In this essay, the present author researched the impact of the criticism of the‘Cult of Stalin, ’in the context of its implication on global socialist regimes. Above all, its impact over Asian socialist countries are analyzed. Special attention is paid on the Chinese communist party and DPRK. Emphasis is put on the fact that Hungarian and other East European revolution have un precedent impact over the fragile democratization in Asia. Kim IL Sung could perpetuate its ‘Cult of Chuch'e, ’because Moscow had to concentrate on Eastern socialism.

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Energy resources such as oil and gas might work as one of diplomatic means and a pipeline which transports oil and gas, as well. There are some such examples in and around the Former Soviet Union in these days as pointed out below.
Ukraine shut off a gas-valve, Belarus turned off the tap of the oil pipeline, Azer-baijan stopped oil flow from Baku to Novorossisk, Georgia seems to have decided to depend on Azerbaijan gas instead of Russian. Russia is constructing and planning to lay pipelines without passing a third country, some of oil and gas producing countries in the Caspian region are trying to export their products bypassing Russia and some European states support such an action, some countries are trying to invite transit pipeline construction within their territory. Russia will differentiate gas export prices depending on importers' loyalty to Russia.
The above-mentioned are one of evidences for the strategic features of a pipeline, but nonetheless attention must be paid to the following two aspects.
1) Profit which a long-term reliable relation brings outweighs a short-lived advantage, gained contrary to principle of reciprocity.
2) Use of pipeline for a political purpose might be a peculiar phenomenon in a specific region for specific time duration as almost all cases studied here concern the Former Soviet Union.
Conclusion: A pipeline might affect relationships between nations and vice versa. We, men of reason, should live basing on the assumption that a relation among producers, a relation among consumers and a relation between a producer and a consumer must be supplementary and cooperative, not exclusive.

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Which countries were considered as comprising “Eastern Europe?” Generally speaking, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are regarded as having belonged to Eastern Europe and, without a doubt, the concept of Eastern Europe as one region was grasped most easily in the era of the Cold War. However, even this conclusion is hasty. Yugoslavia never joined the Warsaw Pact and it was only a semi-member of COMECON, while Albania withdrew from the former in 1968 and from the latter in 1962. Even those people who think that “Eastern Europe” really did exist as an entire region are faced with the current dissolution of Eastern Europe because of the EU's eastward expansion.
Furthermore, the case of Kosovo illustrates the dissolution of Eastern Europe as one region. Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia, but because of human rights violations against the majority Albanian population of Kosovo by the Milosevic regime, from March to June 1999, NATO undertook air strikes not only in Kosovo, but also in Serbia proper. This was a clear example of infringement of Serbia's state sovereignty, both formally and substantively. After the fall of Milosevic, state-building in Kosovo is being undertaken by neither Serbia nor Eastern Europe, but by the international community. On 2 February, Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the future status process of Kosovo, announced his Draft Comprehensive Proposal on the Kosovo Status Settlement. According to the draft, Kosovo can, in practice, obtain independence. Kosovo will be an independent state, although Serbia strongly opposes this. Neither Albanians, Serbs, people in neighboring countries, or even the international community imagine “Eastern Europe” as one region.
Nowadays, the EU member states in Eastern Europe are only interested in strengthening their political and economic relations within the EU and in building special relations with their eastern neighbors Russia and Ukraine. The non-EU member states of the region only desire EU membership. Moreover, the term “Eastern Europe” is closely connected with the memory of domination by the USSR. EU enlargement and Soviet connotations of “Eastern Europe, ” which cannot be detached from the term, ensure that Eastern Europe will no longer remain as a distinct region in the future.

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This paper criticizes Hirschman's interpretation of “the events of the autumn of 1989” that is representative of the popular interpretation. According to the popular interpretation, the process started just by change of the Hungarian west border in May, 1989. Hirschman (1995) has written the same. Using only this framework he studied why and how the Exodus and the reform movement tied up in East Germany in the autumn of 1989. He did not recognize very important historical facts and showed some unsuitable judgments.
The central point of the events of the autumn of 1989 in East Germany is the opening of the Berlin Wall, i.e., liberalization of emigration and foreign travel. It was the result of the “Ausreise” (this word means departure, but as an official East German word it refers to emigration) movement that had existed since 1975 and was growing quickly. The most important demands for reform by people who decided to stay in the country in the autumn of 1989 were also liberalization of foreign travel and election. Therefore, the departure movement and the reform movement had different interests as well as a common interest. The history and roles of the departure movement since 1975, which is the most important historical fact, is missing in Hirschman (1995) and in the popular interpretation.
The departure movement was not simply an escape movement, but a very strong and aggressive dissident one, because it demanded from the government acceptance of the human right to leave the country, which could not exist without ban on free departure and free foreign travel (isolation of the East German people) . The victory of the movement (the wall opening) brought about a chain collapse of East European communist systems. That suggests the movement was one of the three major movements from the bottom which brought about the system collapse. The others were Polish solidarity and the independence movement in the Baltic States.
Hirschman also made other misjudgments. He argued that there were no “voices” in East Germany and that the tie-up of the departure movement and reform groups, such as “new forum” (derived from groups for peace, human rights and environment) arose for the first time in the autumn of 1989, and that Christa Wolff and other in traparty artistic people were the main forces for “voice.” In addition, because he considered the events of the autumn of 1989 separately from the historical context, the events were drawn only as accidental outbreaks.
If the events of the autumn of 1989 had been considered in Hirschman's framework, the concept of “voice in pursuit of exit” could have been utilized. Footnote 5 of Hirschman (1995) mentioned the “voice in pursuit of exit” which Scott (1986) discovered as one of the forms of the emancipation of Cuban slaves. Hirschman called it “a mixed, exit-cum-voice strategy.” He should have developed this concept for study in the East German case if he wanted to persist in his model of voice-exit.

