At 475d1─476d6 in Plato’s Republic, Socrates and Glaucon speak about “sightlovers”（philotheamones）, people who are eager to see any theatrical performancebut not interested in Forms. Socrates says that sight-lovers do not possess “knowledge”（epistēmē）but only “belief” （doxa）. Glaucon imagines that they would be offended to hear this and would object. So Socrates presents an argument to persuade the sight-lovers that his description of them is correct （476e4─480a13）. Interpreters have seldom addressed the question of whether the sight-lovers would have been persuaded by Socrates’ argument. The aim of this paper is to show that they would have been persuaded. The challenge is to show how the sight-lovers, who do not subscribe to the theory of Forms, could accept the argument that rests on that theory（on any interpretation）.
　For this purpose, I first present an interpretation of the argument, according to which, “what（perfectly）is” means what is perfectly f（say, beautiful）and refers, for Socrates, to Forms collectively. For Socrates, knowledge concerned with f is acquaintance with Form F, and at the same time, the sufficient understanding of what f is; while belief is acquaintance with f sensibles and an insufficient understanding of what f -ness is.
　The key to understanding how the sight-lovers would have been persuaded is to notice that initially they would probably take “what is perfectly beautiful” as referring to exemplarily beautiful sensibles, such as theatrical performances. Without accepting the theory of Forms, they could accept the premise stated at 477a3─4 about the correlation between the degrees of F-ness and the degrees of intelligibility. It is at 479a5-b7 that Socrates makes the sight-lovers accept that no sensible can qualify as “what perfectly is.” They might accept this, since they know from experience, say, that the same theatrical piece once found most beautiful may turn out to be awful depending on the circumstances of performance. By the end of the argument, the sight-lovers are such as neither determinately to reject nor clearly to recognize the existence of Forms.
　To conclude, I address the following question: If Socrates could have persuaded the sight-lovers that they lack knowledge, as I have argued, then, what does this fact mean for the broader context in the Republic, in particular Socrates’conception of the ideal city?

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This paper proposes to elucidate the volitional basis of deontology in Aquinas’s ethics.
　We analyze the concept of commanding（imperare）as a clue to this purpose. In the Summa Theologiae I-II, Question 17, Article 1, Aquinas says that to command is essentially an act of reason, based on an act of will because reason’s role is to order another to do something by way of intimation. Although the will can be commanded by reason, the mutual series between will and reason cannot proceed ad infinitum. Aquinas says that the first act of will comes not from reason, but from an “instinct” of a higher cause, i.e., God.
　Aquinas believes that the first act of will is necessarily to intend the ultimate end, which means perfect good. Human beings can freely select any other end and any other means than the ultimate end, in comparison with what perfect good means.
　In the Summa Theologiae I-II, Question 94, Article 2, Aquinas suggests the first precept of natural law is unconditional duty, saying “good ought to be done and pursued and evil ought to be avoided.” We can interpret this precept in greater detail by saying that because the will necessarily intend the ultimate end, human good, which is ordered to the ultimate end by reason, ought to be done.
　Moreover, the characteristic of duty remains in the virtuous act, even that of charity（caritas）, a theological virtue infused by God’s grace. This is because it is necessary for human beings to intend the ultimate end until attaining it by seeing God’s essence directly, something impossible in this life.
　 In conclusion, we can say that the first act of will, i.e., necessarily intending the ultimate end, is the volitional basis of deontology in Aquinas’s ethics.

