The purpose of this paper is to clarify the mechanisms of the develop-and-import scheme of rush products (tatami and goza rush mats) by Japanese trading firms from the viewpoint of economic geography. The results of this study are summarized as follows:
Import of rush products to Japan has increased remarkably since the mid-1980s. In this increase, Japanese trading firms located in older rush production areas have played significant roles. Especially the trading firms located in Okayama Prefecture have had control of the organization of the importers’ association, and have a large share in importing rush products from China.
The business procedures of Japanese trading firms in China are examined, taking the cases of the three largest trading firms (TOKURA & CO., LTD., IKEHIKO Corporation, and HAGIHARA & CO., LTD.). These trading firms have had connections with the Chinese market since before World War II, and these connections have contributed to extending their procurements in China after the mid-1980s. Moreover, these trading firms have arranged their procurement bases in Zhejiang Province, where the conditions for rush cultivation are the most ideal in China. The procurement strategies of Japanese trading firms have many similarities, and their behavior has had an influence on the remarkable development of the export regions in Zhejiang Province.
The development mechanisms of rush product suppliers by Japanese trading firms are examined. As a result, it is clear that Japanese trading firms started business relations with Chinese suppliers through production share trade, because it is very difficult to ensure the rush production materials in China. In addition, Japanese trading firms frequently give skilled technical guidance to their suppliers, because most of the Chinese workers have no experience in weaving rush products. Eventually, Japanese trading firms have developed their suppliers by transfering their domestic production materials and skills to China. However, the skill level of the rush product suppliers in Zhejiang Province is still insufficient and Japanese trading firms still rely somewhat on their relations with domestic rush production areas even now.
The author draws two conclusions on the mechanisms of the develop-and-import scheme by Japanese agribusiness. First, Japanese agribusinesses consider not only cost factors but also historical relations with the country, natural conditions in production areas, and the skill level of suppliers when they develop export-oriented regions in foreign countries. Second, the relationships between Japanese agribusinesses and their domestic production areas should be paid much attention, when we examine the mechanisms of develop-and-import schemes by Japanese agribusinesses.
