Throughout the Pre-war Showa period, Kazushige Ugaki (1868-1956) was regarded as a potential candidate for the Prime Minister. (In fact, in Showa 13 (1938) according to an imperial order he began to form a cabinet, but this soon failed due to opposition from the Army.) Very little research has been done on Ugaki during this period. In this work, using previously available documents as well as some new documents released by his family, the author analyzes Ugaki's views on foreign relations in the period centering on Showa 15 (1940). Through this analysis the author hopes to clarify Ugaki's position in the political world of the time. Here the author analyzes 3 points. The first is the relation between Ugaki and the arguments of Takao Saito, who was dismissed in Showa 15 (1940) from the House of Representatives after he criticized the government and army over the "China Affair". Second using the series of his written statements of opinion which he began to write in Showa 11 and thereafter frequently revised, the author analyses Ugaki's opinions about the policies he felt Japan should take towards the war in Europe. Third through these opinions to analyze his thoughts on racial competition. Through this analysis the following points were clarified. In opposition to the idealism expressed in Konoe's declaration of Showa 13 (1938), Ugaki viewing the "China Affair" from the standpoint of power politics, urged its quick resolution and so supported Saito. He also viewed the war in Europe from the standpoint of power politics ; the Soviet Union through its Non-aggression Pact supporting Germany, the United States standing on England's side and at some point being expected to join the war, where Japan remaining non-alligned and capable of playing an important role in international relations. Also he was strongly, opposed to acting ideologically in concert with Germany and Italy. (In this respect he was strongly opposed to Konoe's "New Order".) Finally although he was not ideologically opposed to Japanese expansion into the South, he vehemently warned that it would bring on strong American and English opposition. Because he feared that it might prove an opportunity for a coalition of Caucasian world powers, he was strongly opposed to the military argument of the time for southern expansion. (In the respect of fearing a coalition of Caucasian powers he had a strong resemblance to Aritomo Yamagata.) Because he held the above opinions, it was natural that he was the focus of the hopes of the conservative "status quo" faction, which was in opposition to the reformist faction centered in the military. In the early Showa period Ugaki had planned to form his power base on a coalition of the established parties and gain the reins of government, and even at this late point he had the support of "Genro", senior statesmen and the financial world, but by this time the "status quo" faction had lost power and not only was it unable to put Ugaki up for the Prime Minister position, but furthermore Ugaki himself seems not to have been capable to determine to actively make this faction his Foundation.

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Following the Armistice which concluded the First World War, there occurred a strong international trend toward anti-militarism, and in Japan, as well, public opinion toward military downsizing gained traction. On the other hand, since Japan had not participated significantly in the actual fighting during the War, the Army's equipment was now utterly outdated in comparison with the armies of Europe and the United States, and a call arose for the modernization of the Armed Forces. Given these conditions, in 1925 Minister of War Ugaki Kazushige reduced the Army's strength by four infantry divisions and used the budget funding so released to modernize its equipment, thus accomplishing disarmament and modernization in one stroke. His political position was strengthened through this so-called "Ugaki Drawdown", and he was touted to be a promising candidate for Prime Minister. In 1925, returning to the post of minister of war in Hamaguchi Osachi's cabinet, Ugaki embarked on a second round of military reforms, which like his first arms reduction plan, aimed at disarmament combined with modernization. However, the plan ran aground after meeting fierce opposition from the General Staff, causing Ugaki to resign his position in the Cabinet. As to the question of why Ugaki's reform concept succeeded in the first arms reduction plan, but failed in the second, while the two plans have received considerable time and attention from researchers to date, they have focused mainly on each reform plan separately, and thus have had little success in clarifying the various factors which led to the success of one and the failure of the other. From this perspective, the author of the present paper compares the two reform plans on the basis of a sequential interrelationship, and attempts to clarify the various factors within and without the Army that destined each plan to success or failure, while examining the extent to which Ugaki and the General Staff were aware of those factors.

