The species problem is the longstanding puzzle regarding the nature of species. This paper aims to describe how biologists experience little communication breakdown when they have different conceptions of species. For this purpose, I analyze two debates on species and speciation between Guy Bush and Jerry Coyne & H. Allen Orr. Although they have radically different ideas on species, they experience little communication difficulty. I will argue that this is because they implicitly agreed on the referent of the group of organisms being addressed and possible causal factors of the speciation process. This analysis confirms a leading account in the general philosophy of science on the way in which scientists avoid the incommensurability threat.
There is a widely shared account of the distinction between types and tokens, which might be termed the standard account. However, it has some surprising consequences that are not always realized. According to the standard account, a type is a contingent abstract object that can be created by us, but it does not allow any change and can never be destroyed once it is created, because it is an abstract object. I would like to present an alternative account of types and tokens, according to which types are concrete objects that are located in space and time. This new account is based on a concept that I call a "token generator", which is something that specifies in detail how to produce the tokens.