This paper examines how Central and Eastern European people identify themselves and what factors tend to influence their identities, based on data from the CCEB (Candidate Country Eurobarometer) series. The paper deals with several identity-related indicators, such as European Identity (EI), National Identity (NI), European Pride (EP), National Pride (NP) and EU Image (EI) . EI, a core indicator, shows much fluctuation from survey to survey and from country to country. Secondly, average EI scores show little difference between the ten Central and Eastern European countries (the CEE10) and the 15 EU countries (the EU 15) . This may imply that the people of the CEE10 identify themselves just as the people of EU10 do. Thirdly, concerning mutual relations between identity-related indicators, a strong positive correlation is observed between EP and NP. It is also observed between EU Image and Support for EU Membership, and between Support for EU Membership and Voting Behaviour in a Referendum. Finally, several economic fundamentals are examined as possible factors influencing EI. It turns out that the rate of inflation and the ratio of government fiscal deficit to GDP may influence EI to some extent.
The aim of this essay is to investigate the political evolution of Putinism following the March 2004 presidential election and its aftermath. By 2003 Putin has evolved as unique political figure eliminating the remnants of Boris Yeltsin, by arresting a politicized oligarch, Boris Khodorkovskii and ousting Premier Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. His second tenure, however, turned out to be backlashed. The Beslan tragedy, orange revolution in Ukraine and others gave negative image of the second term Putin Presidency. By 2005, however, things seem to be normalized partly because of high energy prices. Property of oil and energy related company was redistributed among ‘Siloviki’ generals and the state. In Russia property was not totally independent from the power. In this political landscape, future of Putinism is discussed by the middle of 2005, whether he is going to change the game of presidential election, or he will appoint his successor.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russians, in search of an identity to unify their still vast country, are reevaluating a movement of the 1920s, Eurasianism. Why is Eurasianism attracting Russian attention again today? The main reason may be that Eurasianism, in designing an idealistic State system, took into account the unique spiritual, cultural and psychological factors of Russian history. This paper aims to make clear the spiritual foundations of Eurasianist thought. Eurasianism views the Orthodox Church as a spiritual foundation able to unite the whole Eurasian world. However, could the Orthodox Church really provide a common spiritual foundation for the vast cultural range of the various Ural-Altaic ethnics? To this question Eurasianists answer: “The ideal of Orthodoxy is a symphonic, organic and sobor-like unity of various religions.” The expression sobor-like unity derives from the Russian theological term sobornost, which signifies the central concept of the Orthodox Church, whereby the individual shares corporate life and unity, while retaining personal freedom. With this concept of sobornost they insist that the aim of Orthodoxy is not to erase the individuality of each pagan religion and Russianize it, but to create a symphonic world made up of various sounds. In support for this position, they say that there exists some similarity between the spirituality of Orthodoxy and some Eurasian pagan religions, including Buddhism. This similarity could be summed up in terms of the contiguity of the pantheism of religions such as Buddhism and the panentheistic tendency of Orthodoxy. Panentheism is the belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the entire universe. The Orthodox Church, which does not draw a sharp boundary between Nature and Grace, (a characteristic marvelously described in the words of Elder Zosima in the The Brothers Karamazov, ) is indeed panentheistic. When Eurasianists explain the peculiarity of their own culture and of the State system plan based on it, they use the key-concept symphonic personality (lichnost) . Lichnost is often translated as personality or individual, but this notion, which is obviously influenced by Orthodox ideas, is quite different from the usual Western meaning of individual. In Orthodoxy lichnost (the real personal Self) can be achieved only when it is opened to the whole, so it does not oppose the whole, rather it is enriched by it. The society of symphonic personalities is an idealistic organic united whole of plurality. However, Eurasianists also insist that it is a society where various levels of symphonic personalities are hierarchically united. This suggests that the smallest unit of lichnost, which is individual, might have the least autonomic value of itself. Berdyaev severely criticized the idea of symphonic personality, considering it a metaphysical foundation for human slavery. When we read the Eurasian project of a new State governing system named“iheocracy, ”we have to agree with Berdyaev's criticism of the“utopian etatism.”This is because“iheocracy”reminds us of theocracy on the one hand, and of the Soviet totalitarian system on the other. The idea of the symphonic personality comes from the idealism of sobornost and the tradition of philosophy of Unitotality. Eurasianists, in order to overcome the defects of both individualism and totalitarianism, eagerly searched for the symphonic unitotal community, but we have to say that the too hasty attempt to realize it“here and now”on earth, without due consideration of the moral cultivation of each individual, generates a serious danger of Utopianism.
