本研究は，核軍縮における人々の価値観および世論の構造の分析を目的とした調査データの収集とデータ分析のメタ・リサーチ・デザインをまとめたものである．核軍縮が停滞する国際社会において，外交以外の核軍縮を後押しする手段の模索は重要な課題である．国家の安全保障政策を変えるためには，

There seems to be a tendency that nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence have been treated as contradictory concepts. Those who have advocated nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the elimination of nuclear weapons, have claimed that the idea of nuclear deterrence has long been an obstacle for the further progress of nuclear disarmament. Likewise, promoters of nuclear deterrence consider the concept itself as an important mechanism to enhance international peace and security, and thus tend to neglect the idea of nuclear disarmament. In other words, the two concepts are on the opposite ends of the spectrum.

At the same time, it is also possible to point out that the concept of deterrence and disarmament have long been inseparable, and that the two have progressed in parallel with each other. In other words, the promotion of nuclear disarmament has, in some cases, reinforced the concept of nuclear deterrence.

In the early ages of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union experienced a period in which the two countries were contemplating the idea of a General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) with specific proposals for a treaty to initiate the concept. Both the United States and the Soviet Union craved for international support to let the world know that they were seriously thinking of how to ultimately avoid war. On the other hand, the two countries recognized from an early stage that it was nearly impossible to reach an agreement on GCD, and the two moved in the direction of a search for multilateral arms control agreements, resulting in the creation of the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Both the PTBT and the NPT contributed in securing the nuclear status of the already-nuclear possessing states at that time. The two treaties were attempts by the already-nuclear possessing states to dominate nuclear weapons, which were considered as signs that nuclear deterrence does matter in international politics. This prompted discontent among the nuclear threshold states, which eventually led them to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

The indefinite extension of the NPT, the creation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) were cases in which the importance of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence were more explicitly and implicitly advocated by countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. The TPNW which stigmatizes nuclear weapons made the gap between the so-called “deterrers” and “disarmers” even more solid. Moreover, it reminded the international community that not only countries that possess nuclear weapons but also countries that are under the nuclear umbrella regard nuclear deterrence too important to let go, even being accused of not being faithful to the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

There are two purposes of my research; firstly, to verify the nuclear weapons made under the Kim Jong Un regime and evaluate the regime’s survivability in terms of nuclear deterrence theory; secondly to assess the DPRK’s advanced nuclear weapons’ influence on the credibility of the US extended deterrence for Japan and the RoK from the perspective of nuclear deterrence theory. This verification process consists of three stages. First, since a new security environment has emerged due to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons capable of delivering H-bombs to US metropolitan cities, such as Washington D.C. and NYC, that can break through Missile Defense (MD), this research will review the development of its advanced nuclear weapons by both qualitative and quantitative methods by examining how the Kim Jong Un regime made the decision to accelerate its nuclear development and then put it into practice. Next, it will theoretically analyze its influences on the US extended deterrent, especially focusing on MD, for Japan and South Korea, while contemplating the clearly changing security environment that has been observed nowadays. Finally, it will aim to reform nuclear deterrence theory that does not seem to fully explain the extremely asymmetric deterrence relationship between the US and North Korea, and to consider the possible strategic alternatives for Japan and South Korea when it comes to the US extended deterrent whosecredibility has been decreased in terms of nuclear deterrence theory.

The most important theme for crisis management for a state is early termination of international crises which may escalate into a major war. During the Cold War era, which had been characterized by continuing nuclear arms race between the two Superpowers, prevention of nuclear war was the top priority of global peace. In responding to Soviet challenges such as the Berlin Crises, the United States exploited successfully deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence had been the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy.

In the Cold War era, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union reacted very cautiously to virtually all crises because they knew well that failure of deterrence meant mutual suicide. In the post-Cold War era, which is characterizes by multipolarity, strategic calculations of major powers are difficult to predict. As compared with the Cold War era, it is more difficult to maintain alliances in crises, because each country has different stake.

In recent years, repeated crises both at home and abroad has heightened Japanese awareness with the importance of crisis management. However, Japanese interest in crisis management has so far been narrowly limited to policy questions such as swift decision-making process in crisis. In light of the fact that Japanese defense policy continues to rely upon U.S. nuclear deterrence, it is imperative that Japan pay more attention to theoretical aspect of crisis management. Otherwise, Japan could not respond effectively to future international crises.

