科学哲学
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
クオリアなんて怖くない
クオリア・マニフェスト(哲学ヴァージョン)1
美濃 正
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ジャーナル フリー

1999 年 32 巻 2 号 p. 39-51

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The main aim of this paper is to argue for the following two theses: (1) so-called qualia are irreducibly non-physical properties of certain brain states, and (2) in spite of (1), qualia can be legitimately accommodated into a broadly physicalistic framework. On behalf of (1), what might be regarded as a variation of F. Jackson's 'knowledge-argument' is put forward and also a refutation of P. M. Churchland's objection that qualia are but physical properties (of certain brain states) as they are introspectively accessed is attempted. On behalf of thesis (2), the idea of qualia's supervening and nomologically depending upon brain states' physical properties is deployed. A radical criticism of some sceptical arguments concerning qualia is also included.

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