Changing framework or institution for people's identification after the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of main issues to understand political order in contemporary Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) . In this context, constructing suitable collective identity is important project for statebuilding process in this region. As long as surveying institutionalization of citizenship in each Central Asian countries, it consisted with relatively wide tolerance for minorities including Russian citizens or natives. On the other hand, through the institutionalization of border control and visa regime, discrimination among citizenships is getting strict. In Central Asia, there is no appropriate conception to construct institutions, in which combinations of several multi-level identities, such as national, state and regional, harmonize interactively. Region-wide level identities in Central Asia have less affected than state-level ones because of their lack of measures to develop their unity. Although several security frameworks (the former Central Asian Cooperation Organization [CACO], Eurasia Economic Community [EurAsES], Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.) are reconstructed with their geographical enlargement, they are too vulnerable to establish a regional security identity. Emerging of the cascading framework of EurAsES-ODKB (Collective Security Treaty Organization) would not be a revival of Soviet identity. It covers only eastern side of Caspian Sea as the area of influence, while GUAM countries ignoring the area for the shifting of their interest toward Baltic Sea region. The cascading framework also needs physical and moral support from China inevitably.
The aim of this article is to clarify that Polish environmental policies and administration in the term of transition and EU accession period after 1989 have been promoted by policy “continuation” from socialist regime and policy “innovation” in the transition period. In other words, among many huge problems on the transition, this article points out that the Polish environmental administrational system as “continuation” from socialist regime interact with policy “innovation” in the transition period, and such environmental policies and administration have contributed to improvement of environmental quality in Poland. It is necessary for consideration for environmental policies to examine three elements; policies, system and implementation. In this article, the Polish environmental funds system as the most important system that provides financial resources for environmental improvements is focused on. This funds system has shared quite high ratio in environmental investment in Poland, and has spurred increase of this kind of investment. As a result of verification on the Polish environmental funds system, I point out that the Polish EU accession in environmental policies have to be considered not only from the aspect of transfusion of EU's acquis communautaire but also from the aspect of polish original environmental policies from socialist regime. The existences of ample environmental policies and systems in socialist period, the policy innovation to make environmental policies effective in the transition period, and environmental funds system have contributed improvement of Polish environmental situation and EU accession.
The Soviet collapse was one of the most significant events in the 20th century. The reason for it is still a controversial issue. The party apparat has been regarded as one of the key aspects of the Soviet-type political regime. It is well known that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had controlled state (executive) organs before perestroika through the party apparat's intervention. In addition, it is also well known that the party lost most of its control under Gorbachev's reform. There were two reorganizations of the party apparat under Gorbachev in 1988 after the 19th Party Conference and in 1990 after the 28th Party Congress. Researching these reorganizations may help us consider the reason for the Soviet collapse. This article investigates the decision-making and implementation processes of the party apparat reorganizations, and also looks into the structure and work of the party apparat. Utilising party archives that became available after the Soviet collapse, this article makes clear the following findings. Firstly, the first attempt to reorganize the party apparat in late 1988 had created a “power vacuum, ” though the party leadership intended to activate the economy by preventing the substitution (podmena) of the executive organs by the party. When the party stopped intervening in the executive organs, these bodies, which had depended on the party for a long time, also stopped working. The presidency, which was created in March 1990 in order to manage the “power vacuum, ” did not properly function either. Secondly, such a situation complicated further reform efforts. The second party apparat reorganization prolonged and not far-reaching especially in relation to security organs, though the party apparat certainly lost most of its ties with other state organs. In addition, despite the party leadership's intention to strengthen “political activity” of the party, the theoretical or ideological work did not improve. Thus, the communist party failed to transform itself into a normal political (or parliamentary) party, partially because of the “power vacuum.” Thirdly, losing its traditional administrative function and failing to achieve a new function, the party lost its raison d'être. The party organizations were disintegrating well before Russian President Yeltsin's decree on the suspension of the party's activity that was issued immediately after the attempted coup in August 1991.
