The purpose of this paper is to analyze and clarify the characteristics of U. S. strategy in the post-cold war era. It is based on the following three U. S. government strategic reports: (1)
Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, (2)
Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, January 1993, (3)
Report on the Bottom-up Review, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, October 1993.
Discriminate Deterrence provided the basic concept of changing the Soviet containment strategy of the cold war era to a new one emphasizing preparing for a wider range of contingencies in the new era. The
Regional Defense Strategy disclosed the new Regional Defense Strategy, which represented a shift from a focus on a global threat to one on challenges in critical regions. The
Bottom-up Review put forward a strategy for “winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously”. These new U. S. post cold-war strategies are not necessarily desirable for Japan by two reasons.
First, all three strategic reports describe Japan as a future superpower and a rival of the U. S. signalling that the American people are going to be more realistic and cautious about looking to Japan as a ally. The Second is rooted in the new U. S. defense policy concept disclosed by the
Bottom-up Review: “linkage between a sustained U. S. security commitment to allied countries and their trade policy, technology transfer, and participation in multinational security operations”.
This linkage theory would put pressure on U. S. allies to compromise with the U. S. on economic and political issues. Under this linkage theory, if Japan is reluctant to compromise with the U. S. on trade issues, the Japan-U. S. security alliance, which is based on the 1960 security treaty, could be jeopardized by playing the U. S. “security card” against Japan. If Japan rejects a compromise with the U. S. on trade issues, the U. S. may see Japan as “arrogant, ” and latent American suspicion toward Japan may surface.
On the other hand, if the U. S. continues to press Japan to compromise on trade issues by linking these with security commitments, Japan might begin to sense that the U. S. is using defense as a “Trojan horse” to sell American products. The linkage theory could, in this way, jeopardize the basis of the Japan-U. S. alliance itself.
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