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Der handlungsorientierte kategorische Imperativ: „Handle so, daß du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchest.“ zeigt uns, dass Kants Ethik auf den Begriff der Menschheit gründet. Dennoch ist die Bedeutung der Menschheit noch umstritten. Manche moderne Kantianer verstehen sie als Eigenschaften, die ein Kriterium dafür bieten, eine Person zu sein. Aber die Formel warnt uns davor, die Menschheit bloß als Mittel zu gebrauchen. Daher ist die Menschheit keine gegebene Eigenschaft der einzelnen Personen, sondern etwas, das durch unsere Handlungen hervorgebracht und erst dann realisiert warden kann.
　Diese Deutung wird von Kants Text bestätigt: Er bezeichnet sie oft als das menschliche moralische Ideal. Das bedeutet eine moralische Vollkommenheit, deren Essenz darin besteht, dass der Wille nur durch die Vernunft bestimmt wird. Dagegen ist der menschliche Wille fast immer von Neigungen bestimmt. Darum ist diese moralische Vollkommenheit das Ideal für den Menschen und Kant bezeichnet sie auch als Heiligkeit: „Der Mensch ist zwar unheilig genug, aber die Menschheit in seiner Person muß ihm heilig sein“.
　Um diese rätselhafte Tatsache zu deuten, treten wir in Kants Religionsphilosophie ein. Wenn sich der Mensch unter dem Postulat der Unsterblichkeit der Seele moralisch bestrebt, kann er durch eine Änderung der Sitten nur nach und nach Tugend erwerben（virtus phaenomenon）. Aber wenn er sich den „Sohn Gottes“ als die moralisch vollkommene Menschheit zum Vorbild nimmt, kann er eventuell die Sinnesänderung seiner Seele, die zur Heiligkeit führt, durchführen （virtus noumenon）. Die Idee „Sohn Gottes“ gehört nicht zur geschichtlichen christlichen Religion, sondern zum Vernunftsglauben, weil Kant das Festhalten an den von der praktischen Vernunft gebotenen moralischen Gesetze unterstützt. Es gibt einen der Menschheit ähnlichen Begriff: Persönlichkeit. Sie bedeutet „die Idee der Menschheit ganz intellektuell betrachtet“. Dennoch bezeichnet Kant sie nicht als heilig. Worauf der Mensch als homo phaenomenon durch seine Sinnesänderung und Taten abzielen sollte, ist Menschheit, nicht Persönlichkeit.

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the referent of the “we” that appears in G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit（1807）and its intended significance for “we”. This attempt is accomplished by the immanent analysis of the relationship between “we” and the consciousness, whose path to “absolute knowing” is the focus of Phenomenology. Consequently, it is revealed that “we” refers to the public who are contemporary with Hegel, and Phenomenology must be planned as an educational project（das Bildung）for the public or a kind of public selfenlightenment.
　In contrast to Hegel’s later work, Science of Logic（1812─13/16/32）, whose subject is the “speculative thinking” abstracted from the empirical world, the subject of Phenomenology seems to be obscure. Phenomenology describes the developmental path of consciousness headed for “absolute knowing,” but according to Hegel, “we” contemplates（zusehen）its path without any interruption. Since Hegel’s explanation for the methodological role of “we” is not sufficient and he lacks an account of its referent, there has been controversy on this subject. Some interpret the “we” as a philosopher or Hegel himself who has already attained “absolute knowing.” Others interpret the “we” as the reader of Phenomenology, who only reflects upon consciousness in each stage of its development.
　Then, first, this paper shows that both interpretations do not correspond to Hegel’s description of “we.” Second, it presents the real figure of “we” based on the analysis of the first shape of consciousness, “sense-certainty.” Besides, by comparison with the “we” in J. G. Fichte’s early philosophy（the Science of Knowledge）, the distinctive feature of the phenomenological “we” becomes clear: the referent of “we” is indefinite and open. Therefore, “we” should be considered as the public, including the scholars and citizens of various philosophical or even non-philosophical positions. From this perspective, accordingly, the significance of Hegelian philosophy is interpreted as a radical self-examination of the public and the self-transformation of its knowledge.