After World War lithe Polish government planned to reconstruct the infrastructure and accelerate industrialization and urbanization. In 1949, the Communist Party declared that they built a metallurgical complex “Nowa Huta” on the outskirts of Krakow as the main project of a 6-year plan. It was not only a symbol of industrialization and modernization, but also of a drastic transformation of Poland in every field of social life in accordance with Socialist ideology. The Communist Party thought of it as the first socialist city in Poland and propagated it like as a utopia of labours. It organized a lot of young peasants, who had neither land to plow nor work in their hometowns, to migrate to Nowa Huta. They surged into this “modern”city. The peasants, however, were mainly motivated by money-making rather than by the ideology: “struggle against the class enemy” and so on. In the early years of Nowa Huta, most young people regularly went to church with pleasure, and many of them participated in the organization of “Sluzba Polsce” (Service to Poland) . There was no ideological consistency. People sometimes behaved as young labourers or stylish town dwellers, and at other times lived as traditional peasants or devout Christians. In addition to pursuing pleasure and their own interests, they embodied different kinds of ideologies and ideals at the same time. Life in Nowa Huta was not easy because of a lack of houses and a disordered social environment. A priest described the situation as chaotic, confused, and lawless. The party started to attack the church and banned the construction of a parish and any new parish churches. Inhabitants could not have their own parish church. Why would they keep religious practices and faith under these conditions? And how? One of influential factor was catechism. Even parents who had not been to church regularly made their children prepare for their first Communion. Few people refused it. In Poland, the customs, the manner of behaviours, and the calendar are closely related to Catholicism. The church, families, and the local society consisted in religious ceremonies and annual events. These practices depending on the family and the small community strongly connected the religion with their daily lives.
The purpose of this article is to examine Russia's motives and the process of its entry into the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation in the political and security area. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been evolving its multilateral diplomacy in this region. Today Russia participates in not only the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks, but also the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) . In post-cold war Asia Pacific, ASEAN's Forums which respect the consensus and the voluntarism and lead the regional cooperation mechanism coexist with the traditional bilateral alliances between the United States and the countries of the region. Some of the most compelling studies have explained Russia's heightened interest in the Asia Pacific in the latter half of the 1990s from the viewpoint of NATO enlargement. This interest, however, should also be examined in the context of the political and economic relations between Russia and the Asia Pacific countries. This paper focuses on Russia's political relations with ASEAN. First, the direction toward stressing multilateral institutions has roots in Gorbachev's diplomatic concept. Pre-Gorbachev Soviet security initiatives in Asia developed from the strategy of confrontation with western military blocks or containment of China. On the other hand, Gorbachev drew the lessons from ending their confrontation with capitalism. By doing so he succeeded in improving Soviet bilateral relations with a variety of countries in the Asia-Pacific, maintaining the stability of the international environment. In particular, Gorbachev aimed to expand the bilateral economic relations between the Soviet Union and the non-socialist countries such as Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN as well as participate in PECC, PBEC, and APEC to promote its Siberia and Far Eastern socioeconomic development. Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was first involved in the political and security cooperation led by ASEAN before entering the economic cooperation framework. This meant Russia was needed as a guarantor of peace and stability in Southeast Asia rather than just as an economic partner in Asia Pacific countries. Third, since the late 1990s Russia and ASEAN have gradually institutionalized their relationship. In 1996, when Russian Foreign Minister E. Primakov made a speech at the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences, he described ASEAN as the most important center of a multipolar world. In the first half of the 1990s Russia had little interest in the ASEAN regional forum because Russia devoted herself to democratization and the transition to a market economy. The priority in the foreign policy was given to the relationship with Europe, the United States, and the former republics of the Soviet Union. However, the NATO enlargement in 1997 led Russia to seek its own role in international relations. On the other hand, after the Asian Currency Crisis, ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea have been pursuing the problem solving mechanism which is not led by United States. Russia-ASEAN relations entered a new era with Russia's signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in November 2004. To Russia ASEAN is an “electoral district” to be recognized as a vital member of the Asian Pacific community.
