After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most serious problems for today's Russia is how to establish stability and identity as a nation. There are two reasons this problem is especially serious in Russia. First, because of historical, social psychological and other reasons, Russian society has trouble creating autonomous public order. The present writer calls this aspect of Russian society a ‘sand-society’, which means a society where stable order and a market economy are difficult to establish without some measure of authoritarianism. The high rate of support for President Putin reflects, not stability, but a public fear of instability. Second, Russia, in spite of the social characteristics mentioned above, is trying to keep up the appearance of an advanced G8 nation with a civil society based on the rule of law and democratic values. It was in order to cope with this dilemma and to justify his government that Vladislav Surkov set forth his ‘Sovereign-Democracy’ theory of Neo-Slavophilism. There is a strong distrust towards the Western world behind this theory, which insists on Russian individuality and is inimical to interventions or ‘exportation of democracy’ by the West, as in the cases of the collapse of governments in Georgia and Ukraine. This theory above all justifies the great power of the Russian State, emphasizes Russian individuality or peculiarity and affirms people's demands for order, stability, and especially a strong leader. This theory is based on the ideas of Ivan Il'in, who was a Russianist religious thinker condemned for being a reactionary and deported from Soviet Union in 1922. Il'in describes Russian culture as synthetic, intuitive, and organic, while characterizing Western culture as analytic, materialistic, and logical. Surkov's theory retains the basic tenets of Slavophilism, which set Plato above Aristotle and was closely related to German Romanticism and mysticism, while making no deeper interpretation of its roots. Surkov points out three features of Russian political culture—‘centralization’, ‘idealization’, and‘personification’.‘Centralization’ means that strong centralized power guarantees stability.‘Idealization’ means that the Russians feel uncomfortable without an ideal or a mission such as ‘the Third Rome’ or ‘the Third International’. ‘Personification’ means that, in Russia, a person (leader) is considered more important than institutions. The problem of establishing identity in Russia is the problem of stabilizing a ‘sand-society’. Considering these three features in relation to this problem, there are two requirements for stabilizing the ‘sand-society’. One is a ‘mold’ or a ‘framework’ to give sand a form, and the other is ‘cement’ to fix it. Of the three features in Surkov's ‘sovereign-democracy’ theory, ‘centralization’, and ‘personification’ are the ‘mold’ or ‘framework’, while ‘idealization’, and ‘personification’ make up the ‘cement’. Against this Neo-Slavophilism or ‘sovereign-democracy’, so-called modern, Westernizers, democrats, reformists and social democrats-are criticizing Surkov. Curiously, therefore, the controversy between Slavophiles and Westernizers that occurred 150 years ago is now repeating itself. One Russian political scientist describes this phenomenon as a déjã vu and says it means that the problems dating back to the middle of the 19th century have not yet been solved.
The European Union might possibly have overgrown. Obviously, it cannot play the progressive role in the Black Sea Rims which it has played in regard to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltic countries. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the constitutional reform in Ukraine and petit imperialism in Turkey. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Orange forces and the former pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority had reached a compromise, a substantial component of which was the amendment of the constitution, targeted at modifying the existing semi-presidential system by strengthening the parliamentary oligarchy. For this purpose, they rudely violated the constitutional procedure for its amendments. This amendment failed to create a mechanism for balancing the president and prime minister and caused the endless disorder in Ukrainian politics in 2006-08. This process revealed that the Orange forces were not the torchbearers of European values, such as constitutionalism and rule of law. In the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the Party of Regions evolved into a modern organized party. This is exceptional since clientelist parties usually decline after losing power. Thus, there would seem to be no “clashes of civilizations” between the allegedly pro-European Western and pro-Eurasian Eastern parts of Ukraine. Despite the reforms achieved in Turkey during the last several years, Europe did not accelerate the EU accession process for Turkey, but, on the contrary, launched bashing of this country, referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915. Turkey's reaction to these double standards (in comparison with the EU's generous attitude towards no less problematic Romania and Bulgaria) differs from that of servile Eastern Europe. Turkish intellectuals proudly argue that their real purpose is to Europeanize Turkey, and the EU accession is no more than a way to achieve it. Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), representing Sunni Islam, is actively conducting Islamic diplomacy, in particular, in Muslim regions of the former USSR. Turkey cannot abandon its special concern in the Caucasus and Near East because of the existence of their brother nationalities, Turkomans and Azerbaijanis, as well as of their trans-border enemy, the Kurds. Overall, Turkey will remain a small empire, though this does not seem to contradict its democratizing endeavor. Thus, in Ukraine, those who pretend to be friends of Europe have discredited democracy and other European values. Europe's double standards regarding EU accession have not discouraged Turkey, which combines small imperialism with gradual democratization. Under such situation, the European Union seems unlikely to become a dominant political actor in the Black Sea Rims.
