The First Oil Crisis started as a result of the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC announcing a raise in the posted price of crude oil on October 16, 1973 and OAPEC deciding to reduce oil production by 5% per month on the following day, touched off by the breakout of the Yom Kippur War. Japan was faced with an unprecedented dilemma between the Arab countries, who strongly demanded Japan to condemn Israel, and the United States who pressed Japan to align with their Middle East policy based on diplomatic relations with Israel. When the Arabs announced a 25% cut of oil supply on November 4, the European countries, similarly to Japan, who were scarce on resources, immediately criticized Israel, and declared support for the Arabs. However, the Japanese government was hesitant to criticize Israel. And the Arab countries pressed to intensify oil supply reduction unless Japan announced to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in the case Israel would not obey the UN Security Council Resolution 242. On the other hand, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger restrained Japan by stating that condemning Israel would hinder Middle East peace talks with the United States and that cooperative relations with the U.S. would be profitable for Japan from a long-term view. On November 18, the Arab countries announced that they would release the European countries, excluding Holland, from the weighted oil supply reduction measure of 5% from the benchmark set on December, because the European countries had criticized Israel. As a result, the criticism of the weakness of the Japanese diplomacy in attaining resources made the headlines of the Japanese newspapers.
How was the Japanese government to escape such dilemma?
The Japanese government finally criticized Israel by name and made its pro-Arab positioning clear in the statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido on November 22. Further on December 10, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki, as special envoy, left for eight Middle Eastern countries to offer economic and technical aid. At first glance, the Japanese government took a pro-Arab policy without accepting the warning of the Unites States. This document, however, will empirically clarify that the U.S.-Japan friction related to Japanese Middle East policy was resolved before November 22 in the midst of the development of multilateral diplomacy for the “Kissinger Plan”, a unified framework among Japan, the U.S. and the European countries, and that the Japanese diplomacy during the First Oil Crisis achieved to broaden the permissible scope of the United States.

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This article discusses the process of negotiation by which the Japanese government reached an agreement on economic and technological cooperation with the Cambodian government, in which both parties eventually decided to build an agricultural laboratory and medical center. In order to strengthen its economy, Cambodia wished to obtain economic aid from Japan while surrendering its right to request reparation for the losses it incurred due to Japan’s invasion during World War II. Japan appreciated the Cambodian goodwill, because establishing a friendly relationship would be meaningful in securing the Japanese return to post-World War II international society. For Japan, moreover, the success of the negotiations with Cambodia would become the best reference case that could dissuade the South Vietnamese and Indonesian governments from claiming “exorbitant” reparation. Yet, the amount of aid that the Cambodians initially expected reduced within a short period of time, as a result of inter-organizational politics within the Japanese government.

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1972年のニクソン大統領による訪中・訪ソ, および翌年1月のベトナム和平協定の成立により, 日米両国を取り巻く国際環境は劇的に変化し, そのなかで日米は, 両国関係をいかに位置づけるべきかという問いに直面した。日米関係は一時的に動揺を見せたものの, 1970年代半ばにかけて改善に向かう。その過程で, 両国政府が強調したのが, 「価値観の共有」 であった。本稿の目的は, その要因を明らかにすることにある。米国は 「価値観の共有」 を掲げ, 冷戦対立の緩和とグローバルな政治・経済情勢の混迷のなか, 西側同盟の結束を図るため尽力した。一方の日本も, 国際秩序の変容を受けて自国の対外政策のあり方を模索するなかで, 米国をはじめとする価値観を共有する西側先進諸国との協調路線を鮮明にした。そして日米両国は, 「価値観の共有」 を同盟関係の基盤の一つとして理解するようになった。それは両国が, 軍事的意義にとどまらない, 日米同盟関係のもつ重層性への認識を深めたことの帰結であった。そのことは, 冷戦終結を経てもなお日米同盟関係が命脈を保ち続けている所以を考察するにあたっても, 重要な示唆を与えうるであろう。

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By 1973, Asia-Pacific regional order had experienced a dramatic transformation due to President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing and Moscow in 1972, as well as to the settlement of Vietnam peace negotiations. From 1973 on, the United States began to pay more attention to its allies, including Japan, than it had in previous years.

This article examines how the U.S. government defined its partnership with Japan during the ebb of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region. It demonstrates that the United States became convinced of the direction of Japanese foreign policy, which was decidedly pro-American, and thus, came to evaluate Japan as a staunch partner in maintaining regional stability as well as in tackling problems caused by an emerging global interdependence. This, in turn, led to Washington’s redefinition of the U.S-Japanese alliance as a “pillar” of the America’s strategy.

In the early 1970s, U.S.-Japan relations deteriorated mainly because of the “Nixon Shocks” (Washington’s abrupt rapprochement with China and its new economic policies). By 1973, moreover, some American officials felt apprehension about an independent Japanese foreign policy. In November 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger requested the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to foresee the long-term foreign policy direction of Japan. A resulting memorandum noted that Japan would keep an alliance with Washington for ten years, thus easing apprehension among American officials toward Japan.