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The objective of the present article is to investigate the activities of the (Rikken-) Minsei Party (1927-1940) under Japan's national consensus governments of the 1930s, especially its extreme opposition to the claim that the will of the people was being usurped, leading to its refusal to form a government. To begin with, the author examines the process by which the Party decided upon a national consensus platform under the leadership of Wakatsuki Reijiro 若槻礼次郎. The Party's two main factions, led by Wakatsuki and Kawasaki Takukichi 川崎卓吉, respectively, reacted violently to the claim that that they had usurped the will of the people and chose to abandon any effort to form a partisan government. This claim came from the movement to reduce the sentences of the conspirators involved in the 15 May 1932 assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi by a group of young naval officers, which held the Minsei Party responsible for the London Arms Limitations Treaty of 1930. On the other hand, the opposition faction formed within the Party by Ugaki Kazushige and Tomita Kojiro 富田幸次郎 took charge of movements to activate the party politics within the Diet and promote cooperation between the public and private sectors in attempts to find a way to form a Minsei Party government. Then the discussion turns to the efforts by Ugaki to form a new party from within after Wakatsuki stepped down in August 1934, followed by a wavering in the Party's national consensus line, and finally the establishment of such a platform under the leadership of Machida Chuji 町田忠治. The new party movement ended in failure after Ugaki's refusal to stand for party chairman, resulting in the election of Machida. Then leadership of the public-private sector cooperation movement was assumed by Kawasaki, while Tomita abandoned efforts to form a government. The 19^<th> party elections of 1936 pitted Tomita's call for partisan politics against Machida and Kawasaki's appeal for national consensus, as the Machida-Kawasaki line emerged victorious, from which time on, the Minsei Party made no further effort to form a partisan government in the world of Japanese politics following the 26 February 1936 coup d'etat attempt.

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Kazue Yakushiji (1884-1965) was born in Okayama prefecture. He was an architect, an army technician and a company executive. He once even gave being a politician a try. Magosaburou Oohara, an influential entrepreneur, recognized Yakushiji's architectural talent and hired him to design various buildings. Yakushiji also designed many other buildings, such as the former head office of Chugoku Bank and many architectures in the Kurashiki Denken District.This study describes his architectonic activities and his great encounters with Keiji Gotou, Shizutarou Urabe, Shouichi Fugiki, and so forth. It also picks up Yakushiji's visit to Europe in 1922 where he met Le Corbusier.

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The Hamaguchi Cabinet which was formed in July of 1929 made fiscal retrenchment a major pillar in their political program. Ugaki Kazushige assumed the post of Army Minister, and Hamaguchi demanded wide scale reductions in army expenditures. In response to this, Ugaki found money for the consolidation of the army, and in addition to drawing up plans for finishing equipping the army, he tried to restore some of the unspent money to the National Treasury. This was the beginning of the army reroganization issue. However, Ugaki's ideas met resistance from the very beginning by members of the Army Ministry. This was because of the fear that curtailment of expenses meant disarmament. Or perhaps it was because they worried that this was but a tool of Ugaki's political ambition. Nevertheless, finishing equipping was necessary from the point of view of the army and gradually research and preparation for the reorganization of the army moved forward. There were, nevertheless, differences of opinion between the Army Ministry and the General Staff Office. Furthermore, while this plan was being considered, Ugaki fell ill. During his illness, Ugaki considered resigning but finally appointed a temporary substitute. Behind all of this was the government's reluctance to let Ugaki resign in the midst of the chaos over the London Conference. During this time, the preparations for the army reorganization proposal went forward, and according to financial retrenchment plans, a considerable amount in army expenditures was reduced. Ugaki returned to his post in December of 1930. At that time the only means left for him in terms of reorganizing the army was by concentrating on reducing the number of men in order to finish equipping the army. However, there was a great deal of resistance from within the Army Ministry and confusion over restoring money to the National Treasury. It was at this time that Hamaguchi was shot, and it was thought that Ugaki would serve as a substitute or as Hamaguchi's successor. However, neither came to pass, and Ugaki was not able to achieve his difficult goal of reorganizing the army within the narrow confines of the army budget. Instead, when the Hamaguchi Cabinet resigned, Ugaki too handed in his resignation. Thus, he did not have to execute the army reorganization plan which did not receive favorable comments from within the government and which was criticized by many members of the Army Ministry itself.

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The purpose of this study is to examine the public opinion for disarmament between World War I and World War II. This research analyzed editorials be connected with disarmament in the Jiji-Shinpo from 1920 to 1931 to observe how issues are emphasized in the mass media, adopted quantitative and qualitative content analysis. As a result of the analysis, it became apparent that theory of disarmament is difference in each time. To be concrete, disarmament of the army is related with political institution on the one hand, disarmament of the navy is related with international issues on the other.

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It is known well that in the early Showa period there were contentions between two factions of army officers; the Imperial Way Faction (Kohdoh-ha) and the Control Faction (Tohsei-ha). Nagata Tetsuzan was a leading figure of the Control Faction and Mazaki Jinzaburo, the other. Nagata sent letters to Mazaki. This paper introduces five of them in Mazaki Collection owned by Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room in National Diet Library.

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