It is often said that the SNTV that Japan applied for Lower House elections strongly induces LDP Legislators to provide porkbarrel legislation for their constituents in order to win. If this is a unique feature of the system, we should see this phenomenon only among the Legislators but not among the LDP Councilors elected through different systems.
This paper clarifies through game theoretic models the relationship between the electoral systems and the strategies that the candidates should take for winning. The models suggest that providing porkbarrel legislation is the strategy best suited to reach optimal equilibrium under the SNTV, while providing more public interest legislation is the winning strategy under the Upper House electoral systems, i. e., the FPTP and the Party List PR.
The data analysis comparing the involvement of the Legislators and Councilors in the PARC as proxies for their strategies indicates that the Legislators and the Councilors under the Party List PR behave as the models predict. However, the latter under the FPTP behaves differently from what the models lead us to predict: Councilors under the FPTP also provide porkbarrel legislation in order to win.
Although this odd result can possibly be explained within the models, there might be a bug in the logic. We need further development of the models and of the data analysis to grasp the relationship between the electoral systems and the strategies of the candidates.

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Under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s governments, Factionism prevailed into the LDP too much. Takesita Faction, the largest faction, cherished the greatest power over the LDP. In the Takesita Faction, Takesita, Shin Kanemaru and Ichiro Ozawa had the strong power, but recently Ozawa and Kanemaru used their appointive power in favor of their comrades rather than Takesita. When Kanemaru involved the money scandal of Sagawa Kyubin and stepped down from the Vice-President of the LDP and the president of Takesita Faction, the faction got into power struggle. Ozawa was accused for his despotic manner by its senior members backed by Takesita, but its junior members supported Ozawa. In the end the largest faction broke away. It was the first scene of the drama of Japanese political realighnment.
In June of 1993 the political reform bills brought about a split in the LDP, as well as in the Opposition Parties. The divion was mixed with the feeling of pro-Ozawa and anti-Ozawa. When the Opposition Parties proposed a vote of nonconfidence in the Miyazawa Cabinet, the promoters of the political reform and pro-Ozawa members of the LDP cast “yes” votes. They also quitted the LDP and formed new two parties, the Shinseito (Renewal Party) and the Shinto-Sakigake (Harbinger Party). It was the greatest division of the LDP since its establishment in 1955 and also the second scene of the drama.
Prime Minister Miyazawa resolved the Diet, but the results of the general election brought gain of seats for the new three parties including Nihon-Shinto (New Japan Party) and loss for the LDP. Ozawa persuaded to organize the “Political Reform Government” including Shakaito (the Social Democratic Party), Komeito (Clean Party) and new three conservative parties, and all heads of those parties, who became the Cabinet Ministers, shared power and responsibility. Prime Minister was chosen on the reason of the least critics from the parties forming the coalition government and it was Morihiro Hosokawa.
The next coming step of the political realighnment after the pass of the political reform bills, may follow two lines. One is an antagonism of the revisionists of the Constitution and the protectionists of the current Constitution. Another is an antagonism of the advocates of two-party system and those of the several parties system.

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  This paper examines the relationship between a democratization of party leadership selection and party organizational change in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party, the long ruling party, became used to utilizing votes by party members as a method of electing its presidents. Compared with the Democratic Party of Japan, the second largest party, LDP has a much larger number of members, but its factional linkage which holds diet members and rank and file party members together has dwindled. By contrast, the organizational support base of DPJ remains weak, so the demand of local party organizations for votes by party members does not increase. In sum, as a result of many LDP members voting individually, they are coming on the stage of party leadership selection as new actors. Both because the incentives of candidates and members change, votes by party members became popular in LDP.

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The paper examines the change of perception among Japanese policy makers regarding the status and function of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) throughout the 1980s, and how this change was instrumental in the dispatch of the minesweeper flotilla to the Persian Gulf in 1991. After Japan regained independence in 1952, constitutional revision imposed severe limitations on the functions of the post-war military apparatus, the JSDF. Indeed, the Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ) and Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) regarded the JSDF as unconstitutional, and as a source for the revival of militarism.
The paper argues that in the mid-1980s, established perceptions reached a turning point and started evolving. It investigates one key factor that prompted such a perception shift, the problem of the dispatch of the Japan Maritime Self Defense force (JMSDF) minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. In 1987, the United States put pressure on the Japanese government to consider dispatching a naval force to Persian Gulf. This issue divided policy makers in three groups. The first group, including Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, agreed with the JMSDF dispatch to Persian Gulf. The second group disagreed with SDF dispatch, preferring the deployment of the Japan Coast Guard (JCC) instead. This group included Tadakazu Kuriyama, foreign ministry official, and senior staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The third group, including Masaharu Gotouda, chief cabinet secretary, SPJ, CPJ, supported no contribution. They thought that the dispatch overseas of JSDF and JCC were not permissible under the article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
The paper investigates the political debates that occurred within the three groups, focusing on how fears of strong criticism from the Japanese people and the psychological pressure of contributing to the alliance shaped the Japanese dilemma. The paper explores how these elements constituted core features of Japanese ‘post-war nationalism’. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the political debate reached the culminating point with the Japanese government decision to send JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. At the time, the SPJ, CPJ, and liberals from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) raised a strenuous objection to send ships for the Gulf. Yet, the Japanese government decided in favour of the operation. In its aftermath, Japanese people did not support the views of SPJ and CPJ, nor they came to think that the JSDF were a symbol of revival of militarism. They recognized that the JSDF were a tool of international contributions.

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政治的リーダーシップとは，個人的な資質から生まれるものなのか，それとも構造に依拠するものなのか，いずれが正しいのであろうか。日本においても，小泉首相が発揮した（とされる）強力なリーダーシップをめぐって，政治改革や行政改革など，制度的な要因の帰結なのか，「ポピュリスト」的なスタイルの産物なのか，様々な議論がある。本稿も同様の問題意識に立ち，二つの要因の役割について考察する。具体的には，自民党総裁選における党員投票を分析の対象とする。党員投票とは，党内民主主義を促進するための制度であるだけではなく，党首が指導力を発揮するために必要な政治的エネルギーを調達するための装置でもある。そこで，選挙制度改革が党員投票を伴う総裁選の常態化をもたらすメカニズムを検証し，構造的な変化と政治家の個性が果たす役割について，インプリケーションを得ることを目標とする。

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