国際会計財務報告基準のIFRS17号「保険契約」は，プリンシプル・ベース，資産・負債アプローチ，公正価値評価の特徴を持っており，2023年から適用される見込みとなっている。IFRS17号はEUの経済価値ベースによるソルベンシー規制であるソルベンシーIIの影響を強く受けている。一方，米国において法定会計はプリンシプル・ベースの保険負債を導入することとしており，ここでも経済価値ベースが取り入れられようとしている。 保険会社のGAAP会計においても，伝統的保険の保険負債は基礎率をロックインとしてきていたが，長期契約について基礎率を見直す経済価値の要素が取り入れられようとしている。わが国においてはソルベンシーにおいて経済価値のフィールドテストが続けられてきているが，会計処理にまで取り入れるかはこれからの検討となっている。リスク管理の観点から，わが国の保険負債の評価に経済価値ベースを取り入れることを検討すべきであろう。

　This paper studies the Italian banking crisis and its stabilization policy by Italian authority since the European debt crisis. Italian economy faced serious recession by the global financial crisis and Italian banking system also failed into the crisis. Non-performing loans （NPLs） ratio reached 18.2％ in 2015 and the ratio of the 4^th largest bank “Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena” was over 30％. In 2017, NPLs ratio improved to 14.5％ but the situation has not converged yet.

　The European Union （EU） wanted to terminate the Italian banking crisis to stabilize European financial system. However, the final execution entity of the stabilizing policy was not EU but Italian authority. Namely, to terminate the Italian banking crisis, there was the principal-agent relationship between EU and Italian authority.

　However, EU as the principal could not stimulate the incentive of Italian authority as the agent adequately. EU introduced the bank recovery and resolution directive （BRRD）, so called, bail-in rule, in spring 2014. Though, to prevent banking crisis contagion, Italian authority tried to avoid the adaption of bail-in rule and could not do policy intervention adequately. As the result, bail-in rule made the agency cost increase seriously.

　Italian experience tells us that the bail-in rule introduced by EU occurred the conflict of interest between EU and its constituent country. The economic management in the Economic Monetary Union is constantly shaking between principle and discretion. Italian case revealed that discretion takes precedence over principle in the crisis response. To decrease the agency cost, this paper concluded that EU needs to relax the constraint to fiscal expenditure in the banking crisis.

　The new Italian cabinet born in June 2018 is based populism and Euroscepticism. In addition, in the late half of 2018, Italian economy has gone to recession again. In such a circumstance, improvement of banking problem will be delayed and be continuing to smolder as the mid and long-term down side risk of European economy.