In this paper, firstly, I have shed light on Russia's economic revival, and the rise in the standard of living of the general public, the political stability and the energy diplomacy, etc., which it has brought about. In particular, I have expounded in detail on the “Federal Target Program for the Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Zabaikal Region”—the development program for the Russian Far East and East Siberia, with their profound relationships with the Northeast Asian region—and the redevelopment in Vladivostok for the 2012 APEC summit. Then I have touched upon the perception of Russia as seen from East Asia, a comparison of the economies of each of the countries concerned, and the trends for trade vis-à-vis Russia for the countries of Northeast Asia. Additionally I have analyzed the history of economic interchange between Russia and the nations of Northeast Asia, the current state of affairs and problem areas. Next I have covered the mutual interdependence of Russia and the Northeast Asian region for the following; mutual cooperation through international organizations cooperating internationally, such as, the Greater Tumen Initiative Consultative Commission, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the six-party talks on the DPRK's problems, plus the cooperative relationships in the areas of energy, environmental protection, transportation corridors, investment and trade, and finance. Within such a format I have comprehensively discussed the economic relationships between Russia and Northeast Asia, and have endeavored to illuminate the future path of the Northeast Asia Economic Subregion. This is a lecture of 20 October 2007, with additions and amendments.
The Uzbek standard language of today is exceptional among the Turkic languages in lacking vowel harmony. This paper focuses on changes in an ideological position of vowel harmony rules in Uzbek for those who engaged in language politics or educational works in the early Soviet era. The paper deals mainly with the period between 1924, when the National Delimitation in Central Asia took place, and 1934 when vowel harmony rules were abolished from the Uzbek standard written language at the Scientific Conference on Uzbek Orthography. In the 1920's vowel harmony rules were regarded by local intellectuals as a symbol of Uzbek language ties with other Turkic languages and as a legacy of Chagatai literature. At a 1929 Conference the inclusion of vowel harmony rules into the grammar of standard Uzbek, which the chair of the conference proposed, was approved as an “iron law”. However, after the alteration of Moscow's policy on national problems, the vowel harmony rules were attacked as a “dying law” that blocks further development of the Uzbek language, because they were considered to be unsuitable for transcribing international (read “Russian”) words. Vowel harmony rules were abolished not only from transcribed Russian or international words but also from Uzbek orthography in the 1934 Conference, where the number of vowels in Uzbek alphabet was reduced from nine to six, it was decided that the Uzbek standard language should be based on urban dialects in which vowel harmony was weak. It is worth mentioning that it was only after the basic shape of the “Uzbek national language” was determined, that the need for a history of the new national language started to be strongly felt. Many linguists tried to seek its origin and trace back the descent of Uzbek language. In the 1920's scholars were longing for a shape of the “Uzbek national language” in the Turkic languages with Chagatai as the successor, considering that vowel harmony rules remained in the “Uzbek national language” from the past. However, showing a remarkable contrast with studies in the 1920's, studies after 1934 tried to establish a theory that these Turkic languages also lacked vowel harmony rules in the similar way that standardized “Uzbek national language” does. The latter group of studies obscured the historical side of the Uzbek language and substantialized “Uzbek national language” that was being constructed as a part of the cultural essentialism in Uzbekistan. This suggests that, from the viewpoint of the socio-cultural history of Uzbekistan, the abandonment of a written language with vowel harmony rules and the standardization of Uzbek language in 1934 were also some of the extremely important events in the process of the construction of the national representation of Uzbekistan.
