日本の社債市場が大きく発展した1920年代には,朝鮮の植民地企業も鉄道業を中心に相次いで社債を発行する。こうした社債発行は鉄道金融の展開と新たな植民地投資を示していると言えよう。そこで本稿は,朝鮮鉄道会社を対象に,戦間期朝鮮における鉄道金融の展開過程とその意義を考察するとともに,この植民地投資の実態の一端を解明していく。朝鮮鉄道会社債(朝鉄債)の発行は,その引受機関である植民地銀行からの借入金を返済するものであった。これは,朝鮮銀行にとっては債権整理の一環であり,にとっては「産米増殖計画」関連融資の強化を結果する。1920年代後半には本国証券業者が朝鉄債の引受に進出するが,これは植民地銀行の鉄道金融からの後退と表裏をなすものであったと言える。このうち山一証券は発行企業との人的・資本的関係をもとに進出していく。また山一証券による第5回・第6回朝鉄債(28,29年発行)の売捌き先から,その投資実態は,財閥系金融機関及び広範な地域の地方金融機関と特徴付けられ,生損保と大都市の個人投資家がこれに加えられる。

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本稿は「産米増殖計画」期(1920〜34年)における(以下,殖銀と略記)の資金運用(朝鮮農業金融)と資金調達(日本植民地投資)の実証的検討をもとに,同行への大蔵省預金部による資金供給の意義を再検討することを課題とする。殖銀は1918年に農工銀行6行が合併して設立された特殊銀行であり,債券(殖産債)を発行して貸出原資を調達し,朝鮮内銀行貸付の過半を担った。その融資先構成では「産米増殖計画」関連の農業金融が中心で,無担保・長期の水利組合融資の比重が高かった。「産米増殖計画」は1926年に改められ,事業資金として預金部低利資金の供給が決まる。ただし実際には計画外の,昭和恐慌下で破綻に瀕した水利組合の救済により多く充当され,これにより殖銀は多額の債権の不良化を回避することができた。殖銀にとって預金部資金の供給は救済的な意義を持っていたのであった。またこれは同時に殖銀の資金源泉であった地方金融機関や財閥系金融機関,都市銀行,生保,個人投資家などの投資家層が,殖産債への投資リスクを肩代わりされたことを意味したと言える。

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This paper is based on empirical analysis of the application and effects of the Temporary Fund Control Law implemented by the Chosun Government-General from Oct. 1937 to the end of 1940. After the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Government- General began approving selected private investment plans by employing the Temporary Fund Control Law, in order to concentrate funds and materials in industries that had political priority. These were in particular import substitution industries and those industries named in the 'Productive Capacity Expansion Plan.' The Government-General itself supervised the progress of the approved businesses, in order to prevent the misuse of funds and facilities. However, implementation of the 'Material Mobilization Plan' throughout the Japanese Yen Bloc restricted the Government-General's capacity to issue these approvals, because of the difficulty of acquiring materials. Instead of aggressively seeking private investment, therefore, the Government-General was forced to become more conservative, basing its approvals on the candidate company's technical skills and potential for success. The approval results show that the funds were indeed concentrated in high-priority areas. An analysis of 'The Survey on the Business Results of Companies in Chosun' likewise shows that under the enforcement of the Fund Control Law, borrowing by those companies classified as leading industries increased more than the borrowing of those outside that classification. However, total bank loan data does not reveal the same concentration of funds, because only a small portion of total bank loans required approval under the Law. Borrowing by companies not classified as leading industries also increased even after the Law went into effect, and furthermore, there was an increase in the proportion of companies that were not subject to the regulations required for approval, and an increase in their capital as well. In sum, the Temporary Fund Control Law was enforced to control the funds, but its effects were restricted by the emerging circumstances.

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This paper considers the relationship between the soy‒sauce brewing industry and the regional characteristics of the Chikuho area of Fukuoka prefecture. In particular, the relationship between the soy‒sauce and coal‒mining industries is elucidated through an analysis of soy‒sauce manufacturing processes and the development of soy‒sauce sales channels in the area.

The Konomi family was both a brewer and a landlord in this region and offers a useful case study because of its connections with the coal‒mining industry as a landlord.

In the early 20^th century, the Konomi family began extensive improvements of its soy‒sauce brewing operations, a process it completed in the mid‒1910s with the manufacture and sale of a “high‒quality soy‒sauce.”

However, this “high‒quality soy‒sauce” was not popular among consumers at the time, and the new product did not lead to an increase in the Konomi family’s total sales. The reason for this was that the soy‒sauce did not suit consumer tastes. In other words, the improvements that had been sought did not conform to the direction being taken by the “high‒quality soy‒sauce” that was in demand in the market.

The World War I years brought soaring prices of raw materials, including soybeans and wheat, and most brewers accordingly raised their soy‒sauce prices. However, the Konomi brewery continued to keep its prices relatively low.

