In the field of American diplomatic history, the 1930s is depicted as an era of isolationism. It is true that the United States did not actively engage in the international efforts to maintain both the Versailles system in Europe and the Washington system in the Asia-Pacific region. However, American diplomacy in the 1930s was neither dormant nor unproductive. It successfully fulfilled some important achievements in the Western Hemisphere by vigorously developing the so-called Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin American countries.

The architect of the Good Neighbor Policy was Sumner Welles, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs from 1933 to 1937 and Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943. Welles is also known for the central role he played in formulating the postwar plans of the State Department during the Second World War.

By using Welles’ private papers that previous studies rarely consult, this paper examines the kind of international order Welles sought to realize in the Western Hemisphere. Before Welles joined the Roosevelt administration in 1933, the United States had made military interventions in Latin American countries repeatedly and imposed high tariffs on their commodities. Welles observed that the military interventions settled political confusion in Latin American countries only temporarily and the high tariffs prevented them from achieving economic prosperity, which Welles regarded as the fundamental factor for a sustainable stability of the society. In addition, Welles thought that the military interventions and the high tariffs induced Latin American enmity toward the United States, making it difficult for Washington to make the Western Hemisphere the solid foundation supporting American leadership in the world.

Based on those observations, this paper argues, Welles tried to modify the American tariff policy and establish an inter-American conference system to manage internal and external threats to the American republics. In other words, Welles sought to create a new hemispheric order characterized by two principles: promotion of trade and joint action to keep peace in the region. Welles’ endeavors were successful and enabled the Western Hemisphere to have, in Welles’ words, “the most advanced, and at the same time the most practical, form of regional system” in the world. This paper concludes that the hemispheric system not only supported the American war efforts during the Second World War but also impacted the postwar visions created by Welles and his group as a model that other regions should follow.

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There was a remarkable power shift in international politics from the end of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century. The rising states in different regions—Japan in East Asia, the Unites States in the Americas, and Germany in Europe—began to displace in various ways British hegemony worldwide. Following the basic logic of the power transition theory, the world at the time was in an unstable condition in which Japan, the United States, and Germany, as a dissatisfied and non-status quo rising power, sought to change the existing international and especially regional order.

The purpose of this paper, which focuses on Japan and the United States as emerging powers in this era, is to make it clear how the orders of two regions, East Asia and the Americas, although geographically separated, evolved by interacting with each other through the Monroe Doctrine’s functions.

The Monroe Doctrine was originally pronounced in 1823 by U.S. President James Monroe, who declared the principle of mutual non-intervention between the Americas and Europe, eventually becoming a longstanding tenet of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, around the turn of the century, the doctrine, by functioning as an ideational mechanism that legitimized American leadership in the Americas, contributed to a “peaceful” power or hegemonic transition in the region between Great Britain and the U.S. On the other hand, this American doctrine was applied beyond the Asia-Pacific to East Asia, as an idea that could sanction Japanese domination over the region symbolized by the proposal of a “Japanese” Monroe Doctrine by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905. However, the efforts of seeking the Japanese Monroe Doctrine ultimately resulted in the failure of a peaceful power transition in East Asia, despite or because of the use of the Monroe Doctrine.

There are a number of preceding studies, mostly using a historical approach, on the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, few studies explore the synchronic developments of the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, which interconnected the regional order already in process in East Asia and the Americas,from the viewpoint conceptualizing the doctrines as ideas of legitimizing regional hegemony. Furthermore, this paper, highlighting the workings of an ideational factor, the (Japanese) Monroe Doctrine, in the rise of Japan and the rise of the United States, provides a perspective different from the traditional power transition theory that focuses on material power. It can also be said that revisiting the past of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine offers an implication for contemporary international politics in East Asia, which face a new power shift and the possibility of a “Chinese” Monroe Doctrine.

This paper examines (1) the rise of the U.S. and the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas from the late 19th century to the early 20th century; (2) the rise of Japan and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine in East Asia from 1900 to the 1910s; and (3) the development of the Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and East Asia from the 1920s to the 1930s.

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The end of the Cold War, taken as the “victory of liberal values and the United States,” led to the revival of scholarly and practical interest in Woodrow Wilson, who symbolized the liberal tradition of American foreign policy based on democracy, free trade, multilateralism. This article focuses on the liberal interventionism–policies and ideas of protecting or promoting human rights and democracy in other countries by military interventions—that (re-)emerged, along with Wilsonianism, after the Cold War ended.

