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  • 中野 正之
    土木学会論文集
    1985年 1985 巻 361 号 129a-130
    発行日: 1985/09/20
    公開日: 2010/08/24
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 原子力施設の保護と日本の役割―ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻と原発攻撃をうけて―
    小林 祐喜
    日本原子力学会誌ATOMOΣ
    2024年 66 巻 10 号 525-528
    発行日: 2024年
    公開日: 2024/10/10
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー

     2022年2月,ロシアがウクライナに軍事侵攻し,ザポリージャ,チョルノービリ両原子力発電所を攻撃した。ザポリージャ原発については占拠を続けている。運転中の原発を武力攻撃し,占拠するのは前代未聞の出来事であり,従来の核セキュリティの概念を超越している。笹川平和財団安全保障研究グループは,国際原子力機関(IAEA),国連などの国際機関の在り方,国際法の役割と限界を指摘しながら,戦時下の原子力施設の保護,防護について2023年3月に政策提言を取りまとめ,総理官邸などに配布した。その後のザポリージャ原発周辺の状況や,戦時下における原子力施設の保護に関する議論の経過を踏まえながら,日本がどのような役割を果たすべきかについて考察する。

  • 池田 明史
    ユダヤ・イスラエル研究
    2013年 27 巻 75-
    発行日: 2013年
    公開日: 2020/09/16
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • 現代の安全保障
    木村 修三
    国際政治
    1979年 1979 巻 63 号 55-68,L3
    発行日: 1979/10/15
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    (1) Israel is not a militaristic state although she is a model of ‘nation-in- arms’ in the sense that military defense occupies the center of her people's life.
    (2) The reason why Israel is ‘nation-in-arms’ is due to the fact that she was surrounded by hostile countries which do not recognize her legitimacy as a state, and that she has actually fought four times with them in the past. In addition to this, holocaust analogy and ‘Masada complex’ which are latent in the psychology of Israelis, highten terror in their heart.
    (3) But, up to now, Israel has never faced the critical situation in which she could be actually annihilated. Rather, she has always won overwhelming victory in the past wars, with the only exception of the Yom Kippur War. At the same time, it is an undeniable fact that the terror of annihilation has been utilized for the justification of her intransigent policy.
    (4) Israel has tried to persuade the Arab states for their recognition of Israeli's legitimacy as a state, while totally rejecting the wish of Palestinians for the establishment of their independent state. After the end of Six-Day-War, Israel has made every efforts to secure her security on the basis of tei ritorialism by bringing out the conception of ‘defensible borders’.
    (5) If Israel wishes to secure the true security, it might be indispensable for her to recognize the Palestinians' legitimate rights of self-determination through peaceful settlement, in stead of insisting the conception of security on the basis of territorialism.
  • ―PFLPとJRA
    木村 正俊
    日本比較政治学会年報
    2007年 9 巻 198-217
    発行日: 2007/06/30
    公開日: 2010/09/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 飯島 二郎
    宇都宮共和大学 都市経済研究年報
    2018年 18 巻 126-136
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2018/12/22
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
  • 石田 淳
    国際政治
    2014年 2014 巻 175 号 175_56-175_69
    発行日: 2014/03/30
    公開日: 2015/09/05
    ジャーナル フリー
    The essence of realism is its attention to the exercise of power through which political actors pursue their goals of realizing desirable consequences. From the realist point of view, political actors aim at either maintaining or altering the status quo by getting others either to do what they otherwise would not do, or to refrain from doing what they otherwise would do. In other words, power relations and prudent actions are at the core of realism. The primary purpose of this article is to examine why this realist school of international relations went through changes of its analytical foci from the Interwar Era to the Nuclear Era in the twentieth century.
