There are important controversies over the dynamics of the disarmament issue which have not yet been fully addressed. This study suggests a simple framework of analysis by applying an international regime perspective which helps to shed light on these controversies. The most basic assumption in this study is that the international disarmament regime, if it exists, cannot be understood if separated from a certain kind of great power coordination, however limited. From this assumption, the following three subconcepts of the regime are drawn: (1) clarification of the major power constellation of the regime, (2) formation of some particular issue which is commonly beneficial to all major members and also acceptable to other, minor members, (3) cognitive congruence or compatibility over the given issues among major members.
The findings drawn from an examination of the development of the disarmament issue after World War II by applying this framework are as follows: (1) by 1962, all three subconcepts indicated the existence of a regime in this issue-area. The norms or principles that the regime embodied shows that it is properly called an arms control, not a disarmament, regime. But at the same time, the arms control regime is not able to continue without satisfying, or at least pretending to satisfy, some requirements of disarmament norms. (2) after signing the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which symbolizes the foundation of the regime, this regime went into the next phase of developing and structuring which lasted until 1978. In this process, it has been suggested that two indispensable subregimes emerged. One subregime concerns the communication channel through which major members tried to confirm mutual commitment to avoidance of nuclear war, the other the device to institutionalize a hierarchical structure between major (nuclear) and minor (nonnuclear) members. In the early stage of the development process, while communicating rather vaguely their mutual commitment to nuclear war avoidance, major members established the devices of institutionalization. Immediately after that, the regime entered into a new stage of development in which major members tried to confirm their mutual commitment through direct adjustment of nuclear forces. This stage, it is suggested, might internalize new destabilizing factors in the core of the regime.
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