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This article analyzed the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The “Orange Revolution” is widely understood by the western media and countries as a part of political, democratic changes in the former Soviet Union, and also very often called or mentioned as a “Democratic Revolution.” The author has a different opinion and a strong feeling of uneasiness to call it as a “Democratic Revolution.”
However it is rather difficult to explain those changes such as The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgys (2005), as simply a coincidental happening. There should be some explanation of similarities and should be a comparative analysis.
From this point of view the author picked up the general election in Ukraine which was held in March, 2006, and made an analysis of political changes in Ukraine as a whole.
The result of the analysis showed the following: 1) The most of the people in Ukraine have now a feeling of the disillusion by the “Orange Revolution.” 2) The political confrontation in the “Orange Revolution” were based on the geopolitical different direction of the West and the East. This confrontational pattern has not changed so much before and after the revolution. 3) The direction of the West and the East are completely opposite, and almost impossible to compromise. The Ukrainian society is divided by the West and the East, and the power balance is very narrow and full of the tension. 4) However the new element of political changes is now emerging within the Ukrainian society. Especially the economical changes based on the development of the market economy are now becoming more important for the Ukrainian politics, and should not be ignored.
After the election in March, 2006, the former “Orange Revolution” coalition forces tried to establish a new government, but failed. Instead, the opposition pro-Russian forces with the leader of Mr. Jankovich, have succeeded to form a new government. This outcome can be also explained by the economical changes in Ukraine.
After the collapse of Soviet Union the so-called socialism system were broken down one by one, but all the former socialist countries had same (or similar) problems and difficulties. Behind those problems and difficulties you can find out always the friction among the society because of the introduction of market economy. In this context it may be possible to find out the logics and rules of political changes in postsocialist countries based on the analysis of the economic developments. The author has a hypothesis that behind the “Color-Democratic” revolution the economic factor, especially the development of market economy has played a very important role.

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How the political leaders can commit themselves over the promises to abolish a specific kind of armament? By which means can they force the domestic actors or stakeholders to change their behavior?
The international rules to control arms increasingly require qualified administrative management, and implementation of these rules significantly affect the interests of the domestic organizations or groups such as the military, the arms producers or the local governments and residents. So, compliance can be discussed as a matter of attaining cooperation among these domestic actors.
This article examines the key sources of variation in the level of compliance by tracing the political process of the chemical weapons destruction in Russia. The recent three leaders (Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris El'tsin and Vladimir Putin) worked with different external enthusiasm and domestic political energy on the problem. This paper concludes that the most significant and direct source was the deliberate and effective handling by the leader, though the institutional changes also had limited impact on the situation.
Compliance was poor, when a large majority of political energy went into bargaining with the local governments over the compensation for accepting the construction of destruction facilities, and when external commitment lacked political decisiveness to proceed against domestic resistance. Compliance was achieved, though with delay, when strong political leadership was exercised over budget allocation and over establishment of effective mechanisms of control over the local governments and the destruction troops. The case deserves serious attention, because it illustrates us that the institutional changes must be followed by strong and effective political leadership.

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The aim of this paper is to examine the current status and future prospects of the regional economic integration among CIS countries.
Firstly, the institutional framework of FTA and customs union among CIS countries is reviewed. Several plurilateral agreements towards establishing FTA and customs union were signed by CIS countries, but almost all of them have not been realized. On the other hand, a web of bilateral free trade agreements among CIS members is in effect. These agreements stipulate duty-free trade regime in all goods, while allow for some exemptions. Currently, such exceptional goods are very few in trade among 5 members of EvrAsES (Eurasian Economic Community) excluding Uzbekistan (i.e. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), though some NTB (nontariff barriers) remain. Concerning customs union, Russia and Belarus seemed to have succeeded in unifying tariff rates against the third countries in the latter half of 1990's, but some retreats are observed recently.
Secondly, we examined two kinds of indices which represent the characteristics of intra-bloc trade. One is TII (Trade Intensity Index) and the other is HDLR (Horizontal Division of Labor Rate) Index. The results are following. Very high TII were observed with intra-CIS trade in 1996 and 2005, but the indices decreased during the period. In contrast, TII with EU and China were not so high, but increased. HDLR indices show the same trends. In many cases, the HDLR indices were higher in intra-CIS trade than in trade with non-CIS countries, but both of the indices decreased in the past decade. These trends of TII and HDLR seem to indicate the efforts toward CIS economic integration have had little effects on the flow of intra-CIS trade.
Thirdly, we foresee the future prospects of CIS economic integration in relation to the process of entering WTO (World Trade Organization) . In that process, CIS countries are required to abolish all of the existing NTB, which will also contribute to the progress of FTA in the region. As for a customs union, the influence will be adverse. To sum up, it may be safe to foresee that the CIS economic integration will remain at the stage of FTA for several years in future.

