On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling one of the Kuomintang-held islands, Quemoy (Jinmen). The Eisenhower administration ordered the 7th Fleet to recommence patrolling the Taiwan Strait. It was the beginning of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. However the United States did not take a thoroughly pro-Taiwanese stand when the Crisis broke out. The U. S. faced, as Dulles put it, a “horrible dilemma” over the policy toward the Crisis. The Eisenhower administration felt that if the U. S. directly defended Quemoy and other offshore islands against China by force, it would have induced the outbreak of an US-China War, like the Korean War. On the other hand, if the U. S. overlooked Communist China's use of force in the Taiwan Strait, the so called anti-Communist countries defense line —which runs from the Aleutians through the Japanese Islands, South Korea, the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the Philippines, part of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand— would have been broken down by China, and furthermore, by the Soviet Union. However at the beginning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, no consensus existed in the U. S. Government about whether the offshore islands were substantially related to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands which the U. S. had made consistently clear to protect, after being informed of the deneutralization of Taiwan in 1950.
The Eisenhower administration decided to make a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. U. S. -Taiwan treaty negotiations began in November 1954. The U. S. considered that the purpose of the treaty was to bring about a cease fire, and to commit to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and other related territories, so as to create a deterrent to Chinese military action in the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the U. S. exercised effective control over Kuomintang offensive military operations, formalizing the understanding that without mutual consent, the Kuomintang would not take any offensive action which might provoke retaliation by China, leading to the invocation of the treaty.
On December 2, 1954, the U. S. signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The treaty required the U. S. and Taiwan to: (1) Maintain and develop “jointly by self-help and mutual aid” their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversion directed against them “from without, ” (2) Cooperate in economic development, (3) Consult on implementation of the treaty, and (4) Act to meet an armed attack “in the West Pacific area directed against the territories” of either the U. S. or the Republic of China, including Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, and “such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”
Mutual Defense Treaty Article VI specified that, in addition to Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the treaty would be applicable to “such other territories as may be determined by mutual consent.” In addition, Article VII gave the United States the right (by mutual consent) to deploy its armed forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands for the purpose of their defense. In a word, the treaty did not obligate the United States to protect the offshore islands, while still leaving it free to do so.

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Despite French President Charles de Gaulle’s harsh criticism of the American war in Vietnam since 1963, Paris was chosen as the venue for the peace talks between the US and North Vietnam, which finally started in the spring of 1968. Indeed, the US had developed a profound distrust of de Gaulle’s diplomacy, especially with regard to the Vietnam War, and a series of disputes had arisen between the two countries. Why, then, did the US accept Paris as host of the delicate peace negotiations?
In order to answer that question, this article sheds light on the Quai d’Orsay’s role in French diplomacy toward all of Indochina (the two Vietnams, Cambodia and Laos). Before de Gaulle’s first intervention in this policy area in the summer of 1963, the Quai d’Orsay had played a dominant role in peace diplomacy in war-torn Indochina. Its main goal was to protect France’s interests and influence in the region, especially in South Vietnam. To achieve this goal, it was essential to maintain Franco-American cooperation, which had gradually been established in this region after France’s withdrawal in 1954. On the other hand, de Gaulle had very little interest in these “insignificant” local interests, and used Indochina as just as one of the platforms for his worldwide strategy for “grandeur française” and a more equal partnership with the US. That is, the Quai d’Orsay’s Indochinese policy objectives were radically different from those of the President, and were in fact often seriously hampered by de Gaulle’s initiatives. This article will examine how the Quai d’Orsay’s diplomacy intertwined with the President’s to form what we used to see as “France’s policy” toward Indochina.
Based on French archival materials, the article describes the development of the Quai d’Orsay’s regional policy, then the President’s initiatives, designed to serve his global strategy. The Quai d’Orsay took an apparently “neocolonialist” stance, seeking to preserve France’s historical and privileged relations with Indochina, as it did with Black Africa, while maintaining Franco-American cooperation. In contrast, in spite of American opposition,the French President proposed a scheme of “Neutralization” for the entire Indochinese Peninsula, including Vietnam, and ardently praised nationalist movements in the Third World, expressing his support for the independence of each nation in Indochina.
Given these fundamental differences, why were there no apparent contradictions and fluctuations in French Indochinese policy during this period? This article’s analysis shows, first, that, despite all their divergences, the French President and the Quai d’Orsay shared a commitment to the key concept of “Neutralization”; the vagueness of this term allowed them to make successive and substantive policy shifts without any visible disruptions. Second, the French President could count on the Director of Asia-Oceania, Etienne Manac’h, for policy coordination in this area. The experienced professional diplomat was a convinced socialist, but he turned out to be a most faithful executor of de Gaulle’s world strategy in the region, managing to impose de Gaulle’s policy on reluctant diplomats both in Paris and in the field,specifically in the Indochinese Peninsula.

