抄録
The electric power market of Japan has been locally monopolized for a long time. But, like many countries, Japan is moving forward with the deregulation of its electric power industry so that any power generation company could sell electric power in the market. The power price, however, will fluctuate inevitably to balance the power supply and demand. A new appropriate market design is indispensable when introducing new market mechanisms in the electric power market to avoid undesirable results of the market.
The first stage of deregulation will be the competition between an existing large-scaled power utility and a new power generation company. In this paper we have investigated the wholesale market with competition of these two power companies based on a simulation model approach. Under the competitive situation the effects of exogenous disturbance may bring serious results and we estimated the influence on the market when the price of fossil fuel rises.
The conclusion of this study is that several types of Nash equilibriums have been found in the market: the larger the new power generation company becomes, the higher the electricity price under the Nash equilibriums rises. Because of the difference in their structure of generation capacity, the existing large-scaled power utility gets more profit while the new power generation company loses its profit when the price of fossil fuel rises.