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Die Abhandlung erklärt den Dynamismus in Hegels Philosophie des objektiven Geistes aus der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Begriff der ,Leidenschaft‘ in seiner Geschichtsphilosophie und demjenigen des ,Bedürfnisses‘ in seiner Rechtsphilosophie. Hegels Schema der ,welthistorischen Individuen‘, mittels deren Leidenschaften und der hieraus resultierenden Handlungen sich die Idee in der Weltgeschichte verwirkliche, wurde bisher meist vor dem Hintergrund des ,Systems der Bedürfnisse‘ in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft interpretiert. Diese Interpretation scheint aus heutiger Sicht jedoch ungenügend, da sie bestimmte Im plikationen der Hegelschen Geistphilosophie übersieht. Der adequate Nachvollzug dieser Implikationen ‒ der hier hinsichtlich der Unterscheidung der Begriffe ,Leidenschaft‘ und ,Bedürfnis‘ unter Berücksichtigung ihres jeweiligen Kontextes geleistet werden soll ‒ scheint aber auch erst vor dem Hintergrund einiger Ergebnisse rezenter Forschung zu den Vorlesungsnachschriften überhaupt möglich.
　（1）Beim Begriff des Bedürfnisses kommt es auf die Anerkennung des Selbstbewusstseins an. Im System der Bedürfnisse handeln diejenigen selbstbewussten, autonomen und denkenden Subjekte, die durch die Bildung der（leiblichen）Gewohnheit, der Arbeit（bzw. der aus ihr resultierenden Geschicklichkeit）sowie der Sprache verwirklicht worden sind.（2）Der Begriff der Leidenschaft hingegen ist im Kontext der Philosophie des Geistes mit dem Begriff der ,Verrücktheit‘ verwandt. In der Verrücktheit wird die Totalität des Geistes in einer besonderen Bestimmung fixiert und die Struktur des Bewusstseins desselben erschüttert. Demgemäß darf das von einer Leidenschaft getriebene Individuum nicht mit dem gebildeten Subjekt der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verwechselt werden. Ersteres vermag anders als letzteres sowohl die ganze Struktur des Bewusstseins, als auch die gegebene sittliche Ordnung zu revolutionieren, indem der Geist durch es die noch unbewussten Inhalte aus dem Reich des bewusstlos Aufbewahrten（,Schacht‘）zu Tage fördert.
　Zwar lassen sich daraus natürlich keine unmittelbar praktischen Grundsätze ziehen. Sehr wohl aber dürfte auf diese Weise ersichtlich werden, dass und wie sich der Geist Hegel zufolge zum Subjekt nicht nur bildet, sondern immer auch umbildet, gar revolutioniert.

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Heidegger’s term Eigentlichkeit is generally translated into authenticity. This translation often leads us to the assumption that there is something authentic. But Heidegger uses this term to express human Dasein’s modus. He says Dasein is to be grasped through how Dasein is, contrasted with other entities which are grasped through what they are. This means that Dasein is always variable and has no regular modus, including an authentic one. This being taken into consideration, the conclusion is drawn that authenticity is inappropriate to express Eigentlichkeit.
　The term Eigentlichkeit in the thought of Heidegger is chosen “in a strict sense”. The sense of this term lies in eigen, which is own in the primary meaning. Following this, we should translate Eigentlichkeit into own-ness or ownedness（eigen, i. e. own is the past participle in its origin）. This translation matches with the way Dasein exists; Dasein exists in a modus in each case, which means that Dasein owns his or her temporary modus in each case. Eigentlichkeit is owned by Dasein in each case. Therefore, Dasein can lose Eigentlichkeit in each case, Dasein can be in its negation（Uneigentlichkeit） in each case.
　The above matches also with the definition of Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit. They are both based on the fact that Dasein is in general determined by mineness-in-each-case（Jemeinigkeit）. Dasein is always concerned about whether Eigentlichkeit is owned or not.
　Heidegger regards the business of philosophy as the preservation of the power of the most elemental words. Otherwise, the words would be flattened by the common understanding and levelled off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of illusory problems. This is true specifically of the term Eigentlichkeit.