The Russian population decreased between the two censuses conducted in 1989 and 2002 as a result mainly of an increase in male mortality and a decline in birth rates. My previous research focused on premature death or the high mortality rate of the male working-age population. In this paper, multi-regression analyses are applied to regional data from Russia, in order to clarify the relationship between male mortality by age and socio-economic factors in each region. The use of regional mortality rate by age as an independent variable in this paper is a new approach in this field of studies. The result demonstrates that among socio-economic factors analyzed in this paper, a drink-related crime rate (the rate of crimes committed under the influence of alcohol per 10, 000 people) most significantly correlates to high male mortality, and especially to high mortality in the younger cohort of working-age males. As was shown by earlier research, the increase in male mortality in Russia was mainly brought about by such causes of death as trauma and poisoning, including suicide and homicide, and diseases of the circulatory system, all of which often originate in heavy consumption of alcohol. The conclusion of this paper also confirms this observation. By comparison with this factor, the economic factors analyzed in this paper, i.e. per capita money income and the unemployment rate, have weaker correlations to high male mortality. But both factors have statistical significance in regression equations concerning working-age males and the middle age cohort (35-44 years old) among them. While per capita income has a negative correlation with mortality, with respect to the unemployment rate a negative correlation (i.e., the lower the unemployment, the higher the mortality) is observed. This might be a result of heavy stress in industrially active regions, which could enhance mortality caused by trauma and poisoning. The fact that the effect of economic factors is not so significant compared with the drink-related crime rate might be explained by the use of 2002 data in this paper, rather than data from the early 1990s, i.e., the period of economic turmoil caused by system change. These problems and validity of other socio-economic factors remain to be answered.
For countries that have achieved democratization—or are in the process of democ-ratization—it seems that the design of political institutions has important implications for the consolidation of democracy. The Soviet Union was in the process of democratization in the late 1980s, as were other Communist countries, and the Soviet Union/Russia was also faced with the choice of a new democratic political institution. The presidential system was eventually established in 1990 (the Soviet Union) and in 1991 (Russia) . Naturally, many factors explain the choice of a political institution. What factors had the most critical influence on the choice of a new political institution in the Soviet Union/Russia, under Perestroika? The purpose of this paper is to explore this question, reflecting upon the realities of Soviet Union/Russia. The main points can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the political situation of the Soviet Union/Russia, 1990-1993, is analyzed; the introduction of the presidential system and the scope of presidential powers are specifically examined. Secondly, changes of the newly-chosen political institution are explained. Overall, this paper will deal with conflicts between president and parliament over new draft constitution. Which type of draft constitution was finally enacted, and by what processes was it enacted? Finally, this paper will highlight the “actor/elite” factor that markedly influenced institutional choice at the time.
