Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
Online ISSN : 1884-1228
Print ISSN : 0453-0691
ISSN-L : 0453-0691
Volume 8 , Issue 2
Showing 1-5 articles out of 5 articles from the selected issue
  • Yutaka TANAKA
    1992 Volume 8 Issue 2 Pages 49-67
    Published: March 05, 1992
    Released: February 16, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    This paper starts with the observation that the combination of the so-calld EPR argument and Bell's theorem reveals one of the most paradoxical features of quantum reality, i.e. the no-separability of two contingent events. If we accept the conclusion of the revised EPR argument together with Bell's theorem, we are necessarily led to the denial of local causality which was presupposed by the original version of Einstein's criticism against quantum physics.. As the concept of local causality is a cornerstone of Einstein's theory of relativity, we next consider the problem of compatibility between the theory of relativity and quantum physics. Popper's proposal of going back to Lorentz's theory is examined and rejected because the quantum correlation of EPR is not to be interpreted as “an action at a distance” which we can control and use as the operational definition of absolute simultaneity. An inquiry into something like aether as hidden reality behind the theory of relativity is considered as retrogressive as the so-called hidden variable theory of quantum physics. Accepting the non-separability of local elements of reality as the undeniable fact, we discuss the possibility of a realistic interpretation of quantum physics which transcends scientific materialism and classical determinism. As an example of such projects, Stapp's theory is examined with respect to a Whiteheadean process philosophy which provides the meta-physical background for his realistic interpretation of quantum physics. Finally, we present another version of quantum meta-physics based on “the philosophy of organism” which is broad enough to include observer and observed, local causality and non-local correlation, space and time, and potentiality and actuality in the inseparable unity of physical reality.
    Download PDF (1050K)
  • Peter P. KIRSCHENMANN
    1992 Volume 8 Issue 2 Pages 69-96
    Published: March 05, 1992
    Released: February 16, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Since its conception, the Anthropic Principle (AP) has been controversial. For some of its advocates, it replaces the Cosmological Principle and also marks a revolution in the accepted modes of scientific explanation. For critics, it is but a truism or tautology. Of course, the AP comes in various forms, ranging from plausible-sounding “weak” ones (WAP) to speculative “strong” ones (SAP) and even more speculative extreme versions. I shall survey, comment and expand on, already extant analyses of the value and use of APs, in its less speculative versions; I shall also compare the possible role of the AP with that of the principle of natural selection (PNS).
    In particular, I shall argue the following points. (1) The AP is neither a constitutive nor a framework principle of scientific theories. (2) The fact that the WAP, in the sense of a “self-selection” principle (or a warning against observational bias), can be given a Bayesian formulation shows only its role as a useful piece of methodological advice. (3) This implies that WAP-arguments can undermine claims, rule out or weaken hypotheses. (4) Unlike the PNS, the WAP is not a tautology, but a self-evident statement. (5) The WAP never is a substantial premise in AP-arguments or “AP-explanations”; it can at best heuristically guide one to employ arguments in its spirit. (6) In general, WAP-arguments cannot explain events or traits of the universe; they can reduce possible amazement concerning them. (7) While the PNS indicates how to construct equally tautological, though explanatory, models of evolutionary mechanisms, the APs are too unspecific to circumscribe any such set of models; AP-arguments borrow all explanatory accounts from elsewhere. (8) The SAP, when conjoined with one of the “many worlds”-hypotheses and their explanatory power, can indeed yield (highly speculative) explanations. (9) One kind of “AP-predictions” cannot derive any predictive power from the AP; another kind consists of meta-predictions about the future course of scientific theories; certain predictions using the SAP or even stronger principles and claimed to be testable are utterly speculative. (10) While the advocacy of the AP is “locally” restricted to a particular selection of cosmologists and astrophysicists, the scientific norms and standards in terms of which they endeavour to defend the principle are “non-local”, generally accepted, if generously interpreted, ones. In their light, the employment of the AP appears-even to some of its advocates-as a temporary stop-gap.
    Download PDF (1667K)
  • Tetsuya KONO
    1992 Volume 8 Issue 2 Pages 97-109
    Published: March 05, 1992
    Released: February 16, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (789K)
  • Masayuki OBAYASHI
    1992 Volume 8 Issue 2 Pages 111-116
    Published: March 05, 1992
    Released: February 16, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (282K)
  • Yoichiro P. MURAKAMI
    1992 Volume 8 Issue 2 Pages 117-120
    Published: March 05, 1992
    Released: March 31, 2009
    JOURNALS FREE ACCESS
    Download PDF (205K)
feedback
Top