Many studies have focused on the autonomous functions of the Catholic Church under the communist regime in Poland in comparison to other countries in former Eastern Europe. The autonomy of the church is sometimes confounded with the resistance or struggle against the communist party, although the church did not necessarily attempt to fight against the party with concerted effort. Obviously, the church is not a monolithic organization; it has to distinguish the general believers that account for most of the Polish from the leaders of the church. This paper examines how believers became involved with “the struggle, ” referring to the concept of the “collective mentality” proposed by George Lefebvre. He explained that some affairs were composed by the people, who gathered even accidentally, but because of their “collective mentality” they are capable to change the character of the activities into social and political affairs without conscious awareness. I will look, for instance, into an affair that occurred during the establishment of a parish church in an industrial estate around the Lenin Steelworks. I analyze what “collective mentality” was underlying, and how had been changed among people. For 12 years, people in this estate had moderately appealed to the party and to the administration to permit them to have their own church for practical reasons i.e. it was inconvenient to go to other churches as they were too far away, and they did not want to participate in a Mass in the snow and rain outdoors. Meanwhile they had come to clearly distinguish between the party and themselves. Generally, the affair has been recorded as a violent confrontation between the party and the church for freedom of faith. However, the believers that joined in the battle on the street said that at the beginning they only wanted to defend and keep their own cross, which they had built as a symbol of their faith. They changed their attitude gradually because of escalation of violence, and the reaction of the authorities; consequently, many of them began to agitate for freedom of faith and other political ideals. In the process of escalation, however, we can observe some accidental factors, for example misunderstandings, miscommunications and so on. After the incident, clergymen suggested that the battle had been a political fight from the beginning and the believers were motivated by political and social reasons. This case demonstrates how Catholics participated in and were involved in the political field. There were some disconnects between the clergymen and the believers; both had their own stories and values. However, we can say that people shared a “collective mentality” through their relationship with others; that is true not only for the communist party, but also for the leaders of the church. And now the shared “collective mentality” is changing in relation with the others: the different generations, some foreign journalists and us-researchers of history.
This research focuses on the process by which scientific information on Soviet genetics—particularly the Lysenko Doctrine—was accepted by Japanese academic groups in the field of biological science. Nakamura (1967) studied the Lysenko Controversy in Japan and illustrated the process whereby this debate resulted in the inevitable political conflict among Japanese biologists after the conference of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in August 1948. In order to examine the possibility of the purely scientific debate on Soviet genetics, it is necessary to investigate the various types of literatures available in the few years immediately following Japan's defeat in World War II. In addition, there are three approaches that complement Nakamura's research. First, it is necessary to measure the ideological control given to Soviet science by the Soviet Government's scientific policies, because this control directly affected the quality of information on Soviet genetics. In particular, the discussion prepared by the editorial board of the Pod znamenem marksizma in 1939 will be highlighted as the turning point of this control. Second, Western scientific literatures were the most important channel of information transfer for Japanese biologists; in this case, it is necessary to consider the acceptance of this literature and the extent to which it influenced Japanese biologists. Third, Japanese academic groups lagged behind the West in accepting information, at least in the two years after the Japanese defeat in World War II; therefore, it is interesting to compare the acceptance times between the West and Japan. In 1946, the ideological control granted to Soviet science was at its weakest, and it was at this time that western biologists accepted the most detailed literatures and wrote numerous scientific criticisms on the Lysenko Doctrine. On the other hand, at this time, Japanese biologists were still concerned with the lack of availability of scientific literatures.
We can find easily dozens of media and academic articles over the past 1-2 years that foretell and warn of Russia's aggressive foreign policies to her neighbours by means of her energy-exporting power in oil and gas. Many of them are the products of the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in the early 2006, which also reminds some authors of Russia's oil cut-off of the Baltic countries in the early 90's. In their arguments they seem to share a common understanding that Russia has firm intentions and aims in her foreign policies—to decelerate, if not to exclude fully, democratization of her FSU neighbours and to extract maximum diplomatic concessions from them and the EU members, concluding that her oil and gas resources are political instruments these purposes. After having a look at each oil/gas pipeline project of Russia, however, we feel this conclusion may not match reality. In this article the current main oil and gas pipeline projects of Russia (to Europe—BTS, Burgas-Alexandropoulis, Nord Stream, and South Stream; and to Asian countries—East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (VSTO) and Altaj) are briefly reviewed, and it is hard to see her aggressive diplomatic intentions in them. The main motive of new pipeline construction by Russia to Europe is to bypass as many transit countries as possible or to avoid transportation bottlenecks. They are of a commercial character rather than a political one, though the current transit countries which may lose their position by newly routed pipelines of Russia fear the theoretical worst that they will be under a full energy supply control by Russia. The construction plans of eastbound pipelines to Asian countries and the Pacific Ocean have a primary task to develop the areas of East Siberia and the Far East of Russia, accompanied by again commercial tactics in avoiding transit countries and a single destination route of the energy export. We have to pay more attention to the fact that Russia's energy export policy is hardly reliable in the world energy market, not because of her politicized aggressive stance to consumers but because it only plays a passive role against what the world market expects to one of the main oil and gas exporters. Though Russia reacts to given conditions like transit countries, she does not seem yet to involve herself into market coordination and adjustment of demand/supply balances in cooperation with other producers and consumers.