The purpose of this paper is to revaluate Petr N. Savitskii's Eurasianism from a historical perspective. Eurasianism was an intellectual and, at the same time, political movement of Russian émigré scholars in the 1920's which defined Russia as “Eurasia, ” neither Europe nor Asia, for the first time in Russian intellectual history. Savitskii is said to be one of the founders of this movement. Recently, many researchers have begun to re-examine Eurasianism, particularly relating to the political and social situation of Russia in the 1990's right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In their discussions on Eurasianism, some scholars have mentioned Savitskii as an important figure in the movement. However, since most of them showed only partial understanding of the subject on the basis of a few limited materials, much work remains to be done to grasp his entire ideas and evaluate his originality and his way of thinking. This paper will contribute to a better characterization of Savitskii's ideas and their background, as well as his biography. This work is a partial fulfillment of my project to elucidate the historical origins of Eurasianism. Savitskii's Eurasianism emerged under the international circumstances soon after World War I, reflecting his concern of how post-revolutionary Russia could survive in hostile surroundings. Besides, the Bolshevik revolution followed by the civil war carried the whole of Russia to a crisis of disruption. On the one hand, to demonstrate the unity of multinational Russia, and on the other, to find out its unique character, Savitskii, an émigré scholar, developed his notion of “Russia-Eurasia”which, as he expected, would contribute to an identification of the vast multinational region, supposed to bridge Europe and Asia. Savitskii's arguments over “Russia-Eurasia” took various forms, such as the studies of geography, cultures and civilizations, geopolitics, and history. At first sight, they may seem to be different kinds of argument in different disciplines, but once light is shed on the essence, they may well reveal a coherent question of what Russia is, what its unique character is and how it should be. In this sense, it is reasonable to interpret his arguments as an interdisciplinary attempt to give some answers to these questions. The very uniqueness of his thought lies in the view regarding the relationship between geography and history. Savitskii considers geography, not only as a factor which retards human activities, but also one that serves as an opportunity for them. In other words, interactive processes between geography and human activities form history. In this regard, the geographical world “Russia-Eurasia” has been a place for economical and cultural exchanges which binds Europe and Asia together in itself. Savitskii found it a symbol of regional, cultural “integration” and “unity, ” overcoming the segmentation which Russia had faced at that time. As a result, he assumed that this historical role showed the significance of “Russia-Eurasia, ” an idea which turned out to be the core part of Savitskii's Eurasianism.
This article examines how Soviet maternalist policies were implemented in Western Ukraine, a newly acquired Soviet territory in the wake of the Second World War. While the 1944 Soviet Family Code, especially the campaign for “Mothers with Many Children, ” has often been seen as the culmination of the Stalinist pronatalist policies-virtually encouraging extramarital affairs in order to produce children-, its meaning, perception, and methods of implementation were not uniform even in the authoritarian Soviet society. A close examination of the archival documents on the newly created women's departments in the Western Ukrainian party committees reveals that the “Mothers with Many Children” campaign and other state maternal supports served to justify otherwise extremely unpopular Soviet policies in the region. The essentialized gender role of “mother” was a rare measure of Sovietization that did not require special skills, training, or political education, and therefore would not have caused much resistance, bloodshed, or even hesitation. The Western Ukrainian women often quickly learnt how to exercise their new rights in defence of their lives in order to survive the difficult postwar material situation, thus becoming important, if not active, agents in the establishment of the Soviet regime in the region.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after passage of the 1990 law on freedom of conscience, Russian people showed increased interest in religion, moral values, and national cultural traditions. Such a phenomenon is quite understandable because the ideology of socialism had failed. Every other state also has come to bear various aspects of a multicultural society nowadays. Elements, which constitute society, such as ethnicity, culture, and religion, have become far more diversified than expected. As a result, every state is compelled to restructure its educational system, so that it may better accommodate to this growing diversity. While the specific contents of value education differ from country to country, it can generally be stated that those in advanced countries involve citizenship education, multicultural education, or education aimed at developing autonomous value judgment. On the other hand, those in developing countries involve moral education, religious education, or education aimed at developing national identity. From the early 1990s on, we have observed the decentralization of the system of education in Russia. School curricula are being revised, new elective and local initiatives in education are being encouraged, and private schools are appearing. Thus the system of education