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The world in the 1950s witnessed the growth of peaceful coexistence, which was basically brought about by the drastic changes in the Soviet diplomatic postures. The two superpowers' accomodation, however, did not last for a long time. The Cold War tensions mounted once again soon, following the Soviets' launching of the first man-made satellite into space, the East-West collison over the status of Berlin, the successful revolution in Cuba, and the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane in Soviet territory.
During this short period of coexistence, the United States tried to use the given breathing spell for rebuilding the Western alliance. While relying upon the threat of massive retaliation to deter overt attacks by the Russians and the Chinese, the Eisenhower Administration sought a more efficient and less costly strategy of containment, the key to which was the collective security system to allow American allies to respond in local conflicts, as shown in the case of Indochina in 1954.
Fortifying the global American alliance network, with the greater emphasis in Asia and the Pacific regions, would be possible through bilateral security treaties with South Korea and Taiwan, multilateral arrangements in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and inclusion of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty. All these efforts were aimed at not only military but political and economic integration of America's allies, and the linkage of each integrated areas under American auspices, to secure maximum economic prosperity and political stability of the Free World. Expanding trade and investment, as well as American aid, were primary means for neutralizing the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the developing areas.
Secretary Dulles' firm belief in collective security and in economic integration, and his grave doubts as to the idea of national sovereignty, were also shared by President Eisenhower, and hence constituted the backbone of their New Look strategy. Yet they could find little sympathy among American allies toward their endeavor for an integrated and strengthened alliance. Nor was there any sufficient common understanding as to the Communist menace. America's allies were increasingly hostile to excessive pressures from the United States, and the Americans were irritatd by their allies' reluctance in cooperating with them in meeting challenges posed by the Soviet and the Chinese Communists.

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Indian diplomacy since that country’s independence in 1947 can be broadly divided into three phases: (1) a policy of non-alignment (from 1947 until the end of the 1960s); (2) alignment with the Soviet Union (from the 1970s until the end of the Cold War); (3) the post-Cold War phase of participation in multilateralism and the forging of closer links with the United States.
Although the Cold War environment had a considerable influence on India’s foreign policy, certain crucial factors, such as promotion of national interests and a constant desire to pursue an independent diplomacy, played a vital role in the evolution of that policy. The non-alignment policy was an upshot of that exercise, which India stuck to despite enormous external pressures.It essentially meant joining hands with those that shared this perception — this was the beginning of maintaining strategic partnerships — but India obviously looked at the Soviet Union more favorably than the United States. This in turn led Moscow to emerge as a strategic partner for New Delhi, which is the main characteristic of the second phase. It would be wrong to assume that India’s foreign policy was merely a dependent variable of the Cold War.
In the more recent and current phase, while taking an active participation in regional multilateral mechanisms, India’s endeavor appears to be to incorporate the United States as a strategic partner. Aside from mutual economic gains, shared concerns and interests, the rise of China seems to be instrumental in shaping the evolving India–US relationship.
In short, the Indian diplomacy can be characterized by the struggle to advance its national interests by balancing an independent foreign policy with the international politico-security environment. In this respect, India could be called the ‘France of Asia’. France shares certain values and interests with the United States but pursues its own autonomous policy. India looks like following this line until such time as it becomes a major power.

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