Since the 1993 State Duma elections, there had been no ruling party in Russia. Instead many parties, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the “Yabloko, ” liberals, nationalists, and “parties of power, ” had shared seats in the State Duma. But one of the so-called parties of power, United Russia, won an outright victory in the December 2003 elections. Some existing studies attribute the cause of this party's success to the economic performance of President Vladimir Putin's administration. I think we need to examine the accuracy of this view. To this end, in this article, I use statistical methods and analyze cross-regional variations in election results. It would appear that variations in voting patterns of the Russian electorate are clearly manifested by statistical analysis of the relationship between some economic indicators at the regional level and electoral results at the district level. In this article I use multiple regressions. These time dependent variables consist of PR vote shares of the parties of power at the district level in 1999 and 2003, and independent variables consist of inflation, unemployment and growth rates in each region. But there is a problem with the method of analysis. These regressions concern relationships between 89 regions, federal subjects, and 225 electoral districts. In sum, regions and districts can be conceptualized as a hierarchical structure, with districts nested within regions. To solve the problem, I use multilevel modeling, which allows effective study of the relationships between variables observed at different levels in the hierarchical structure. Judging from the results, the analysis, unlike those of previous studies, demonstrates that in 1999 Russian voters evaluated an anti-inflation policy by their government, but in 2003 they expected a future unemployment policy as well as evaluated a promotion of economic growth. These results may oblige reconsideration of the previous studies.
In the Post-Soviet countries, the results of how the term “ridna mova” (Ukrainian for “mother tongue”) is categorized in the National Census are used for determining the language policies in each country. The 2001 All Ukrainian National Census also includes the question of “ridna mova”, and the results of the census show that 69% of Ukrainian citizens regard the Ukrainian language as their “ridna mova”. However, it is still unclear exactly what meaning is attached to the expression of “ridna mova”, and how each citizen of Ukraine interprets the notion of “ridna mova”. Arel explains the concept of “ridna mova” as being interpreted more as the language of one's nationality (referred to by Arel as “native language”) than as the first language spoken in early childhood or as the language which the person commands best (defined as “mother tongue” by Arel) . Using Arel's sub-classification this paper aims to demonstrate how Ukrainian respondents interpret “ridna mova”. The present thesis analyzes the results of surveys conducted in Kiev in 2006. In addition to the question of “ridna mova”, respondents were asked about their first language using the categories of “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best”. The results of these three questions differ from the results of the question about “ridna mova”. To examine the connection between these four categories, their coefficient connection (Cramer's V) was calculated. The results show that the connection among “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best” is very strong, but the connection between “ridna mova” and other categories is comparatively weak. This means that respondents have different interpretations of “ridna mova” and other categories. As Arel states, it seems that the respondents interpret“ridna mova”as the language of one's nationality. But strong connection among “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best” reveal the possibility that respondents additionally interpret ridna mova as a covert “mother tongue”, not only overt “native language”. In addition, an analysis of “contradictory answers” was conducted concerning the question of “ridna mova” as well as the question, “Which language (s) can you speak other than your “ridna mova”? ” Classifying the respondents who had “contradictory answers” by their“ridna mova”, the respondents who regarded the Russian language as their “ridna mova” tended to give a “contradictory answer”. And the respondents who answered Russian language to the question of first language exhibited the same tendency. The analysis of the “contradictory answers” shows that only respondents who regard Ukrainian as their “ridna mova” and answered only “Ukrainian language” to the question of first language can interpret “ridna mova” without contradiction, because their “native language” and “mother tongue” are same-the Ukrainian language.