This choice was influenced by the demands made by coal miners during the 1918 “coal‒miners’ rice riots” for price cuts in daily necessities. The class of coal miners that bought “the highest quality soy‒sauce” tended to prefer a sweet and viscous variety like the double‒brewed soy‒sauce produced and consumed in northern Kyushu.

Konomi’s “high‒quality soy‒sauce” therefore met the demand of the coal miners, enabling the Konomi brewery to expand its operations.

This case suggests family’s that it was important for regional entrepreneurs to suit the commodities they produced to regional characteristics.

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This paper elucidates one of the characteristic features of Japanese colonial rule over Korea, focusing on capital flows between the two economies. First, an attempt is made to estimate how much and in what sector capital investments were made from Japan to Korea in each phase of the colonial period. Based on these estimates significant findings include the followings: 1) In the early phase of colonial rule the Government-General took the lead in capital investments from Japan in areas such as railroad construction and the implementation of plans for increasing rice production. However, private direct investments increased rapidly beginning in the 1930s mainly in manufacturing and electric power industry. This process speeded up the transformation of the Koran economy into an integral part of the Japanese one. 2) During the Pacific War the financial institutions of Korea rapidly increased their purchases of securities, most of which were issued by Japanese government. This suggests that the role of financial institutions as principal agents of capital import was now reversed. 3) The increase of both capital inflows and outflows during the war indicates merely the transfer of purchasing power, which was not allowed to be realized by compulsory deposit and investment regulation policies. The result was a reallocation of resouces in Korea for war-related purposes. An attempt is also made to show how Japan could accelerate capital export to her colony. This paper emphasizes the role played by 1) the Korean monetary system, in which her currency was pegged to the Japanese one at an equal rate of exchange and in which the issue of the former is allowed on the basis of the latter, and by 2) the almost total dependence of Korea's trade structure on Japan. These two factors enabled Japan to accelerate capital export to Korea in spite of the shortage of foreign exchange reserves, particularly under the managed currency system. This resulted in expanded equilibrium within the Japanese colonial empire, as long as Japan's productive capacity was expanding. However, when it reached its upper limits during the war, Japan's capital exports under the trade control led to inflation in Korea.

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The purpose of this paper is to show how industrialization of Korea in the 1930s was influenced by the preceding agricultural development plans for increasing rice production (1920-34). Until now the rapid industrialization has been explained mainly by Japan's armaments-expanding policy in the 1930s. However this paper emphasizes internal factors created in the process of agricultural transformation in the 1920s. On the one hand, increase in rice production and its export to Japan at relatively high price produced an enormous surplus in the agricultural sector. This, in turn, enabled Korea to increase imports of manufatured goods. Through the agricultural development and trade with Japan, Korean economy could rapidly expand markets for manufactured goods beyond her production capacity. Later this expansion stimulated new rise and growth of many small-scale factories owned by Koreans or Japanese residents in Korea. Also it induced private direct investments from Japan to the manufaturing industry in Korea. This process promoted import substitution for manufactured goods. On the other hand, most of agricultural surplus fell into the pockets of large landlords and merchants who took the lead in rice production and export under landlord-tenant system. In order to examine whether agricultural surplus remained within the agricultural sector or was transferred to other sectors, we made access to the available lists of large landlords and stockholders, and examined the relationship between them. The results of this examination revealed that a lot of landlords not only took actively part in stock investment, but also established their own companies in non-agricultural sectors. In case of the companies owned by Koreans, it is estimated that more than one third of their capital was invested by landlords and one forth of their owners were also landlords. In short, agricultural development in the 1920s provided favorable conditions for the industrialization in Korea in the next decade in terms of domestic market expansion and capital formation.

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　This paper analyzes how the Korean farmers responded to the changes of agricultural conditions, and as the results, how the route of rice sale changed. The object of study is cooperative sale of unhulled rice, the general form of farmers-selling rice in colonial Korea.

　Until the 1920s, most farmers sold the unhulled rice to rice merchants in their own home. But with the fall of rice price, farmers had to minimize the loss. So the cooperative sale and farmers' sale of their product through regional shopping centers appeared newly. In the 1930s, the Government-General's policy of distribution-rationalization, the operation of examination in unhulled rice, and the construction of storehouse for agricultural product, increased cooperative sale.

　The form, the price, the quantity, and the stratums of cooperative sale can be summed up as follows. (1) The organizer of cooperative sale was the Aricultural Association of Korea. And the customers were rice exporters or rice-cleaning millers. (2) The price of cooperative sale was higher than the market price by ¥0.5-1.0. (3) Rice sold in cooperative sale amounted to 8,205,000 tons in 1939. (4) Total number of farmers who joined to cooperative sale was 650,000 in 1939. And small-scale farmers also joined to that.

　In the 1920s, rice sales were dominated entirely-by the route of farmer/unmodernized landlord-broker-rice merchant-rice exporter or rice-cleaning miller, and modernized landlord-rice exporter or rice-cleaning miller. But in the 1930s, new route of farmer/landlord-organization for agriculture-rice exporter or rice-cleaning miller appeared and spread.

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