The exhibition ‘Surviving the Japanese Occupation: War and Its Legacies’ opened at the Former Ford Factory in Singapore on 15th February 2017, the date when the city-state fell to the Japanese Army 75 years earlier. This exposition is located at the very place where British troops surrendered to the Japanese Army in 1942 and consists of four parts: Introduction, the Fall of Singapore, Becoming Syonan and the Legacies of War. This paper describes the display and reports the narrative recounted in the last zone which focuses on the postwar reconstruction of Singaporean society. The Singaporean Government has presented a single official narrative of the ‘Singapore Story’ as the history of the nation: the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and the People’s Action Party, the city-state’s struggle against colonialism and communism, its successful economic policies, and its apt handling of diplomacy with its bigger and powerful neighbours. The government has used this story to integrate its people. In contrast, a new historical narrative has emerged which differs from the ‘success story’ projected by the People’s Action Party. This version highly values the role of the left wing parties. This study refers to the secondary history textbook and also considers the images of postwar Singapore that are presented in the abovementioned newly inaugurated museum in the context of the trend of historiography. Both the history textbook and the museum exhibition emphasise the suffering from war and Japanese occupation and recount the country’s recovery from this period of difficulty. In addition, both employ the approach of social history and focus on the experiences of ordinary people through documents, photographs, films and oral testimonies rather than on the achievements of political and economic leaders. By contrast, both carefully remove historical sources that may cause ethnic division and may detract from the legitimacy of the ‘Singapore Story’. One such example would be documents attesting to the role played by the Malayan Communist Party in Singapore’s independence movement. The historical narrative portrayed by the textbook and the exhibition seems to embrace various accounts of Singaporean history but both eliminate stories that may affect national integration or lead to a questioning of the official narrative.

This paper reconsiders the development of post-colonial Southeast Asia from the viewpoint of Chinese immigrants who have moved back and forth across national boundaries around the former Straits Settlements and beyond. In a strict sense, the Straits Settlements consists of three territories under British rule, namely Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. However, its informal circle of influence was much wider, encompassing the adjacent Dutch and Siamese territories. This informal circle of influence of the Straits Settlements (hereafter, the “unofficial Straits world”) has been connected and activated by Chinese migration flows. Penang’s connection with Medan (north Sumatra) and Phuket (south Thailand) is a typical example. In Medan and Phuket, the late 19^th century and the early 20^th century saw the spread of mining and plantation businesses and secret societies along with the influx of migration of the Straits Chinese from Penang. Throughout the 20^th century before and after decolonization, such migration flows were sustained so that individuals could circumvent persecution in one territory by seeking refuge in another. Even after the colonial period, this “unofficial Straits tradition” as a colonial legacy has been utilized in periodic political crises in postcolonial Malaysia and Indonesia as well as in Thailand. For example, repeated anti-Chinese movements at the times of turning points of political development in Indonesia (in the late 1950s, 1965, and 1998) have re-activated past experiences of cross-border networks of Chinese immigrants, connecting Penang and Phuket with Medan. The fact that they have crossed the Malacca Strait in search of a better business environment and education opportunity as well as safety means the cross-border migration in the era of nation-building takes various forms such as the relocation of a business base, studying abroad, internships, and marriage in addition to taking refuge. A question that arises from these findings is what these refugees’ “home” is; one’s birthplace, present parental residence, and ancestral homeland may not be the same. If the cross-border Chinese migration flow has been the connecting force of the territories within the “unofficial Straits world,” its unique nature lies in the diffused reflections of the very concept of “home” itself.

The objective of this study was to consider stances of ulama on modern state and control over shari‘ah interpretation by the Malaysian government. This study analyzed materials on kafir （infidel） declaration including fatwas in Malaysia in the 1980s. The main focus of the study was discourses by Parti Islam SeMalaysia （PAS） or Islamic Party of Malaysia and contradictions by the government. PAS was founded by ulama in the Malay Peninsula in the 1950s. PAS played a role as a political platform of ulama to confront with the government. In the former half of the 1980s PAS attacked the government for its secular − or infidel − characteristics. In this period the conflict between ulama and the government was most fierce in the Malaysian history.

When PAS declared the Malaysian government to be infidel, the government competed by issuing fatwas by official muftis. In Malaysia there are enactments to regulate issuance of fatwa. Issuance of fatwa is monopolized by official Fatwa Committees under Majlis Agama Islam or Islamic religious Council in each state. After an official fatwa is published in a gazette, the fatwa becomes binding. All Muslims in the state must follow it. Actions or discourse against the gazetted fatwa are penalized according to the enactments. Such state control on fatwa is very rare in the history of the Muslim world.

Although the government attempted to regulate kafir declaration by PAS, the confrontation escalated and an armed conflict broke out in 1985. In Memali, state of Kedah, a PAS leader called Ibrahim Libya was swooped by security force. Ibrahim was known by his judgment against the “infidel” government. As a result of the conflict, Ibrahim himself and his 14 followers were killed. After the incident, the way of burial for victims became an issue between PAS and the government. PAS tried to mobilize ulama in Majlis Agama in Kedah, and attempted to obtain an official fatwa to bury victims as martyrs. The burial as martyrs meant that Ibrahim’s death was the result of legitimate uprising against the infidel government. However, PAS failed in the attempt. The attempt by PAS reflected ambivalent stance on the state control on fatwa. Although the fatwa control is a regulation on shari‘ah interpretation by ulama, it is also an opportunity for ulama to utilize state power to influence on the Muslim society.

The state control on fatwa was a part of the nationalization of Islamic affairs by the Malaysian government. Because of such nationalization policies, the authority of ulama declined in long term. Ulama were involved in bureaucracy and lost their own voices as teachers, scholars, and muftis. PAS can be considered as an attempt by ulama to retain their authority as shari‘ah interpreter through a political platform. However, state power was fascinating and even PAS was not necessarily against the nationalization of Islamic affairs. The controversy on kafir declaration and fatwa showed the dilemma of ulama between shari‘ah and the state.