a particular developed form of the Korean Communist Movement defined as the “Movement for National Liberation”, which tried to surmount the Cold War by establishing a sovereign state with a united government over the whole Korean peninsula.
Originally the Korean Communist Movement developed as the Movement for National Liberation in order to end Japanese colonial rule and establish an independent nation. From this movement some parties emerged to assume leadership when Korea was liberated by the forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. This post-liberation leadership tried to surmount the special difficulties of the divided occupation and form a united government with Korean sovereignty.
But the two super powers began to establish separate regimes following theoir intentions in each occupational area with the progress of the Cold War. The American army of occupation in South Korea suppressed the left elements under the influence of the Korean Communist Party and backed the right wing nationalistic elements such as Syng-man Rhee. By contrast the Soviets gave the Koreans the right of self-administration on the surface and pretended not to prevent them from governing their inner politics, but in reality Soviet policy pursued a “divide and rule” policy from the early stages of occupation. The Soviet Army of occupation in North Korea contrived to win the nationalist elements over to its side through the so-called “united front” policy, which was also used in Eastern Europe as “People's Democracy”. Behind the “united front” the Soviet Army had the communist parties follow its instructions and promoted Kim Il-sung to take the initiative and found a Party in the northern area only. After the famous “Trusteeship Imbroglio” the Soviet Army formed a political power headed by Kim Il-sung. With the development of the Cold War, Soviet style socioeconomic reforms were carried out by Kim Il-sung from 1946 only in the north. These policies by the two super powers finally gave birth to the crisis of a civil war between their client states.
In this difficult environment the most urgent problem for the Koreans was to escape such a war and form a united independent government over all of Korea. The assertion of the “Democratic Base” as a resolution of this problem was raised first by Kim Tu-bong, the president of the “Korean New Democratic Party” founded in February 1946, not Kim Il-sung, who has been thought to be its first advocate. Kim Tu-bong formally proposed the idea at the inaugural assembly of the “North Korean Worker's Party” in August 1946.
Kim Tu-bong was a prominent intellectual leader of the anti-Japanese independent movement by the “Korean Voluntary Army” centering around Yenan with close connections to the Chinese Communist Party. His idea and plan for establishing the “Democratic Base” was an application of his experiences in Yenan to North Korea, that is, to institute first the same style “Democratic Base” in the northern area similar to the one founded by Mao Tse-tung in Yenan and then, as a second step, extend it from there to the south through the “National United Front” policy. Adapting this policy to the situation under the Soviet forces he tried to establish a united government over both areas under Korean sovereignty, a priority in the Korean Communist Movement from its inception in the anti-Japanese independent conflict.
Today, in the “post-Cold War” world with “the Grand Failure” of Communism, it is critical to consider the role that the “Democratic Base” played in the Movement for National Liberation in the history of the

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In this paper, I reflect on the correlation between the formation of Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and KIM Il-sung's maneuver to wage the Korean War. For a long time, it was believed that KWP was formed through the merging of South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP) and North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP) from June to July in 1949 with KIM Il-sung as the chairman of the Central Committee. However, new materials prove that the formation of KWP just meant the integration of the Central Committee of both KWPs and had a close connection with the tactical defferences between PAK Honyong, the top leader of SKWP, and KIM Il-sung who had been pointed out the leader of Korean Communist Movement by Stalin in 1946.
PAK pursued the overturn of Rhee Syng-man's regime by guerrilla conflict of SKWP in South Korea and tried to avoid the civil war between South and North regimes by appealing for a ‘peaceful unification plan’ which the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF) proposed. DFUF was established under PAK's initiative in June 1949. In this tactics it seems that SKWP and NKWP formed a ‘Joint Central Committee’ to manage activities of DFUF between June 28 and July 7 in 1949, when KIM Il-sung failed to take up the chairmanship of the Central Committee since the appeal of DFUF was not only one to withstand invasion of South Korea but also to contain KIM Il-sung's tactics. His tactics had dual purposes to achieve Korean unification and to seize the actual initiative of Korean Communist Movement with KIM's head position of KWP through advancing Korean People's Army into South Korea.
KIM opened up his tactics in a conversation with T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassadar to North Korea, in August 1949 after his agreement to the ‘peaceful unification plan’ of DFUF. Although in September 1949 the Central Committee of Soviet Communist Party rejected this military option and ordered KIM and PAK to develop the latter's tactics with alerting KWP to the intervention of U. S. forces into the civil war, KIM Il-sung made a use of an opportunity of the favorable turn of Sino-Soviet relation. Finally, KIM gained his end in January 1950 that Stalin allowed him to prepare to open the war on condition that Mao Tse-zung should agree with KIM's tactics. Before the agreement of Stalin and Mao to open the civil war in Korean Peninsula, PAK had no other choice but to cooperate with KIM's tactics. Therefore the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and KIM began a purging of KWP after failing to accomplish his purposes through the war.