    The realism of the Interwar Era found its target of criticism in liberalism, which totally ignored the conflict of interests among major powers over the status quo. E. H. Carr in particular severely criticized the liberal defense of the status quo. Then, the ideological confrontation between the two crusading superpowers during the Cold War directed the realist research to the misperception of intentions. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, fully understood the seriousness of the security dilemma in the Cold War context, in which the intention of the liberal United States was naturally misperceived by the Soviet Union as demanding for change of the status quo in her favor and this misperception exacerbated the prospect for negotiated settlement of conflicts. Finally, the nuclear arms race during the Cold War generated awareness among realists that the avoidance of total nuclear war was in common interests between the Cold War rivals. In this context, realists came to be aware of not only the risks of misperceived threats but also those of misperceived promises among states. This article stresses that Yoshikazu Sakamoto, placed in a proper historical context, should be re-read as one of the few Japanese scholars of international politics, who chose to theoretically tackle contemporary American realist questions, often associated with Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Schelling.
  • BBCの事例から
    税所 玲子
    放送研究と調査
    2021年 71 巻 8 号 32-46
    発行日: 2021年
    公開日: 2021/09/20
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
    新型コロナウイルスの感染拡大の中で、偽情報・誤情報の広がりが喫緊の課題として認識される中、世界の公共放送の代表格といわれるイギリスBBCは、「信頼できる確かな情報の担い手」として、自らの役割と価値を改めて打ち出そうとしている。 本稿は、その取り組みの最優先策として挙げられた「不偏不党の徹底」に焦点をあて、その理念がどのように放送で実践されてきたのか、その変遷を概観した。スエズ危機やフォークランド紛争など、時として権力と激しく対立しながら模索してきたそのアプローチは、デジタル化と多民族化が進む中で、「シーソーのようにバランスをとる」ことから、「多種多様な価値を反映」させるべく、「正確性、バランス、文脈、公平・公正、客観性など」が合わさった多様なものであるべきだとの認識へと進化を遂げる。そして、戦後最大の外交政策の転換と言われるEU離脱によって政治社会が分断し、対立感情があらわになりやすい雰囲気が広がる中で、左右からの批判にさらされたBBCは、再び変革を迫られる。本稿では最後に、これまで視聴者とのエンゲージメントの手段としてきた取材者のSNS発信を制限するなど、新たな実践の形を模索する姿を紹介する。
  • 鹿島 正裕
    国際政治
    1996年 1996 巻 113 号 135-151,L15
    発行日: 1996/12/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The third Arab-Israeli war of 1967 quickly ended in an overwhelming victory for Israel, in what is called the “Six-day war” by her. At that time, the Arab countries claimed that the United States had participated in the war on the Israeli side, and severed diplomatic relationship with her. Because the U. S. -Egyptian relationship had already been bad before the war, and the Israeli aerial attack was far more efficient than Egyptians had expected, they suspected U. S. -Israeli complicity. In fact, the Johnson administration had repeatedly warned Israel not to initiate hostility, while trying to organize an international fleet to deter Egypt from the use of force. The Arab side, however, continued to maintain that the United States had encouraged Israel to attack Egypt in order to weaken the revolutionary Nasser regime. The then unofficial spokesman of Nasser, Mohamed Heikal, still does so in his recent thick book “1967 al-Infijal (outbreak)” (Cairo, 1990), which is based on declassified documents of the United States and Egypt.
    According to him, when Egypt demanded the United Nations Emergency Force (which had been stationed in Sinai Peninsular since the 1956 Suez War) to leave from the Israeli border area, United Nations Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, an American, advised Secretary-General U Thant not to accept partial withdrawal, thus provoking Egypt to demand total withdrawal and to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and then close the Strait of Tiran for Israel. It was an American plot to give Israel a casus belli. After that the United States warned Egypt, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, not to initiate hostility while hinting to Israel that she would not, unlike on the occasion of the Suez War, support any United Nations move to sanction Israel if she attacked Egypt.
    On the American side, serious studies based on declassified documents as well as interviews with then policy-makers have been accumulated, some of which expressly try to refute the Egyptian accusations. I have studied and compared these books and articles, checked many of the documents and interviewed some people myself, and concluded that it is not that the United States “unleashed” Israel to attack Egypt, but that the Nasser regime itself let, through a series of miscalculations, the Egyptian military provoke Israel into war. However, Israeli decision-makers were wise enough not to attack Arab forces prematurely—they gave time to the U. S. and Britain to try to organize the international fleet. When the Johnson administration found the efforts rather fruitless, it was in fact inclined to let Israel help herself. In this sense the United States was involved in the political process leading to the outbreak of the war.