Kissinger, meanwhile, was confident in the détente with Moscow. Other officials also considered the Soviet diplomatic maneuver and its presence in the Asia-Pacific highly limited. Thus, the U.S. was required to define its alliance with Japan in the regional environment in which Washington faced no imminent threat. As regards to U.S.-China relations, it was getting stagnant, leading Kissinger to downplay the importance of it.

With the fall of Saigon, South Vietnam, in April 1975, Japanese foreign policies toward Asia and the United States were vigorously implemented, resulting in an improvement of the relations with South Korea, the beginning of cooperation with ASEAN, and the positive attitude toward military cooperation with Washington. Kissinger welcomed these active Japanese foreign policies. Kissinger, moreover, came to realize that Japan was playing an important role in addressing problems brought about by the global interdependence.

These changes in the configuration of the U.S. foreign policy mindset were clearly revealed in the “Pacific Doctrine” address delivered by President Gerald Ford in December 1975. In this address, Ford affirmed that America’s partnership with Japan was a “pillar” of the U.S. strategy, heralding a new era: one in which the U.S.-Japanese alliance would play a robust stabilizing role in the region and in the interdependent world.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify empirically the political and diplomatic processes centering on nuclear submarines’ visits to Japan in 1964. When the Security Treaty with the United States was revised in 1960, Japan legally stipulated that bringing nuclear weapons into its territory should be a matter for prior consultation. However, during the negotiations to revise the treaty, it did not place explicitly on the agenda the issue of port calls by nuclear-armed ships.

On the other hand, the U.S. was rapidly advancing the development of nuclear weapons to be mounted on submarines. After the revision of the treaty, it successfully launched a Polaris missile from an underwater nuclear submarine, and proceeded with the development of Subrocs to be mounted on submarines. Under these circumstances, in June 1961 and January 1963, it requested Japan to accept visits by its nuclear submarines.

The development of nuclear weapons technology and the existence of public information on it are factors that are essentially outside of alliance politics. And the former was originally intended by the U.S. to maintain its superiority over the Soviet Union and increase its credibility in the eyes of the allies. The development of Polaris missiles and Subrocs, however, put the Japanese government in a difficult position in domestic politics. Opposition legislators were able to grasp the development status of new nuclear weapons from information released by the U.S. and to take up the issue in the Diet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus had to consider how to handle, under the prior consultation system, cases of visits by submarines equipped with Polaris missiles and Subrocs.

At the time MOFA, on the basis of pre-existing official documents and government statements that had been made in the Diet, offered legal and policy interpretations of such cases. However, there were various limitations in applying to sea-based nuclear weapons past policies that presupposed those that were land-based.

In the end, while the government could not officially allow visits by nuclear-armed ships to Japanese ports, it also fell into a situation where it could not come to an explicit agreement with the United States on how to handle such visits under the Security Treaty. In this way, the development of new nuclear weapons to increase America’s credibility in the eyes of its allies had rather the political consequence of creating, for Japan, an alliance management dilemma. In 1964, in the absence of any resolution of the dilemma, Japan made a highly political decision to allow nuclear submarines to visit its ports.

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This manuscript analyzes the nationalism seen in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy after the World War II, focusing on Takeyo Nakatani, the president of Japan Arab Society. Nakatani’s activities, thoughts about the Middle East, and his network with Japanese politicians will be investigated. Specifically, it examines Nakatani’s relationship with conservative politicians such as Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Takeo Miki etc. in his approach to the Arabian countries, as well as how Nakatani’s Pan-Asiatic notion left over from the pre-war period effected his ‘public diplomacy’ to the Middle East.

Concretely, the manuscript first examines Nakatani’s role in Japan’s involvement of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam construction project. Then, it inquires the process of establishing the Japan Arab Society in Tokyo and Nakatani’s ‘public diplomacy’ with Egypt and other Arab countries. Finally, Nakatani’s postwar Asianism is discussed in the example of the Middle East issues, especially the Palestinian Question.

Consequently, Nakatani was a Japanese nationalist, keenly advocating that the Japanese Imperial regime and so the institution of Tennō should be preserved in post-war time. Tennō, Japanese Emperor was a holy existence which took his roots from a two-thousand year history and was placed at the center of Japanese nation and people. His ideological background deeply related to the Greater Asianism, Pan-Asianism in other word, did not leave him in post-war period either.

Since Japan’s technological and economical superiority to other Asian countries, he consistently advocated that Japan was still the leader nation of all Asia even in post-war time. He believed that most of Arabian countries in the Middle East obtained their independence via Japanese defeat in the World War II, that Nakatani explained it as ‘Japanese sacrifice for Asian nations’ in the war.

‘Asia’, which was Tōyō in Nakatani’s word, was centered on Japan and Japanese Emperor was the core of this concept. Nakatani’s way of thinking is none other than ‘the post-war Asianism’. He thought that Japan’s diplomacy towards the Middle East as a demilitarized country should be based on peaceful system, and the economic and technical aspects should be mainstream of the politics to countries in the region.

Briefly, Nakatani as a non-state actor played crucial roles in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy in post-war period. And Asianism, nationalist ideology in Japan before and during the war was still effective in his actions, remarks on the Middle East issues and even network in the relations with both Japanese politicians and leaders of Arab countries.

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