This article focuses on the legal backgrounds and aspects of the reform of Russian federation initiated by President Putin Of course, the reform of Russian Federation is an important event in Russian politics. But without understanding the legal background and aspects, we can not comprehend the feature of Russian Federation reform fully, because the federation reform by President Putin is a reaction to the fact that some of federation subjects have formed its own legal system since the early stage of the transition in Russia, and others began to legislate its own laws and decrees after the adoption of new Russian Constitution. As a result, Russia came to have two legal system, federal law and regional law, and the legal aspects became more important in the relation between the federal center and federation subjects. Putting it in another way, it is not enough to restore to political negotiations in order to resolve the problems and conflicts between the federal center and federation subjects. Since the beginning of the transition process in Russia, the federation reform has been a main and difficult issue. 1993 Russian Constitution provides that Russian Federation is a democratic federal rule-of-law state and federation subjects each are equal subjects of Russian Federation. It divides jurisdictions between Russian Federation and federation subjects - the jurisdiction of Russian Federation, the joint jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of federation subject. At the same time, 1993 Russian Constitution allow concluding treaties on the delimitation of scopes of authority and powers between the federal center and its subjects (power-sharing treaties) . In 1993 Russian Constitution the relation between the division of jurisdiction provided by Russian Constitution and the delimitation of scopes of authority and powers decided by the treaties is not sufficiently clear. 1993 Russian Constitution has two contradicting elements. On one hand, it allows Russian Federation to be stronger in the sphere of the legislative power and judiciary power. The Article 76 of the Constitution provides that on issues within the jurisdiction of Russian Federation federal constitutional laws and federal laws shall be adopted and on matters within the joint jurisdiction federal laws shall be issued, in accordance with which federation subjects shall adopt their laws and decrees. According to the Article 71 of the Constitution“law courts; Prosecutor's Office; criminal, criminal-procedural and criminal-executive legislation; amnesty and pardon; civil, civil-procedural and arbitration-procedural legislation; legal regulation of intellectual property”belongs to the federal jurisdiction. Because of this the federation subjects have few powers in the sphere of the judiciary power. Russian judiciary system has common features of that of unitary states. On the other hand, 1993 Russian Constitution contains unique articles, the origin of which can trace back to the principles of the federation embodied in the form of USSR. Article 11 is a typical example of this. President Eltsin concluded 49 power-sharing treaties with individual federal subject from 1994 to 1998. While some of power-sharing treaties contributed toward maintaining the Russian Federation, the conclusion of the power-sharing treaties served as a method for Elttin to get the supports from the federation subjects. Power-sharing treaties individualized the relations between federal center and federation subjects. On the contrary, Putin's challenge is to establish the legal order between federal center and federation subjects. While under the federal structure stipulated in Russian Constitution the federal center has strong powers, the federal center did not have enough ability to force the federation subjects to comply with Russian Constitution and federal laws. President Putin became aware of this weak point in the Russian Federation.
More than one decade has passed since“Berlin wall”fell down in 1989 in the Eastern Europe. This transformation has opened the door for East European countries to be integrated into the global economy. What influence did this globalization put on the regional changes in the transition of Eastern Europe? The purpose of this paper lies in analyzing the problems of these regional changes, aiming at breaking through the limits of research studied on the basis of the analysis unit of the state, industrial sector and enterprise. Chapter 1 characterizes the regional changes of Eastern Europe as follows, (1) rising and expanding of the new regional differentials in the whole European continent, (2) expanding of north-south differentials inside the Eastern Europe, (3) appearance of the new 4 types of area differential inside any East European country (leading areas, loser areas, negatively continuative areas and new entry areas in market transition), (4) administration, infrastructures, institutions and policies concerning the region are being restructured and newly shaped, upon which pressure of joining the EU has given a decisive influence. Chapter 2 is confined to Hungary, analyzing how the area-territorial structure has been changed under the influence of foreign capital investment inflows. The point to understand here is that the multilateral functional elements accumulated in the long term in the local areas constitute their characters by coming in touch with FDI. Chapter 3 is devoted to review the above regional changes in the historical perspective of 20th century, during which this East European region has been transformed three times. The industrialization in the beginning of 20th century gave birth to disproportionate and uneven regional development. Introduction of state socialism after the WW II produced the convergence of regional unevenness and contractions in a degree with some differentials among the areas left to some extent. And then, at the end of this century, the regions are faced with the alternative choice of mercantilist type development of regional economy or multinational firm one. As for this choice, developing of post-Fordism in the whole European continent has put great influence upon regional development in the Eastern Europe.