  • 地域協力機構と民族紛争を中心に
    山戸 衣絵
    時事英語学研究
    1999年 1999 巻 38 号 41-52
    発行日: 1999/09/01
    公開日: 2012/11/13
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡 真理
    日本文学
    2010年 59 巻 3 号 28-36
    発行日: 2010/03/10
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    昨年暮れから3週間にわたり、ガザ地区はイスラエルによる一方的な破壊と殺戮に見舞われた。この攻撃は、61年前、イスラエル建国によってパレスチナ人を襲った「ナクバ」(大いなる破局)の暴力が、この間、ひとたびも終わってはいないことをあらためて証明した出来事だった。その爆撃の只中で、一人の英文学者が「今、そこ」で起きている事態を日々、メールで世界に向けて発信し続けた。その記録は日本で『ガザ通信』という一冊の書物にまとめられる。これらは何を意味するのか?戦火の中からインターネットを使って現地の声が発信されることは、もはや珍しくない。イラク戦争については、そうした「声」がいくつも書籍化されている。その意味では、「イラク」という記号が「ガザ」という記号に置き換わっただけだ。そこにどんな意味を-しかも、文学的な-を見出そうというのか?『ガザ通信』を素材に、このテクストをめぐる思想的、文学的コンテクストについて考察したい。
  • 川口 正昭
    日本物理学会誌
    1992年 47 巻 8 号 613-618
    発行日: 1992/08/05
    公開日: 2020/03/04
    ジャーナル フリー
  • エチオピアにおけるイエメン系移民とカート
    大坪 玲子
    嗜好品文化研究
    2018年 2018 巻 3 号 120-128
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2022/08/31
    研究報告書・技術報告書 オープンアクセス
  • 冷戦史の再検討
    渡辺 愛子
    国際政治
    2003年 2003 巻 134 号 121-135,L15
    発行日: 2003/11/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to explore Britain's clandestine cultural activities in the USSR conducted by the British Council's Soviet Relations Committee (SRC). Established in 1955 in response to Foreign Office requests for a body that would be responsible for ‘the promotion of closer relations between Great Britain and the U. S. S. R.’, it is argued that, in reality, the government wanted the SRC to act as a bulwark against the activities of domestic Communist ‘friendly societies’. The paper seeks to identify and evaluate the attitude adopted by the British Government towards cultural interchange with the USSR by elucidating upon the value given by contemporaries to cultural propaganda in the political forum, and then moves forward to address the question as to what the government hoped to gain from a cultural-intercourse with the USSR, or rather, how abstention from official cultural commitments was the strategic aim of the government. The SRC was well aware of the dangers and benefits associated with cultural penetration, and, from the outset, was anxious to avoid getting involved in protracted negotiations over a binding cultural agreement. Whilst resisting Soviet advances to create a formalised agreement, the SRC acted as a stent, keeping open a channel of communication with the Soviet authorities, and implanting—in Soviet eyes—the corruptive seeds of democracy.
    The paper concludes by suggesting that the politics of international cultural, relations being conducted behind the Iron Curtain changed rapidly with events in world affairs during the 1950s, such as the Hungarian Crisis. Whilst the policy of the British Government initially appeared beneficial to British interests, it soon became clear that the Soviets were gaining more from these cultural exchanges in terms of the technical expertise that they acquired, and the propaganda they could attach to them. They endorsed cultural relations, but cultural relations had to be on their terms. The ambivalence of the SRC's status presented an obstacle to the Soviet authorities that initially held them at bay, but in the end, proved to be counterproductive and ultimately ineffective, resulting in its disbandment in 1959. However, the achievement of the SRC was that it helped to increase the volume of western representations of ‘democratic’ ideals both at home and in the USSR, and fostered a relationship with the USSR that was far from being merely ‘passive’-rather, Britain's cultural diplomacy in this period was a raft of unique and subtle strategies, which, though it ultimately failed, attempted to conduct cultural propaganda at arms-length, in order to pursue Britain's own world-view.