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In Being and Time（Sein und Zeit）, Martin Heidegger points out that the personality of a person who is aware of their mortality is individualistic, and they seem not to have relationships with others. By contrast, in The Human Condition（Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben）, Hanna Arendt emphasizes the relations between others as “action”（Handeln）.
　In this article, I first of all endeavor to compare the “being-with”（Mitsein）in Being and Time with the “action” in The Human Condition, and from there attempt to reinterpret the Dasein as a performer of the action. This argument indicates that we are “with” others precisely in actions involved in unpredictable possibilities.
　Secondly, I focus on authenticity, which is disclosed when the Dasein is anticipating death and the existential structure of our “who” is revealed. It would appear that “individualization” and “no relation” negate being with others in the world, but this existential metamorphosis into authenticity is our transformation into Dasein as a performer of action in the world with others through our becoming aware that we are each a unique “who” who cannot be defined in the world.
　Death as the most extreme possibility is neither a predictable possibility nor an unpredictable possibility on the line that extends from the present into the future, but it shows that we ourselves are beings with potential in the sense of making these possibilities.
　By clearly showing the relationship between authenticity and the performer of the “action”, I endeavor to point out that the thoughts of Heidegger and Arendt are not opposing, but rather complement each other. Finally, this article shows that it is precisely because plural “whos” who are the most unique “beings with potential” when anticipating death face each other that actions have the characteristics of newness and initiative as if they were a “second birth.”

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In der heutigen Zeit der Wissenschaft und Technologie bewegen wir uns überall und vor allem mit dem Prinzip der Nützlichkeit. Heideggers Betrachtung in seinem Vortrag „Die Frage nach der Technik“ zufolge wird der Mensch in der Struktur der modernen Technik ausschließlich dazu herausgefordert, das Wirkliche als „Bestand“, d. h. Nützliches, zu bestellen. In der Struktur der modernen Technik wird das Wirkliche immer bloß als „Bestand“ entborgen. Demgemäß hat der Mensch in der Struktur der modernen Technik keine andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung mehr, und er würde dann die Möglichkeit verlieren, sein eigenes Wesen zu erkennen, wonach er eigentlich zum Entbergen gehört. Darin hat Heidegger die Gefahr der modernen Technik aufgezeigt, und gerade dort hat er aber in der Kunst, vor allem im Dichterischen, eine Möglichkeit des „Rettenden“ angedeutet.
　Der heideggerschen Erläuterung der Dichtung Hölderlins zufolge wird das Seiende in der Dichtung durch die dichterische Nennung mit dem wesentlichen Wort erst zu dem ernannt, was es ist. Mit anderen Worten: In der Dichtung wird das Seiende mit dem wesentlichen Wort als das Seiende enthüllt. Dieses Wesen der Dichtung hat, meiner Interpretation nach, der Haiku-Dichter Matsuo Basho schon früher verstanden und selber in solcher Weise Haiku-Gedichte verfaßt. Auch bei ihm zeigt sich die Dichtung qua poiēsis, wie Heidegger gesprochen hat, als die Entbergung, d. h. die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit der Natur.
　In diesem Sinne könnte die Dichtung gerade im Zeitalter der modernen Technik zur Rehabilitierung der vielfältigen Möglichkeiten der Entbergung beitra gen. Vom heideggerschen Gesichtspunkt her würde die Dichtung also uns den Menschen dazu erwecken, die „Unverborgenheit“ des Seienden zu hüten. Demnach dürfte man in der Dichtung eine Möglichkeit des „Rettenden“ im Zeitalter der modernen Technik anerkennen.

