Dignāga denied that recollection (smṛti) as well as recognition (abhijñāna) are separate means of cognition (pramāṇāntara) in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In this regard, however, it is questioned whether recollection is not excluded from two means of cognition consisting of perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), or not any means of cognition. It is at least clear that recollection is not perception with the only exception that it is cognition of a recollection itself. On the other hand, recollection is similar to inference in terms of conceptual cognition.

Later commentators such as Jinendrabuddhi or Prajñākaragupta said that inference is nothing but recollection. Even if what Dignāga intended is the same as the interpretation of these commentators, it is safe to say that recollection is not a separate means of cognition. Dignāga’s concept of recollection is highly important in our inquiry into his system of epistemology, because Dignāga emphasizes recollection when arguing his theory of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana) which is one of the most significant theories in his epistemology.

『法華経』（全27章）のうち「如来神力品：20」には，釈尊自らが教化してきた地涌の菩薩のみに『法華経』を委嘱するという〈別付嘱(ぺっぷぞく)〉が説かれる一方で，最終章の「嘱累品：27」には，全ての菩薩に『法華経』を委嘱する〈総付嘱(そうふぞく)〉が説かれる．このように『法華経』には，別付嘱に代表される「純化・排他的姿勢」と，総付嘱に代表される「融和的姿勢」の混在が確認されており，どちらの姿勢が『法華経』にとって本来的・本質的かの議論は，いまだ結論をみていなかった．

『法華経』の内容を再吟味した結果，「序品：1」から「如来神力品：20」に至る教説は，

先達の如来から成仏の授記を与えられない者は，いかに修行しようとも成仏することができない．『法華経』の制作者たちは，釈尊入滅後の〈成仏の授記を与えてくれる如来がいない時代〉という強い意識のもと，釈尊の意義を，“説法によって現在化され衆生に授記を与えて利益する〈現実のハタラキ〉”と捉えた．そして，このことを自覚し釈尊の〈ハタラキ〉を代行する法師（地涌の菩薩）が存在し，仏語にして釈尊そのものである『法華経』を説示して衆生に授記を与え続ける限り，釈尊も永遠にこの世に存在し続けることになる．

という，純化・排他的姿勢を中心とした唯一の文脈の中に位置づけられることが確認された．この文脈を，『法華経』の〈メインストリーム，テーゼ（正）〉と呼ぶことにする．

『法華経』にとって，『法華経』を説示して成仏の授記を与え，釈尊滅後にその〈ハタラキ〉を現在化する行為は，経典の成立・存在理由の根底を形成しており，何らかの別行為（象徴行為等）によって代替することは不可能である．ところが「巻末七本」の「普賢菩薩勧発品：26」では，「普賢菩薩の名号受持という象徴行為によって『法華経』聞法と代替可能」という教説が展開されており，これは『法華経』にとって〈アンチテーゼ（反）〉となる．総付嘱も，「誹謗者の堕地獄回避」の問題に有効な解決策を示していない以上，『法華経』にとって本来的ではないといえる（アンチテーゼ，反）．『法華経』における「融和姿勢」とは，実は「正と反を止揚して合を目指すもの」ではなく，「正と反の混在，夾雑を放置する姿勢」であったのである．

段階成立か否かに関わらず，『法華経』は紀元三世紀の竺法護訳以降，一貫して現在の全27章構成を維持し続けてきた．インドにおける『法華経』の“編纂者，実践者”が『法華経』の教説における夾雑状態を放置してきたという事実は，インドにおける『法華経』の実践が実質上，「書写を通した功徳の獲得」に限定されており，『法華経』はどこまでも「エクリチュール」として存在していたことの一証左と考えられる．