The birth of “A Just Russia” was a significant event in national and regional elections of 2007. It was taken as a milestone to bring a change to Russian political party system that predominance of “United Russia” continued on. Some researches discussed the possibility of the two-party system that the left faction confronted the right-center, and the other expressed deep concern over the danger that political party system in itself would be strictly operated by administrative power. In recent years, the camp that takes politico-sociological approaches appeared. For example, the group of Richard Rose does not overvalue a temporary change in support variation for Russian political regime. They never concentrate their interests on administration elite's behaviors only. Its analysis clarifies how Russians recognize the political regime. This perspective helps to deepen understandings what kind of role political party play to be expected. In Russia, preference of voters has been quite floating. The voters have been unlikely to ballot on cleavages and positive party support. Does the appearance of new left-center party cause a change for Russian political party system? Russian government began to build ruling party system in rapid political changes. The Presidential office took the leadership to organize“A Just Russia”. However, it is not definite if the interferences in the parties consolidate Russian political party system or not. Because the power of ruling parties deeply depends on the authority of the Federal President, and Russian voter's preference also is based on retrospective voting for President's achievement. In this article, I will analyze “A Just Russia” which attracted keen attention in the result of 2007 elections. This article primarily aims to examine why “A Just Russia” should have been formed, moreover, I presume that the question is likely to be a good scope finding a particularity of Russian political party system. “A Just Russia” is the successor of “Party of Life” under Sergei Mironov; the chairman of the Federal Council. The new party formation was not irrelevant to the support for “Rodina” declining and the reforms of Russian federalism. Although preference of Russian voters shifted into left position since the latter half of 2004, this change in voting behavior was the outcome of retrospective voting against social benefits reform beginning from June 2004. To clarify these, I mainly analyze on the process of the new left-center party formation and the result of regional parliamentary elections performed since the forth election of State Duma.
The aim of this article is to clarify the traditional natural law Theory and the systemic Ethics on the “theology of the body” of Karol Józef Wojtyla (John Paul II) . First, after being based on the time situation of rupture of solidarity by the hometown loss (existence loss) in Central Europe, which first had big influence on the ideological background of Wojtyla, the Thomistic Personalism which is the ideological basis of Wojtyla is expressed. Then, I point out that Persona is relational subsistence and, so, the essence of Persona has an other-directedness. Second, if a human being given Persona is created as “an image of God”, ontological structure of the individual of body-soul one has hylomorphic structure, and it will be shown clearly that this individual's ontological structure is a dynamic state which is called the union (unio) to the One based on the order of existence. Third, the outline of the natural law theory based on the ecstatic metaphysics is described. As long as God is imaged in itself, since existence in itself is brought by the ecstatic creation of the highest existence (God), it is oriented to the others so that it may be transcended. That is, because the good is by nature self-diffusive and the diffusive self must be given to the others, creatures are interiorly propelled to communicating that good. (Bonum est diffusivum sui [Pseudo-Dionysius] ) . In the basis of this view, what is called “a law of ecstasy” (Wojtyla) is worked. This law is consists of firm belief that those who love follow and come out of self, in order to find out the existence completed more in the others. Given this metaphysics of bodily ecstasy, the natural law is our participation in the pattern of ecstasy that governs the universe, and created nature's sharing in the ecstatic being of its Creator. Fourth, from the Thomistic viewpoint, after examining critically the body-soul dualism of Descartes=Hobbes, just the loss of God and the idol-worshipizing of reason which come from the body-soul dualism show clearly that they are the nature of violence of liberalism. At last, I discuss the critique of liberalism, that is, the “culture of death” which is described in John Paul II's encyclical “Evangelium Vitae” I point out that just a natural law which takes a Christological form establishes the “culture of life”, and just the politics which accepts the others is just the affirmation of the social “solidarity” symbolized by the blood (of Christ) which flowed out of the body. And a part of the Christoform constitutionalism (relation between Privilege and Democracy) is clarified.
Recent years, Chinese-Russian border trade develops rapidly. This trade is a part of the Chinese-Russian economic and trade cooperation, and it plays a major role in the development of the borderland region of the two countries. There is a general understanding of the meaning of “border trade”, but it still has not an exact definition. The information materials concerning this trade have not been analyzed consistently. In this paper the author clarifies the definition of border trade and its concrete systems, Mutual trade (in Chinese: hu shi mao yi), Small amount trade (in Chinese: bian jing xiao e mao yi), consignment trade and shuttle trade, using the result of interviews and data gathering in the China-Russian borderland region, carried out by the author in the period from July to September 2007. It also examines more closely the dynamics of the borderline trade policy of the two countries. Because the Heilongjiang province accounts for more than 60 percent of all Chinese-Russian borderline trade, the paper analyzes the statistical materials of this province and examines main causes for changes in volumes of border trade. It is demonstrated that the border trade has been largely influenced by the policy of the two states and by the. recent economic booms in two countries.