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Généralement, on pense que le sacré est un concept pour définir l’essence de la religion. La religion est basée sur la distinction entre le sacré et le profane, et le sacré, qui est isolé de la région profane, a l’ambiguïté du pur et de l’impur, et du faste et du néfaste. Contrairement à cela, ces dernières années, de nombreux doutes sur le concept du sacré et le dualisme du sacré et du profane ont été soumis. Une telle critique pourrait également être dirigée vers Georges Bataille, qui employait le sacré comme un concept important de sa pensée. D’une part, il acceptait le dualisme de Durkheim dans « hétérologie », mais d’autre part, dans le compte rendu sur L’homme et le sacré de Caillois, il dirait que la différence entre le sacré et le profane n’était que celle de « l’angle de vue ». Cet article vise à défendre la théorie du sacré chez Bataille contre les critiques du concept du sacré, et à montrer sa possibilité de surmonter la distinction entre le sacré et le profane.
　D’abord, après avoir confirmé la position du sacré dans la sociologie religieuse de Durkheim, nous montrons que, dans La structure psychologique du fascisme （1933）, Bataille a remplacé le sacré et le profane par l’hétérogénéité et l’homogénéité et a analysé la structure sociale avec ces concepts. Ensuite, nous prouvons que, dans La théorie de la religion（1947）, il a repris le sacré comme le problème d’une conscience de soi, et le monde sacré et le monde profane coïncident dans « la nuit du non-savoir ». Et enfin, il devient clair que, dans La guerre et la philosophie du sacré （1951）, Bataille a atteint à l’ambiguïté entre le sacré et le profane en saisissant la relation entre les deux comme celle entre la totalité du monde et les objets isolés. De cette façon, on conclut que Bataille peut surmonter le dualisme et considérer le sacré comme un problème général de la vie humaine qui ne se limite pas à la religion.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of modern natural image in Hans Jonas’ works. Jonas is a 20th century German philosopher who is well known as one of the most influential pioneers in the field of bioethics and environmental ethics. His primary work The Imperative of Responsibility［1979］indicates the potentially catastrophic character of technological civilization and emphasizes the necessity of developing a new ethical theory in response. However, Jonas focuses not only on the individual danger of technological products, but also modern natural image as a cause. According to Jonas, this image is ontologically “worth-neutral” and can be characterized as an “Ethical Vacuum.” Jonas analyzes its historical origin and considers the fundamental danger of such ontology on human beings. These thoughts on the modern natural image should be regarded as a pilot study on new ethics in Hans Jonas’ works. However, it is difficult to understand these concepts completely because Jonas has not presented them systematically. He conducted this analysis not in a single work, but only in fragments. Few preceding studies on Jonas have focused on the modern natural image but it has not been clarified in totality. Since these thoughts should be regarded as a pilot study on new ethics in technological civilization, they inevitably need clarification to understand his ethical theory. Hence, this paper attempts to reconstruct his thoughts on modern natural image from related works and present it in entirety.

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This paper aims to contribute to the research into the philosophy̶in particular, the ethics̶of Arnold Gehlen: one of the most famous representatives of “philosophical anthropology.” At the same time, it endeavors to make a contribution, albeit slight, to ethics in general by critically analyzing his ethics. Because the meaning and problems of Gehlen’s ethics cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the main point of his philosophical anthropology̶that is, his fundamental view of the human being̶this paper first discusses this view and then proceeds to explore his ethics. In the first part, I explain Gehlen’s belief that, unlike all other species, the human being is independent from（almost）all biological instincts and is consequently the totally cultural（non-biological）being. In this part, I also explain that this belief cannot be supported from the perspective of modern biology（evolutionary theory）. In the second part, I illuminate that, in contradiction to his fundamental view of man, Gehlen’s pluralistic ethics takes biological components into consideration. I demonstrate at the same time that, besides this theoretically problematic contradiction, there are many other problems in his ethics: unclear and inconsistent explanations of four fundamental moral principles, contradictory arguments about the sharp antagonism between the moral principle of institution（state）and the morality of the Enlightenment（which promotes some other moral principles）, etc. Finally, I argue that, in spite of all these problems, Gehlen’s ethics has at least one advantage over the ethics of philosophers such as Habermas and Honneth, who criticize his ethics on many points: in contrast to the latter ethics, Gehlen’s ethics admits and is open to a certain meaning of biological（evolutionary）elements in our social and moral life̶a meaning that seems to be undeniable in light of modern biology（modern evolutionary theory）.