清弁（Bhāviveka, 6c）が彼の二諦説のなかに二義的な勝義を設けていることは，夙に指摘され，彼の思想の特徴とされてきた．『般若灯論（Prajñāpradīpa）』においてその二義的な勝義の一つとして無分別智（nirvikalpajñāna）が挙げられ，それは一義的な勝義である真実（tattva）を対象とする智である．筆者が着目したいのは，『思択炎（Tarkajvālā）』において清弁が，この真実を対象とする無分別智とは別の無分別知に言及していることである．『中観心論（Madhyamakahṛdaya）』第3章冒頭部において清弁は，智慧（prajñā）を二諦に即して二種に分け，勝義的な智慧と慣習的な知恵とを区別する．勝義的な智慧は真実を対象とする智すなわち無分別智であるが，一方で，慣習的な知恵の働きとして相（lakṣaṇa）の決択を置く．後者は『思択炎』において，自相（svalakṣaṇa）を対象とする無分別知であり，つまりは直接知覚（pratyakṣa）のことである．「分別を介在させない」という意味では，勝義的な無分別智も慣習的な無分別知も同じ働きを持つと言えるが，果たす役割が相違することに注意が向けられるべきであろう．本研究は，清弁の言及する二つの無分別知が，その背景となる二諦説の中でそれぞれどのような役割を担うのかを解明する試みである．

It is well known that there are differences in the definition of trairūpya theory between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, especially in the third characteristic. Jinendrabuddhi, a commentator on the Pramāṇasamuccaya （PS） and Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti （PSV）, interprets the two texts while adopting Dharmakīrti’s definition in such a way that even Dignāga’s statement does not cause problems.

Jinendrabuddhi, in his Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, explains the word nāstitā as nāstitā-eva and asati as <abhāva>, <anya> and <viruddha> in the phrase nāstitāsati of PS 2.5cd. Thereby, his understanding of PS comes close to Dharmakīrti’s theory of the third characteristic. This assertion that nāstitā of PS has a restriction indicated by eva also applies to nāstitā in the phrase asaty eva nāstitā of PSV. In addition to this, he states that anya in the phrase nānyatra of PSV means “what is different from asat,” not “what is different from sapakṣa.” Furthermore, na viruddha iti indicates that asat is incompatible with nāstitā. Such an interpretation of PSV by Jinendrabuddhi is aimed at refuting Uddyotakara, who criticizes Dignāga’s definition of the third characteristic.

Although Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of Dignāga’s PS and PSV does not correspond to Dignāga’s intention, it is meaningful in that he tries to bridge the gap between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and defends Dignāga against criticisms of Uddyotakara.

本稿は、哲学的議論及び司法の場における裁定者の在り方、及びその資質・行為について、インドの古典哲学文献及びダルマ文献の記述をもとに分析する。第2節では、古代インドにおける議論の場を示す術語・概念について、ニヤーヤ学派及び仏教の初期の論理学文献、及びダルマスートラの記述をもとに整理する。第3 ・4 節では、仏教やジャイナ教の文献にみられる「審問者」（prāśnika）や「四要素」（caturaṅga）といった概念に着目し、哲学的議論における裁定者の位置付けを考察する。第5 節では哲学文献とダルマ文献にあらわれる議会／法廷（sabhā）関連語の意義を確認する。第6節では、哲学的議論における裁定者の資質・行為に関する規定を取り上げ、ダルマ文献との連関を示す。以上の検討を通して、裁定者観の変遷をセクト的・文化的側面から裏付けつつ、古典インドの哲学的議論空間の把握における両文献群の比較の有用性を示したい。

In the 1990s, samatha and vipassanā being introduced by Theravada monks into Japan, the interest in Buddhist meditation once again arose. One remarkable aspect of this movement is that this interest was found in ordinary society, rather than in academic circles. Later, the introduction took the form of “mindfulness,” which was less in the sense of religious practice. Much later, after the 2000s, academic fields like psychology, neuroscience, and Buddhist studies came to have an interest on this field. In recent years, they have come to question the difference between the terms chi 知 and nen 念.

I myself made have researched this question through materials of the Japanese Hossō School. I focused on two monks, Jippan 実範 (?–1144) and Ryōhen 良遍 (1194–1252). In a work titled Shinrishō 真理鈔, Jippan writes that “sensitive consciousness” would be called “non-consciousness” or nirvikalpa. In the Shinjin yōketsu 真心要決 of Ryōhen, he writes that “seeing without discriminating” and “hearing without discriminating” is the state of non-consciousness. To express being in such a state, he used the words shōchi 証知 or chi, not nen. Judging from this, chi seems to have been used for expressing the state of “non-consciousness.”