This paper aims to trace the descent of ‘enthusiasm’ in the twentieth century Russian cultural history as well as understand the Totalitarianism under the Stalinist authority and its consequences in the late twentieth century. In doing so, we started by categorizing the concept of ‘enthusiasm’ into the ‘earth-grounded type’ and the ‘authority-oriented type’. The mainstream symbolist movement in the early twentieth century Russian culture obtained an eschatological tendency under the influence of Sorov'yov's school. Later, Ivanov opened up a way to the Primitivist movement by recognizing the role of ‘symbol’ within the Dionysian integration. Such is an example of the ‘grounded’ type of enthusiasm. Nourishing on such enthusiasm, the Russian avant-garde art movement blossomed. After the Russian revolution, the Russian avant-garde art, through artist such as Mayakovsky and Meierhold, realised the enthusiasm in both directions. On the other hand, there were artists such as Eisenstein who attempted to integrate to the Stalinist authority by deploying an anthoropological imagination, even though tending towards the ‘earth-grounded’ enthusiasm. The era of the ‘Thaw’ was also the era in which the spirit of integration (sobornost') originated in the Russian Orthodox tradition flourished. But since Stalin's death the centripetal force of enthusiasm was lost. The process of anti-Stalinism failed to realise the regression towards world history, and caused the new era of closure called ‘the post-Utopean era’. The characteristic of ‘informal culture’ which existed between the ‘Thaw’ and the Breshnev era is understood as the movement attempting to overcome the Stalinist influence through intense sophistication of the concept of ‘distance’. Even though the Soviet socialist declined through the influence of high-tech revolution in the Western Europe, the recent Postmodernists devise Russian history with the concept of ‘emptiness (pustota) ’, identifying Russia as the state of simulation without reference. Such Postmodernists attempt to harmonize with the Totalitarianism, but at the same time seek for a way to overcome Stalinism as they skillfully attempt to secretly innovate the rigid dichotomous framework.
During 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become a middle-class power, while the United States as the only superpower is increasingly inclined to behave on its own way in the international scene. How is Russia trying to cope with the US? This question is closely related to a broader issue, i.e. how Russia is making its adaptation during the system change of international relations. This article attempts to answer this question by addressing itself to the issue of strategic stability. Under the Cold War system the strategic stability between the US and the Soviet Union was attained by controlling offensive nuclear weapons with defensive nuclear weapons promised not to develop and deploy by both sides. But since the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation has become perceived bigger threats, which pushed the US to the development of the National Missile Defense (NMD) . Thus Russia wants to maintain the old strategic stability, while the US wants to develop the NMD. The negotiation started between the two. First we analyze Russian behavior in the nuclear arms negotiation and the intention of various actors with the specific emphasis on the arguments on the military reform. Then at the latter half of the article we examine Russian attitude toward the issue of non-proliferation problems. This time we focus on the situation of military industrial complex and its reconstruction process, and also the specialists' arguments on the matter. We will analyze them from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001. The reason why we stop at September 11 is to show that Russia did not suddenly change on September 11. As conclusions we argue that first, Russia initially tried to maintain the old strategic stability but it turned out to be impossible to do so because of her financial constraints and the urgent need for military reform. President Putin slowly began to stop Russia's pretending a superpower by renouncing his previous goal to maintain the strategic parity with the US. Then, on September 11, 2001, he grasped at the chance and decided to become a big power in the new US-led international system. Second, when it comes to a new threat, nuclear proliferation, Russia was also slow to recognize its significance because its huge military industry needs to export military weapons in order to survive. And we find that while making efforts to secure the US non-proliferation commitments, Russia is also trying to sell more weapons to even the 'rouge nations' like Iran. But now the US can't stop those commitments for its Key words; strategic stability/START/NMD/nuclear non-proliferation/Iran
This thesis deals with regulatory reforms and privatization of network industries (transport, energy and telecommunication) in three Central European transitional economies (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) by focusing on the necessity of the strategies in airline industry with the conclusion that the measures, irrespective of the effectiveness of some of conventional governmental regulations and protections, are surely expected to strengthen their core-competences as well as to overcome the socialist legacies of lack of capitals, business knowledge and world-wide networks, which contribute to balancing the national budget, boosting economy and increasing consumer welfare in the Central European countries which have been eager to join the European Union, because that symbolizes the Return to Europe or the Return to History: the three Central European economies have been highly approved for the rapidness of the system conversion, the three carries enjoy almost the same performances (in terms of the number of passengers etc.) and share the same agenda such as joining in some world-wide alliance for global competition. The thesis is composed of three parts: the 1 chapter gives the general direction and the 2nd gives the historical reasons of regulations and state-owned services, necessity of regulatory reforms and privatization after the system conversion and finally the trends and aims of joining in world-wide networks, especially some European Networks, and the final part generalizes the thesis.