It is common to call the post-Cold War liberal interventions “humanitarian intervention (HI)” or “responsibility to protect (R2P),” because they seem to have the protection of human rights, rather than democratization, as their mission. This is the reason why very few contemporary scholars and proponents of HI and R2P have paid attention to Wilsonianism or Wilson’s liberal interventionism. On the other hand, one of the components of Wilsonianism is the spread of democracy or liberal democratic internationalization by intervention, rather than the protection of human rights by intervention. However, Wilsonianism was often alluded to, especially in the debates on American foreign policy, when the United States, having become the sole superpower in the world after winning the cold war, began to engage in liberal interventions (mainly called HI or R2P). The characterization of these interventions as Wilsonian was not necessarily misguided, because it was very rare that these interventions pursued only human rights or civilian protection, and overlooked democratization in the target country. Above all, the Iraq war, which was started in 2003 by George W. Bush and justified in terms of promoting democracy and human rights, as well as addressing threats emanating from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and its support of terrorism, represented the complex nature of contemporary liberal interventionism; thus, its justification generated much controversy among not only HI/R2P supporters, but also Wilsonian scholars.

The purpose of this article is to reexamine Wilson’s (original) liberal interventionism—his interventionist policies in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the 1910s—by considering its association with HI/R2P in the post-Cold War era, and its significance and implications for contemporary liberal interventionism. First, I will highlight the similarities and differences between Wilson’s liberal interventionism and HI/R2P in terms of the forms of intervention (unilateral or multilateral) and their main purpose. Second, I will demonstrate how proponents of HI/R2P and Wilsonian scholars, who believed that Bush’s wrong justification for the Iraq war tainted HI/R2P and Wilsonianism and wanted to revive their liberal interventionist projects, respectively, attempted to decouple their genuine and legitimate liberal interventionism from Bush’s illegitimate intervention. Finally, I will indicate what we should really have learned from Wilson’s liberal interventionism by considering the aftermath of the Libyan intervention—so eagerly promoted by supporters of HI/R2P and Wilsonianism—in 2011.

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This paper clarifies the decisive role played by Latin-American “legal” regionalism in the 19th century in relativizing European international law and dismantling the European monopoly of the power to set international principles.

Simon Bolivar’s pan-Americanism in 1820’s is widely known as unsuccessful project for a political union of Latin American states. Actually, however, his project had two main pillars, the creation of a political union and that of “American public law,” and what was more important to the future world was the later. When Americas achieved their independence in 1810–20’s, the governing international principles were that of Vienna, agreed among European Powers and whose basic features were dynastic legitimacy and balance of power between monarchs. These principles were not compatible with the sovereign statehood of most of newly independent American states born in decolonial revolution and declared independence without recognition by ex-monarch. Nevertheless, those rules were considered as “European public law” or “European international law,” which was at that time mere synonym of “international law” governs the general relations between civilized nations. In this situation, Bolivar begun to pursue not only a union of Latin American states but also “American public law” which should be constituted by rules and principles that are different from that of Europe and suitable for America. Bolivar’s ideal American public law contains, e. g., popular legitimacy principle, denial of forcible intervention, obligatory peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality, etc.

The efforts of Latin American states to realize these ideal new norms continued throughout centuries. Certain of these norms have acquired universal approval, taking the place of old European originated norms. In the late 19th century, some Latin American scholars started to argue that the assumption of identity between “European international law” and “international law” was not appropriate any more asserting the existence of American international law and possible existence of other regional international laws. In the beginning of the 20th century, the existence of American international law was accepted in Europe with rise of social or objectivist legal thoughts and European regionalism. The modern academic assumption of the identity of “European international law” and “international law as the law of civilized nations” had disappeared in 30 years from 1880’s to 1910’s. Latin American legal pan-Americanism triggered this fundamental change of the conception of international law.

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The conflict that occurred between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1955 was resolved through the O. A. S. The process of resolution of this conflict seemed to be the same as that of the conflict between these two republics in 1948. But the international environment surrounding these two conflicts differed very much. Why on the surface did they seem to be the same?
There was a struggle between democracy and dictatorship in Central American and the Caribbean Basin area at that time. It was very difficult for the Eisenhower Administration to formulate and govern its' policies. Especially after the Guatemalan Crisis in 1954 when the intervention of the United States was very well known. In 1955, the Department of State under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had to take sides with and support the legitimate “liberal and democratic” government of Costs Rica in consideration of the world-wide reaction.
The conflict in 1955 showed the complicated structure of the international environment. In such an environment even the officials of superpowers including Secretary Dulles never have “free hands”. No one can dance alone in the world arena.

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