This paper deals with the continuities and changes in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy by asking the following question: has the basic notion of French strategy switched to the so-called “deterrence by denial” as opposed to “deterrence by punishment”? Some raised such question, by observing that France no longer insists on her nuclear weapons’ retaliatory capabilities, but underlines its arms’ precision as if they were to be used in counter-force operations. Such critiques do not make sense to others, because all deterrence capabilities should be or should at least look operational in order to be effective. And in a world where many countries are increasing their military invulnerabilities, the search for operational capabilities is a condition sine qua non to strengthen the deterrence.

In order to answer the above question, this article first traces the French nuclear strategy thinking from 1945 on, with a focus on the strategic quarrels, in 1960s, between Pierre Gallois and Raymond Aron. Aron was against Gallois’ nuclear weapons’ “equalizer” concept which made French nuclear deterrence oriented not only against Russians but also against Americans. These quarrels were more political than strategic. In fact, the Vth republic under De Gaulle promoted the notion of national independence based on Gallois’ concept on nuclear deterrence and rejected Aron’s preferences on France-US cooperative relations. The article then analyses how France’s independent nuclear policy found its righteousness as US-USSR condominium emerged during the Cold war. France was against US coexistence with the Soviets which would undermine its Ally’s national interest. The US-USSR condominium was sacred through Arms Control measures. Even Aron criticized the condominium by calling the SALT I agreement a US-USSR “Alliance”.

The second part of the article is devoted to the revision of France’s nuclear deterrence strategy in the post-Cold war era. It was especially under Jacques Chirac’s administration that France’s nuclear doctrine went through an important revision. The article uses presidential discourses, parliamentary discussions as well as ministerial internal documents such as “Horizon stratégique” in order to analyze how and why France had to review its nuclear deterrence strategy. The focus here is put on the notion of “counter-deterrence”. This notion is based on France’s recognition that France can no longer be on the side to deter but will be deterred by an emerging country in the post Cold war era. And it happens that these emerging countries are non-democratic countries marking the decline of the Occident.

This article concludes that continuities in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy remains essential whereas the changes are only apparent. The changes are nonetheless important because they confirm that today’s nuclear world order as two-folds (or disconnected between): global order between Russians and Americans; regional order among emerging nuclear countries including nuclear-capable Iran.

In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, people around the world faced the danger of nuclear holocaust. The US and the USSR, having acquired the hydrogen bombs, were developing the ballistic missiles such as ICBMs and SLBMs. Against the backdrop of the détente after Stalin’s death, the two nuclear powers were apparently stuck in nuclear stalemate. It, however, came into question if uncontrolled nuclear arms race would automatically lead to stable mutual deterrence between the two nations in view of the rapid technological evolution of their nuclear arsenals. How to manage the transition to stable mutual deterrence, thus, became a major issue of concern for such emerging fields of research as strategic and arms control studies in the US.

This article focuses on the Pugwash Conferences and the role that American scientists played in the transnational non-governmental organization’s pursuit of disarmament under such circumstances; it is also an attempt to reconsider the history of the nuclear age from transnational perspectives. The Pugwash Conferences was organized in 1957, to provide a forum for scientists from the East and the West to discuss issues concerned with peace and security of the world during the Cold War. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the major topic of discussion was disarmament. Especially the reduction of nuclear danger and the prevention of a nuclear war were considered to be urgent. By the time the first conference was convened, however, distrust between the East and the West was so deep that nuclear disarmament seemed to be infeasible both technically and politically. Scientists could not ignore the formidable reality.

In the early 1960s, minimum deterrence became one of the most contentious issues between American and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash conferences in relation to general and complete disarmament (GCD). Some American scientists, considering minimum deterrence as desirable and feasible to prevent a nuclear war and to restrain nuclear arms race in the interim, proposed disarmament schemes based on the concept. On the other hand, Soviet participants supported their government’s GCD proposal, opposing to nuclear deterrence intransigently. Although it was after the USSR’s concession to the West on GCD that Soviet scientists accepted minimum deterrence, American scientists helped create broad support for minimum deterrence by introducing it to and providing its logical and political foundations at the conferences.

Consequently, the Pugwash Conferences came to seek ways to live with nuclear weapons, while striving to ease distrust between the East and the West. In fact, the Pugwash Conferences supported American-Soviet collaboration to form and maintain a strategic arms control regime based on the concept of mutual assured destruction during the Cold War. Nevertheless, nuclear arms race did not stop under the security framework. This was a disappointment for many scientists who were involved in the Pugwash movement, though humankind survived the Cold War. After all, the nuclear age is far from over even today. Ironically, however, American scientists’intellectual struggle to pursue the challenging goals without yielding to despair would remain worth remembering, unless we are set free from the nuclear threats.