    It must be emphasised that some of the materials used in this article are, to date, still categorised as being ‘closed files’ in the National Archives, London. For this reason, permission to access and make use of the material contained in these files was granted by the British Council on the signed undertaking that the names of individuals mentioned would not be published.
  • 中村 廣治郎
    宗教研究
    2005年 78 巻 4 号 985-1006,v
    発行日: 2005/03/30
    公開日: 2017/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
    日本のイスラム研究にはピークが二つあった。一つは昭和十年代(一九三五-四五)で、今一つは「石油危機」以後の昭和五十年代以降である。それぞれに時代的要請に応えるものであったが、いずれの時代のイスラム研究においても宗教学が果たす役割はほとんどなかったといえる。このような状況を改めるには、宗教学としての方法的自覚をもって研究することが必要であり、その一つの方法が、宗教全体を視野に置いた類型論的アプローチを試みることではなかろうか。その具体例として、イスラム史におけるスーフィズムの展開をどのように捉えるか、などの問題を取り上げて論じてみたい。
  • ―展開と解体―
    木村 正俊
    年報政治学
    2009年 60 巻 2 号 2_50-2_69
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2013/02/07
    ジャーナル フリー
      Between the 1950s and 1970s the world politics was dominated by revolutionary movements in the Third World and the hero of the age was Che Guevara. The Palestinian liberation movement emerged in that era. This article analyzes the evolution and devolution of the Palestinian liberation movement by regarding it as one of the revolutionary movements in the Third World.
      After discussing general arguments over revolutions in the World Politics, this article treats the development of the Palestinian liberation movement and the change in its attitude toward armed struggle. Armed struggle by the Palestinian national movement and regional politics in the Middle East influenced each other. Armed struggle by Palestinian guerrilla groups stimulated the 1967 War, which resulted in changes in their attitude toward armed struggle and the shift in the agent of liberation.
      The Palestinian Revolution encouraged the Lebanese Civil War. The coalition group between the Palestinian liberation movement and Lebanese progressive groups was opposed to the Lebanese conservative groups. The 1982 War had a crucial effect on the fate of the Palestinian Revolution.
  • 小島 真智子
    国際政治
    2021年 2021 巻 204 号 204_17-204_32
    発行日: 2021/03/31
    公開日: 2022/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper deals with the continuities and changes in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy by asking the following question: has the basic notion of French strategy switched to the so-called “deterrence by denial” as opposed to “deterrence by punishment”? Some raised such question, by observing that France no longer insists on her nuclear weapons’ retaliatory capabilities, but underlines its arms’ precision as if they were to be used in counter-force operations. Such critiques do not make sense to others, because all deterrence capabilities should be or should at least look operational in order to be effective. And in a world where many countries are increasing their military invulnerabilities, the search for operational capabilities is a condition sine qua non to strengthen the deterrence.

    In order to answer the above question, this article first traces the French nuclear strategy thinking from 1945 on, with a focus on the strategic quarrels, in 1960s, between Pierre Gallois and Raymond Aron. Aron was against Gallois’ nuclear weapons’ “equalizer” concept which made French nuclear deterrence oriented not only against Russians but also against Americans. These quarrels were more political than strategic. In fact, the Vth republic under De Gaulle promoted the notion of national independence based on Gallois’ concept on nuclear deterrence and rejected Aron’s preferences on France-US cooperative relations. The article then analyses how France’s independent nuclear policy found its righteousness as US-USSR condominium emerged during the Cold war. France was against US coexistence with the Soviets which would undermine its Ally’s national interest. The US-USSR condominium was sacred through Arms Control measures. Even Aron criticized the condominium by calling the SALT I agreement a US-USSR “Alliance”.