Just after the February Revolution in 1917 Boris Brutzkus actively participated into the public debate over the agrarian reform. This paper shows how he conceived the task of reform under the newborn democratic government. Although his view on this problem is less known than his famous lecture on Marxist socialist economy in 1920, it deserves attention for its unique perspective placing the peasant farming as a vital element in capitalistic development of the Russian economy. His focus of criticism in this period was Russian Populists (Narodniki) who were at that time in the midst of popularity. He strongly warned that their agitation about the overall land distribution without compensation and redemption would not only lead sweeping economic catastrophe but also seriously endanger the fate of democracy. While Populists see the root of agrarian crisis in the land shortage among peasants, Brutzkus points out that the essence of the land shortage was accumulation of agrarian overpopulation caused by the extremely sluggish pace of Russian economic growth. Because of this, Russian industry could neither absorb the increase of rural population nor provide domestic market for agricultural products. In addition, on the side of villages the communal ownership of land held back the population flow into cities. Thus the solution of agrarian crisis needs also the development of industrial production. In his opinion such a development is possible only under capitalism. Therefore the land reform must be compatible with the general framework of capitalist economy. In this connection Brutzkus emphasizes the importance to preserve Stolypin's legislations with necessary democratic revisions. Referring to the experiences of Western countries, he advocates that the peasant's private ownership of land with the system of well-organized mortgage credit can promote intensification of peasant farming and flow of rural surplus population into cities. Since land is now one of precious assets of people, every peasant who receives land must bear responsibility to the national economy for its adequate utilization through the payment of rent corresponding to the prices of expropriated land. From these considerations Brutzkus urges intellectuals to tell people honestly that land cannot be distributed freely. He believes that the success of land reform depends on peasant's individual initiative and energy and for this end the immense energy of excited people must be transformed into creative force for economic construction. Brutzkus' standpoint was similar with those of Neo-populists (Neonarodniki) in its recognition of peasant farming's vitality and deep concern on the fate of national economy. However, Neo-populists still shared with traditional Populists negative attitude toward capitalism and the private land ownership. Most of Russian liberals were also sympathetic to the socialization of land in a moderate form. These circumstances placed Brutzkus in a quite isolated position. The Populist program was adopted by Bolsheviks and put into execution by communal peasants. In this point the October Revolution was the Populist agrarian revolution. Along with his critique of Marxist socialism, Brutzkus' penetrating criticism against Populism has great historical significance in its deep insight and civil bravery.
The purpose of this note is to examine the impact of oil price changes on the Russian economy: to what extent does oil price shock influence its gross domestic product (GDP) and the price level? Another goal of this note is to examine the effect of monetary policy. In order to identify the impacts, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model is employed. The time span covered by the series is from the first quarter of 1997 to the third quarter of 2007. Our findings are as follows: when UOP rises 1 per cent, RGDP grows 0.3 per cent. At the same time, the shock leads to a negative 0.4 per cent increase in CPI. The important point to note is the asymmetry of the CPI. It seems reasonable to suppose that this reflects the successful economic policy.
This is to analyze politicians' exploitation of the North-South rift in Kyrgyzstan from the so called “Tulip Revolution” which ousted President Akaev in March 2005, to the first Parliamentary election based on a proportional system which was conducted in December 2007. Concerning the analysis of contemporary Kyrgyzstani politics, some researchers emphasize the North and South rivalry. On the other hand, others insist that the Kyrgyz politicians ally and separate amorphously, regardless of the North and South factor. Since President Bakiev has held power, facing the mass rallies against him, he succeeded in grasping control of the Parliament through the first Parliamentary election on the basis of proportional representation. This author analyzes the course of the consolidation of power by President Bakiev and the exploitation of the regional and tribal factors. Alliances and ruptures among politicians were observed regardless of the North and South factor, but this factor plays an important role in the politics of Kyrgyzstan. The results of the analysis of the Parliamentary election are as follows: 1) Political division seperated by North and South 2) Recognition of rift between North and South in the election poll 3) Imbalance between the political forces in North and South 4) Unification in North and South as a result of regional and tribal factors rather than policy This analysis concludes that Kyrgyz politicians exploit both regional and tribal factors which are then employed in strategies for consolidation in an attempt to divide their opponents.