With the transition to a market economy, Russia became a significant market for Japanese manufacturers in the 1990s. In the same period, Japanese companies began to enter the Russian market themselves. There is, however, little existing research into entry strategies used by those companies for their entry procedure. In this paper I have selected Canon as a case study and investigated the unique features of the marketing environment in Russia as well as the impact these features have had on entry strategies used in the region. The purpose of the paper is to assess whether entry strategies, theory and practice developed in Western free-market economies is being used to help guide the Russian market, to analyze how Japanese companies have responded to those markets and the kind of entry strategies they have adopted thus far. In 1997 Canon set up the Moscow office of its Finnish corporation ‘CANON NORTH-EAST OY’ and began exporting directly to Russia. Canon's entry mode to establish its subsidiary outside Russia cannot be explained under existing theories. Why, when it began to export directly, without using Japanese trading companies, did it establish its subsidiary in Finland and not in Russia? Takeda's Entry Model argues that a company begins by exporting, then establishes a sales subsidiary in the actual market, ultimately establishing its own production subsidiary. However, Canon chose to establish its sales subsidiary in Finland primarily because it was too great a risk for them to use the target country. The company claimed that they could not predict how corporate tax would change because the legal system in Russia was so unstable. Subsidiaries have to abide by local law. It was therefore, risky for Canon to undertake operations in Russia. In addition, the key merit of establishing subsidiaries is that a company will be able to realize the “completion of sales”. However, in Russia, if a Canon subsidiary based in Moscow imported directly to Russia and did not use local distributors, it would not be able to compete with those Canon products imported by independent local distributors. Consequently Canon chose Finland. The established market entry modes are applicable in Russia, but must be modified in relation to the specific features of the Russian market. If the foreign market is not ruled by law, as in Russia, a company may decide to establish a sales subsidiary offshore.
This paper explores how Russian regional governments engaged in privatization policy and what kind of impacts their unique policies had on federal-level policy aims. Implementation of privatization policy can be divided into three periods: The first period, from October 1992 to July 1, 1994, is called “voucher privatization”, the second (to March 1997) is called “money privatization” and the third, “individual privatization.” The federal government had specific aims such as: effective management of enterprises, development of investors and revenue gains. At first, regions were opposed to the privatization and some of them implemented various independent schemes: suspension of the policy, renationalization, control of competition, demand for federal property, etc. Such regional differences originated from the regions' particular economic situation, their leaders' economic/political orientations and countermeasures to the economic crises. The number of reported cases of regional privatization policy has gradually declined, thus it appears as if the differences among regions has diminished. However, the phenomenon can be attributed to gradual institutionalization of federalism and officially enlarged and endorsed regional competence rather than the interpretation that leaders abandoned their policy. Engagement of regions bore both positive and negative consequences. First, Russian fast privatization could not be implemented without the regions' cooperation. Second, the regional governments alleviated the pain of reform by maintaining the employment and old-style social safety net system. On the other hand, however, improvement in management efficiency, the main aim of the federal government, was undermined. Moreover, the policy discrepancy between the federal and regional level hindered the economic transparency of all of Russia, which foreign investors found an political risk. This leads to the further delays to structural reform. Regions placed their particular aims above those of the federal government. This invited a situation in which various ransitional strategies coexisted. On the other hand, the federal government ultimately allowed and endorsed such regional discretions. As a result, while difficulties with the transition were mitigated in some regions, negative impacts can be observed with respect to efficiency, investment climate, and market transparency. These effects amplified the problems already inherent in the federal policy.
