Learning in perception. “Spirit is in perception already memory” pointed out H. Bergson in his Matter and Memory. One and the same object (stimulus) comes to evoke different phenomenal worlds in perception as it is repeatedly given and becomes familiar to us. The concept of one-to-one correspondence between stimulus and phenomenon in perception was rejected as ‘Konstanzannahme’ by Gestalt theory of perception. Isomorphism, however, has taken no notice of the phenomenal modification (e.g. in visual perception) by learning. The learning theory must deal with the phenomenal modification in perception as well as in behavior.
The concepts of stratum, context and attribute. As Koffka has pointed out, the repetition of behavior in learning is not the repetition of ‘accomplishment’; it is the repetition of ‘process’. This ‘process’ which indicates ‘means-end relation’ is the concept of context itself. And the modification of ‘accomplishment’ in the sense of proficiency may be regarded as that of stratum. While context means pattern of molar behavior, attribute indicates unit (or element) of molecular behavior. In the case of perception, Wundt's ‘sensation’ is attribute, Robin's ‘F-G’ articulation (in general, Gestalt) context, and the phenomenal modification in perception (which is as it were, evoked by the proficiency of seeing, that is, perceptional learning of, one and the same stimulus), modification of stratum.
Consciousness in status nascendi. An idea (Vorstellung) must be defined as a ‘memory-attitude’ which adjusts us to the coming stimuli. The image-like character of an idea, then, is only one of the phases of this attitude. And this attitude as an idea, being formed by learning conjugately with given stimuli, is always accompanied by a peculiar consciousness (consciousness in status nascendi) which can foresee the coming event. Therefore, this consciousness indicates the completions of the learning of a certain task in a given environment, that is, the learning of a certain context in the highest stratum. Our behavior in everyday life owes to this consciousness, its smoothness and its ‘readiness’ to behave in conformity with the ‘cultural pattern.’
Behavioral structure of perception. The modification of perceptional phenomenon by learning does not imply the modification of context, but of stratum. It seems that even Gestalt psychology has confined its studies on perception to the problems of context; Gestalt is only a ‘model’ concept, which is too abstract to describe concrete perceptions. For every concrete perception is full of ‘meaning.’ And it is the consciousness in status nascendi as ‘conation’ that creates the concrete perception and gives it the ‘meaning.’ The nature of perception does not consist in copying the external world but in adjusting us to the coming stimuli. Therefore, the fact that a concrete perception is full of ‘meaning’ implies that it has some behavioral character which is beyond F-G articulation. While the so-called ‘Einstellung’ determines the context of perception, learning determines its stratum.
Two cases of ‘constancy.’ When one and the same stimulus has become familiar to us, and the perceptional learning has been completed, the phenomenal world keeps constancy in its behavioral structure regardless of the shape of retinal image of the stimulus. While the so-called ‘constancy, ’ which is defined as the ‘phenomenal regression to the real object’ by Thouless, is the constancy of a lower stratum, the constancy in behavioral structure may be called that of a higher stratum; while the constancy in a lower stratum means the constancy of context, the constancy in a higher stratum means the