has become more flexible and there is a favorable situation to introduce religious education as an elective. In the early 1990s, the Russian Ministry of Education made the decision to introduce religious studies in Russian schools by means of curricula stressing Christian ethics and morality. High officials from the Russian Ministry of Education also approached Western Christian educators for help. The response was a collaborative effort of over 80 Western mission groups called the CoMission, which instructed Russian public school educators in the teaching of Christian ethics and morality. The CoMission was to teach those Christian beliefs that were common to all Christian denominations, but its curriculum represented a Protestant approach to Christian ethics and Scripture. In 1995 the Ministry of Education suspended the Protocol of Intention with the CoMission. By virtue of its title Alla Borodina's textbook “Basics of Orthodox Culture” became the symbol of the proponents of introduction of BOC. The textbook has the stamp “Recommended by the Coordinating Council on Cooperation of the Ministry of Education of Russia and the Moscow patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.” The discussion about the teaching of the “Basics of Orthodox Culture” in public schools began as a reaction to a circular letter by Russian Minister of Education Vladimir Filippov to regional offices of administration of education in October 2002. To the letter was appended sample contents of education in the academic subject of “Orthodox Culture.” Two camps arose; on one hand were those who approve the introduction of basics of Orthodox culture into the curriculum of secondary education; on the other hand are those who categorically oppose it. Two members of a human right organization made an attempt to initiate criminal investigation against Borodina. They accused her of anti-Semitism. More than ten court sessions took place in Moscow concerning this matter. Nevertheless the “Orthodox Culture” has already become a regular school subject in several cities and provinces of Russia: Voronezh, Kursk, Smolensk and others. It will be a great loss for Russia's children if either the path of indoctrination or an irreligious school education is pursued. In the former case, while trying to preserve national identity and the consolidation of Russian society, they potentially lose democratic principles and freedoms. In the latter case, while trying to preserve freedoms, they lose all connection with their national spiritual tradition and,
The Military convention of Belgrade was concluded between the Allies and Hungary when the First World War came to an end. This convention established the boundary line on the southeast part of Hungary. But this boundary line was violated by the Rumanian Army which crossed it from Transylvania on 15th December, 1918. Later, this line was modified in favor of Rumania. About that time the Ukrainian invasion started under the initiative of the French Army. The French Army was obviously defeated owing to a shortage of forces. Some historians argued that the Ukrainian invasion had an influence on the amendment of the boundary line. They explained that the French policies took a measure in favor of Rumania, because they wished the supplement of the shortages of forces by the Rumanian Army, accepting the territorial demands of Rumania as compensation. The purpose of this article is to explain in view of the Ukrainian invasion why the amendment of the line was realized in favor of Rumania. The first chapter makes clear the significances of the Military convention of Belgrade for Hungary, France and Rumania. This convention should accept the Hungarian territorial demands and contribute to extend the French influence on Central Europe through the occupation of Hungary. But for Rumania it would hinder her territorial claims. The second chapter makes evident through the process of the Ukrainian invasion the factors related with the amendment of the boundary line. It is quite obvious that the French Army was not enough to invade Ukraine, therefore the military authorities suggested to make a profit from the Rumanian Army. The French Army without the indigenous inhabitant's cooperation was overpowered by the Bolshevik Army. For this reason an anti-Bolshevik policy was increasingly regarded as necessary. Besides the Rumanian government had indicated her intentions to render some military services in Russia. The third chapter concerns influence of the Ukrainian invasion on the amendment of the boundary line through the discussions on the revision in the Peace Conference. There was an atmosphere in the chamber that one should defend the benefits of the Allies. Therefore on the one hand, the demands of Rumania were approved, on the other, the claims of a hostile country, Hungary, were rejected. However it remarked that France proposed to recognize Rumania as an Ally, and submitted the draft for the amendment of the line. Besides the fact that Rumania let her army march across the boundary line to make fait accompli might have served to accord her territorial demands. The French Army, however, did not occupy Hungary, for it considered that this circumstance would permit the Rumanian Army to advance. Therefore, the French policies must be emphasized as a factor of the amendment of the boundary line in favor of Rumania. In this case, however, a great importance should be attached to not only the shortages of forces, but also to the anti-Bolshevik policy and it should be also taken into consideration that an anti-Bolshevik attitude of Rumania proved to be favorable for France. With reference to the amendment of the boundary line, this policy has not been argued enough until today.