The main objective of this article is to study the impact of international factors on democratization. After the end of Cold War, both democratic consolidation and a free market-oriented economy have been accepted as universal values in Central Europe. Thus, international actors from the EU, WB, and IMF to Western social organizations, such as foundations, NGOs, and churches launched into democratic assistance. Among them, I focus on the role of Western foundations' assistance that support societies in development and in transitions to establish democratic norms and values. According to existing literature, there are four ideal types of international influence. First, the ideal type is “contagion, ” which implies the demonstration effect. By developing the technology of communication, the experience of democratization in one country spreads to others. The second type represents “consent, ” based on prevalent norms and expectation through some foundations, NGO or international organizations, which enlighten the people who are not accustomed to democratic norms and attitudes. The third, the type of international influence is “control, ” which includes punishments, economic sanctions and rewards given by external forces. They encourage the transformation of a non-democratic into a democratic country. Finally, the fourth type shows “conditionality, ” which intends to make a non-democratic regime restricted by a donor country or some multilateral organization. Currently, this ideal type of international pressure is prevalent throughout the world. Therefore, I pay attention to the role of foundations' assistance through “consent, ” that is why their aid programs include both party-reform, political institution-building and establishing social infrastructure of democracy. These roles of foundations will empower civil society forces to reform the state. In the case of Poland, under Communism for forty years, the Polish state dominated by the Communist party controlled all spheres of social and political life. Thus, transition to democracy means rebuilding civil society, a task which more than sixty Western foundations took part in supporting. Even while the authoritarian regime controlled all state-society relations, some democratic dissidents, like intellectuals and non-official labor unions, could continue to exist under Communist rule, because Western foundations, such as German foundations or NED, had provided democratic aid to Poland through the network of foundations' assistance. In the transition phase, some foundations tried to reform party organizations. Others coped with economic problems or provided the social infrastructures of a democratic regime to build civil society. After the transition to democracy, Poland faces obstacles to keep civil society united for cooperation and collective action. As the authoritarian regime is no longer there, the challenge has shifted from cooperating in a common goal of removing old rulers to the functioning of various groups and organizations in civil society. So, the democratic government may experience a democratic competition between the interests and views of each group in the population. In this point, foundations' assistance through “consent, ” can only deal with the difficulty of integrating them in democratic consolidation. Thus, a democracy will be consolidated when democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life as well as in calculations for achieving success, through foundations' assistance.
On September 17, 1939 the Soviet Red Army invaded Eastern Poland, following the German invasion of Western Poland some two weeks earlier. In the occupied territory, which contained Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) and Western Byelorussia (Belarus), Poles were deported in the short period leading up to the German invasion of June 1941. It is estimated that from 250 thousand to 1.65 million Poles were subjected to deportation. This brought about a major transformation in the social and economic structure of the area. This article examines how the deportation of Poles influenced the transformation of social and economic structure in the Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) . Considering this problem, we also actress Soviet rural policies - land reform and collectivization, then explore correlation between deportation and the two policies. After annexation the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine was elected to power. On October 28, 1939 the Assembly formally announced the confiscation of land belonging to great landowners, monasteries, and state officials. By the end of 1939, 2, 753, 000 hectares of land in Galicia and Volhynia had reportedly been confiscated representing 29.9% of the total land of two regions held by landowners and monasteries. Simultaneously, the first deportation of Poles began. A decree that was issued by the Soviet government declared that Polish military settlers (osadnikis), should be removed from Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. In February 139, 590 people were deported to Siberia, Ural and so on. The land reform and deportation of Poles led to the increase of Ukrainian landed farmers, including middle peasants (stratum-serednyak) . In January 1940, the Soviet authorities began formal collectivization, or kolkhz (collective farm) in these regions. By June 1, there were 2, 866 kolkhz in Galicia and Volhynia, representing 205, 137 peasant households, or 12.8% of the total number of households. These households had 796, 827 hectares of land in their possession, or 14.9% of the total land in the regions. As for Galicia and Volhynia, the Soviet authorities were preoccupied with the defense of the western borderlands from 1939 to 1941. On the eve of war there were the two waves of deportation that occurred. The first mass deportation which was completed on April 1940, including families of Polish official, gendarmes, landowners. 320 thousands people were deported from Galicia and Volhynia and Western Byelorussia. At this time, including Ukrainians, that were activists and opponents to collectivization. In the second mass deportation refugees consisted of Poles (41%) and Jews (59%) . The forced deportation of Poles removed the active elements of the Polish population from Galicia and Volhynia, and brought social and economic transformation in these areas. But this could not create a material base for the collectivization of two regions. In fact collectivization did not fully materialize and land reforms continued. On March 241941, on official land reform decree was issued. As a result, in Galicia and Volhynia, the deportation of Poles, especially active elements, such as osadniki created a material base for the increasing number of Ukrainian peasant arriving. This led to a major transformation in the social and economic structure, “depolonization”, of these regions.