    The second part of the article is devoted to the revision of France’s nuclear deterrence strategy in the post-Cold war era. It was especially under Jacques Chirac’s administration that France’s nuclear doctrine went through an important revision. The article uses presidential discourses, parliamentary discussions as well as ministerial internal documents such as “Horizon stratégique” in order to analyze how and why France had to review its nuclear deterrence strategy. The focus here is put on the notion of “counter-deterrence”. This notion is based on France’s recognition that France can no longer be on the side to deter but will be deterred by an emerging country in the post Cold war era. And it happens that these emerging countries are non-democratic countries marking the decline of the Occident.

    This article concludes that continuities in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy remains essential whereas the changes are only apparent. The changes are nonetheless important because they confirm that today’s nuclear world order as two-folds (or disconnected between): global order between Russians and Americans; regional order among emerging nuclear countries including nuclear-capable Iran.

  • 現代の安全保障
    藤村 瞬一
    国際政治
    1979年 1979 巻 63 号 22-37,L2
    発行日: 1979/10/15
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    As we are going to argue the security problem of a state, then we, generally, used to begin the analysis of her armaments, defence potential and military readiness. It, however, is not enough. Because the international relations in recent years are so complex and tangled that the range of emergency or crisis of a state can not be forecasted. So we should also discuss about the other means of security than the military one.
    I, hereto, would put a proposition that there are two ways to ensure the security of a state. One is the tangible means of security as military defence, and the other is intangible one as diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic approaches. It, I think, is a proper and wise policy that a small, minor power state, especially surrounded by the uncertain and peril circumstances, should choose and pursuit the intangible means of security.
    Austria is an appropriate example to do so.
  • -予測と感性に関する雑駁な考察-
    大谷 毅
    感性工学
    2023年 21 巻 2 号 74-83
    発行日: 2023/03/31
    公開日: 2023/03/31
    研究報告書・技術報告書 フリー
    電子付録
  • 上原 史子
    国際政治
    2009年 2009 巻 157 号 157_99-114
    発行日: 2009/09/30
    公開日: 2011/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article covers the development of the Austrian foreign policy shift from permanent neutrality to a strong European Engagement after World War II. After World War II, the Allies (USA, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) divided Austria into four zones. Neutrality was reached in long and difficult negotiations between the Austrian and the Soviet governments, granting Austrian independence on October, 26, 1955. Neutrality can be seen as the prize Austria had to pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Austrian territory after ten years of occupation. With neutrality, Austria declared not to join military alliances and would not allow military bases from foreign countries on its territory.
    From the beginning, Austria's neutrality has been accompanied by an active and independent foreign policy. Unlike Switzerland, Austria joined the United Nations and has played an active part on many UN commissions and committees, in addition to providing troops for several UN peacekeeping operations since 1960.
    Participation in the economic integration of Western Europe has hardly ever been seen by Austrian politicians to be in conflict with their country's neutrality, so in the 1960s, there were further discussions concerning membership of the European Community. But Austria's neutrality proved to be an obstacle when these discussions were abandoned in the face of strong opposition from the Soviet leadership, which at that time saw the EC as an extension of NATO.
    The free trade agreements concluded between Austria and the EC in 1972 were regarded as a sufficient basis for economic cooperation with the EC over the next 15 years. It was towards the end of the 1980's that the question of joining the EC was again raised by the Austrian government, with a view to participating in the EC's Single Market.
    While Austria prepared for membership, the question was to be answered if such a step would be compatible with the status of permanent neutrality being the core of the State Treaty (“Staatsvertrag”) from 1955.
    In 1988, the Soviet foreign minister, Shevardnadse, was strongly against the EC membership of neutral Austria, but in 1989 its tone was softened and Soviet Union recognized Austria's right to choose its own integration policy. On 17 July 1989, Austrian foreign minister, Mock, handed in Austria's application for EC membership in Brussels.
    In the aide-memoire from the Austrian government to the EC in 1990, the aim of accession was confirmed: Austria was in the heart of Europe and wished to assume all the rights and obligations of a Community member. Neutrality, it went on, was Austria's “specific contribution to the preservation of peace and security in Europe”. Thus Neutrality has been redefined in order to enable Austria to conduct a policy of European solidarity.
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