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Chiheisen (1955) is the first collection of poetry by KIM Si-jong (1929-), a Korean resident in Japan writing poetry in Japanese. It consists of two parts. According to Kim, the second part is composed of what he calls “things more Korean than what foreigners could articulate in Japanese."

Kim used two poetic methods to change ‘things Korean' into ‘things more Korean.' Firstly, he used images closely related to Korea, such as Chima, Jindallae, and hometown scenery, not in the conceptual framework to arouse emotional feelings but in the context of reality. This unconventional method is derived from ONO Tōzaburō's Shiron (1947) that condemned traditional Japanese poetry and described that lyric poetry is ‘criticism', not ‘feelings'. Kim, who had admired Japanese poetry during the Japanese colonial rule, was greatly influenced by his work.

Secondly, Kim adapted some lines from modern Korean poetry into historical events such as the Massacre of Koreans during the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Korean War. Kim insists that modern Korean poetry was formed based on ‘Japanese naturalism as aesthetics' under the Japanese colonial rule. Moreover, some borrowings were taken in the way of dissimilating KIM So-un's Chōsen Shishū (1940, 1943, 1953, 1954), an anthology of modern Korean poetry translated into Japanese in the seven-five meter. Kim had been a devoted reader of Chōsen Shishū during the colonial period.

This paper will explore how ‘things more Korean' indicates decolonization of ‘things Korean' including Kim himself from ‘things Japanese.'

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In this paper, I uncovered the history of Zainichi Koren Art both in Kanto and Kansai district from 1945 to 1950s with interviews which amount to over 50 times. In the analysis, I discussed what an impetus for creating their art works was, when they met each other, what kind of curriculum of art education they chose and how they made the cultural exchange with Japanese artists. I emphasized that the study of Zainichi Korean Art History is late behind in comparison to the literary studies and others, and that we should reconsider their art works in our history.

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本稿は集団的自衛権が1945年から今日まで行使されたことがないのか検証することを目的とする。また、本稿は日本を取り巻く国際環境が刻々と変化し、従来の考え方が国際社会において通用しにくくなってきている今日、安全保障環境を憲法解釈というレンズを通して判断することは非常に重要であると考えたことを問題意識としている。

2015年に成立した安全保障関連法案は限定的な集団的自衛権の行使を認めるものであり、国際環境の変化を如実に示すものであった。この法案が審議されている間、国会近辺等では学生団体まで巻き込んだ反対運動が展開され、テレビや新聞もこれを大々的に喧伝した。この時に反対する勢力が口を揃えて言ったのはこれまで1人も戦死者を出していない自衛隊が集団的自衛権の行使容認によって戦死者が出るような組織になってしまうのではないかという危惧であった。

では、これまで、本当に戦後日本は集団的自衛権を一度も行使したことはなかったのであろうか。このことについて研究を始めた際、偶然、朝鮮戦争時に日本が朝鮮海域に「日本特別掃海隊」を派遣していたことを知った。そして、そこでは若い隊員が「戦死」していたのである。

朝鮮戦争はどのような経緯で始まり、どのような経過を辿ったかについて、国際環境や戦局を概観し、当時組織された国連軍がどのような状況にあり、日本の助けを必要としていたかについて考える。

そして、この戦争において日本は自国の領域内外においていかなる協力を行ったのか。占領期であったとはいえ、日本国憲法が施行されて5年経つ日本が行った協力について考える。日本が行った協力には現在の法制ではとても考えられないような協力を行っている場合もあり、これについては政治的判断以上の解釈を行うことは難しい。

その様々な協力を踏まえた上で、現在、日本国憲法下において国防任務にあたっている自衛隊の成立過程と変化してきた憲法解釈についても考え、どのような解釈が時代の変化とともに採られるようになってきたのかを併せて考える。

日本の憲法解釈の変遷に基づいて、PKO協力法、周辺事態法、イラク特措法、そして平和安全法制について、成立の経緯や歴史、当時の国際環境等を勘案し、述べていく。

そして最後に、日本の集団的自衛権行使を限定的ながら認めるという新しい憲法解釈が政治的判断を狭めるものであり、時代に適したものであるのか、そうでないのかについても判断する。

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