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Nous avons pour objectif d’éclaircir la signification du dialogue chez Weil dans sa Logique de la philosophie. Il suggère sa propre logique, dans laquelle le dialogue est un moment essentiel: en effet, selon lui c’est le dialogue qui constitue le discours. Le discours lui-même implique la contradiction, et il essaie de s’orienter vers la cohérence à travers la négation qu’il subit. Pourtant, la cohérence ne s’achève jamais, elle continue d’exister comme Idée au sens kantien. Le dialogue se maintient par les discours contradictoires, qu’il nomme violence: ainsi la violence se rapporte à la logique. C’est la vérité et la violence qui s’opposent, non pas la vérité et la fausseté. Le philosophe a peur de la violence au sens weilien; il ouvre le dialogue dans le but de créer un discours cohérent. Le dialogue que Weil suppose donne de l’importance à sa cohérence pour qu’il choisisse l’accord ou le silence, c’est-à-dire l’abstention de toute communication. Cela ne signifie pas l’incapacité du dialogue, mais indique que la tâche de la philosophie, en délimitant le domaine du dialogue, se pose en tant que confrontation à la violence. Ainsi, le dialogue chez Weil montre que la logique appartient intrinsèquement à une communauté donnée.

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The early non-cognitivists in metaethics used to claim that moral sentences such as “torture is wrong” are neither true nor false, because they are merely expressions of our attitudes or emotions. By contrast, more recent non-cognitivists have come to acknowledge that there are in fact moral truths, i.e., moral sentences that are true. This change of view is often defended by appealing to the so-called minimalist or deflationary theory of truth, according to which “true” is simply an expressive device for agreement or endorsement, so that there is nothing more in saying “S is true” than in saying S itself. With this theory on truth in hand, it becomes surely possible for non-cognitivists to recognize the existence of moral truths, since they can sincerely accept some moral sentences.
　However, in my view this is not an appropriate way for non-cognitivists to accommodate the moral truth. A first difficulty is the problem of “creeping minimalism”, which is to the effect that once non-cognitivists invoke the minimalism about truth, they cannot stop invoking minimalism about other notions （such as belief and fact）, so that they end up collapsing into realism. A second difficulty is that the appeal to the truth minimalism makes it difficult for noncognitivists to admit the legitimacy of constitutive explanations about truth in other domains than ethics. A third difficulty is that the appeal to the truth minimalism makes the significance of explanatory project by quasi-realists hardly intelligible.
　After considering these difficulties, in the final part of the paper I propose an alternative strategy for non-cognitivists. It consists in holding the “functionalism about truth”, according to which truth is a functionally defined and multiply realizable property. By endorsing this view, I argue, non-cognitivists can successfully meet the three difficulties mentioned above, so it is recommended for them to accept it.

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“Imina,” the custom that prohibited people from addressing each other by their personal names, was prevalent in pre-modern East Asia, including Japan. Today, most researchers accept this opinion, which was given in a famous study by Hozumi Nobushige. However, Motoori Norinaga, one of the most prestigious scholars in Kokugaku, had a different idea. He argued that “Imina” was only a Chinese custom, and that it did not exist in ancient Japan. Previous research contradicted him, but did not discuss the reason for his insistence. Thus, there is a problem with regard to understanding the meaning of “Imina” in his thought.
　From this point of view, this study firstly focuses on how he described “Imina” in accordance with “Kojikiden” and “Tamakatsuma.” In these texts, he animadverted on it strongly as “Karagokoro”, the word that he usually use for attacking Confucians. Therefore, “Imina” has a particular meaning in his thought. Second, we examine the history of the idea of “Imina” in the Edo period. We refer to several scholars, including Suzuki Teisai, Dazai Shundai, Arai Hakuseki, Murata Harumi, and Mencius, and disclose that the belief at that time was that “Imina” was based on the emotion of sorrow for the dead. In other words, sorrow for the dead prohibits the use of a person’s name. Finally, we consider why Norinaga attacked “Imina.” In an annotation in “Kojikiden,” he stated that sorrow for the dead should give rise to the impulse to call a person by name, according to a Japanese poem by Kakinomoto Hitomaro. Moreover, he explained that we should express our feelings without protesting with one of his the most important ideas, “Magokoro.” Based on these thoughts, “Imina” was a bad custom that covered “Magokoro” and had to be criticized as “Karagokoro” by him.

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