心理学研究
Online ISSN : 1884-1082
Print ISSN : 0021-5236
原著論文
社会的ジレンマ状況で非協力をもたらす監視罰則──ゲーミングでの例証──
北梶 陽子大沼 進
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ジャーナル フリー

2014 年 85 巻 1 号 p. 9-19

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This research demonstrated the negative influence of monitoring and punishing during a social dilemma game, taking the illegal dumping of industrial waste as an example. The first study manipulated three conditions: a producing-industries monitoring condition (PIM), an administrative monitoring condition (ADM), and a control condition (no monitoring). The results showed that non-cooperative behavior was more frequent in the PIM condition than in the control condition. The second study had three conditions: a punishing condition (PC), a monitoring condition (MC), and a control condition (no monitoring, no punishing). The results indicated that non-cooperative behavior was observed the most in the PC, and the least in the control condition. Furthermore, information regarding other players’ costs and benefits was shared the most in the control conditions in both studies. The results suggest that sanctions prevent people from sharing information, which decreases expectations of mutual cooperation.

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© 2014 公益社団法人 日本心理学会
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