The dGe lugs pa scholar bSe Ngag dbang bkra shis （1678-1738） established the theory of interdependence in his rTen ’brel chen mo. On the basis of Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of dependent origination （rten ’byung, pratītyasamutpāda）, Ngag dbang bkra shis presented a new idea that is not found in Tsong kha pa’s version, namely that the mutual relation can be established between a seed and a sprout. This means, according to Ngag dbang bkra shis, that the concept of seed depends on that of sprout, and vice versa. This theory is acceptable to the Mādhyamika school alone and not to the proponents of real entities, such as the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, for the latter schools consider only the noninteractive relation between cause and effect as dependent origination, while the Mādhyamika understands the interactive relation between cause and effect as dependent origination. Thus, Ngag dbang bkra shis complements Tsong kha pa’s theory of dependent origination by recognizing the interdependent relation between cause and effect.

It is well known that Dignāga’s syllogism consists of three members, namely thesis (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta). Dignāga rejects the Naiyāyika’s theory of the five-membered syllogism, and does not regard application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana) as members of the syllogism, as he considers these to be of no value. According to him, hetu and two types of dṛṣṭānta should be stated to show the three characteristics of a correct probans, that is, pakṣadharmatā, sapakṣasattva, and vipakṣāsattva. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya (-vṛtti), Dignāga explains that pakṣa, stated to show the object of reasoning, is not nessesary for a proof. However, he cannot completely abandon the statement of pakṣa, and states a pakṣa in his syllogisms.

Dharmakīrti’s syllogism drastically differs from Dignāga’s, as illustrated by a typical example as follows: “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a pot, etc. And sound is produced.” Dharmakīrti’s syllogism consists of two members, vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā, and he never states a pakṣa. The statement of pakṣadharmatā may be regarded as hetu. However, unlike Dignāga, who states it with an ablative case as a reason, such as kṛtakatvāt, Dharmakīrti directly shows it, such as śabdaś ca kṛtakaḥ. The statement of vyāpti may be regarded as the dṛṣṭānta. Unlike Dignāga, who states two kinds of dṛṣṭānta, Dharmakīrti states only one kind. Moreover, the order of the two members is changed, with vyāpti stated first, and pakṣadharmatā stated second.

From an historical perspective, Dharmakīrti and his followers regard the statement of pakṣadharmatā in their syllogism as hetu, even though it seems to play the role of upanaya. By making the statement of pakṣadharmatā, the general rule established is applied to the subject of concern. Such a statement is nothing but upanaya, and some logicians of other schools point out that the statement of pakṣadharmatā stated in Dharmakīrti’s syllogism should be regarded as upanaya, not as hetu. Therefore, Dharmakīrti’s syllogism structually resembles Aristotle’s syllogism in that vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā correspond to the major premise and the minor premise, respectively.

Chinkai (1091/92–1152) discussed the ‘conviction’ chapter (信解品) of the Lotus Sūtra in his work Sanron gensho mongi yō (三論玄疏文義要) and questioned whether the Three Turnings of the Wheel (三輪説) could fully contain all the meaning of the Buddha’s preaching. Chinkai thought that some scriptures such as the Larger Prajñāpāramitā and the Vimalakīrinirdeśa are neither fundamental nor insignificant. They should belong to the Mahāyāna, as scriptures about Bodhisattvas. As he pointed out, although the Zhonglun (中論) was used to explain the Three Turnings of the Wheel as a general theory, it was not difficult to see that, from the two aspects of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, Chinkai included the Larger Prajñāpāramitā into Mahāyāna, and thought it was a mistake to consider the Mahāyāna scriptures other than the Huayanjing and Lotus Sūtra as mere expedient teaching (枝末法輪). In conclusion, Chinkai believed that the Three Turnings of the Wheel (三転法輪) was an incorrect and subordinate view in terms of Tenet Classification (教判).