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The Czech Green Party was founded in 1990, but gradually marginalized and forgotten by both the voters and the media. A critical moment appeared when leading activists of environmental movements and former dissidents joined the party after 2002. In the 2006 election the Greens succeeded in getting 6.29 percent of the vote and six seats in the parliament. Clearly, this article aims to examine the party organization, its program and the internal relations of the Czech Greens.
The Czech Greens share common features of the New Politics party: electorate profiles and framework party. One feature, however, participatory party organization, is not fully applied to the party. With respect to the program, the Czech Greens have a distinct characteristic. While programmatic orientation of the New Politics is related to some left-wing policies, the program of the Czech Greens shows liberal orientation.
Since the party congress 2003 the presidium was dominated by leading activists of environmental movements. Because of their adamant way, sources of discontent accumulated between the party memberships, particularly former dissidents. In the congress 2005 the presidium was replaced by new chairman Martin Bursik and left the party. Under the new administration, the Czech Greens turned toward liberal tendency and aimed at entering government with Civic Democratic Party. Opposing to this course, former dissident Petr Uhl asserted that the Greens should be opposi-tion. Uhl played a fundamentalistic role in contrast with realistic position represented by Bursik.
It is impossible to forecast whether the Czech Greens would be maintained in the Czech party system. The Greens, however, could have the advantage of a member of the European Greens.

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The purpose of this paper is to interpret Leonid Lipavskii's “A Dialogue Poem, ” considering his view of the world.
Leonid Lipavskii (1904-1941) is a soviet philosopher, who is one of the members of the group “Chinari”, which existed in 1920s' in Leningrad.
The form of “A Dialogue Poem” is, as the title says, dialogical. In this poem “choir” insists that people, who have alternation of generations, must live in a daily life. But “One person” denies not only its opinion but also his own corporeity.
From Lipavskii's view the world is waving liquid. If a frequency of one wave is different from that of others, then the wave is comprehended as an existence. The emotion of horror appears when the frequency of one's wave is going to synchronize with that of the world, which means a deprivation of an individual.
In earlier studies it was thought that Lipavskii considered the emotion of horror as something negative and even disgusting. But in fact Lipavskii himself desires the emotion. One of the reasons is that he thinks a deprivation of an individual as “Nirvana” in Buddhism. The other is that he wants to have a view of the world itself. When one tries to know the true aspect of the world, he must feel horror. For Lipavskii the emotion of horror pays his curiosity.
We can read his above-mentioned thought not only in his philosophical texts but also in the poem “A Dialogue Poem.”

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The present paper only deals with the Slavic languages that are in use in present-day Poland. There is no arguing that the populations living in the north-east part of Poland (the region of Bialystok) are Belarusians and so they speak the Belarusian language, or that south of this region, along the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian borderline there are villages where people speak (or have been speaking not long before) Ukrainian dialects. South-east of Poland (The Bieszczady Mountains) had been inhabited by the Lemkos until 1949, when they were deported westwards. Linguists classify their speech as belonging to Ukrainian dialects. The Lemkos are divided in their opinion on that matter. Some say they feel to be Ukrainians, and they consider their language a Ukrainian dialect. Others are not ready to recognize their Ukrainian identity, and claim their language has an independent status. Both the Belarusians, Ukrainians and the Lemkos (as well as a small number of non-Slavic Lithuanians in the very north of Poland) live within the Polish language environment, which makes them bilingual.
In the remaining part of the country there lives a population speaking a variety of dialects within the Polish language. It is for at least a century that the contentions about the language status of Kashubian has been going on. Kashubian is the speech of the ethnic groups living south of Gdansk. They inhabit the area of about 6 thousand square kilometers. The latest reports show that the Kashubian population equals about 300 thousand. Traditionally, in Poland the speech of the Kashubians is regarded as a dialect of Polish. Various researchers from beyond Poland, and some younger Polish linguists refer to it as the Kashubian language. Lately, a lot has also been said on the growing language separatism between the Silesians.
The borderline between what we are ready to name a language or a dialect is unclear, and it seems one has to agree with H. Popowska-Taborska (1998: 87) in saying that the judgement depends on the criteria one prefers. Dixon's (1988: 7) distinction between the political and the linguistic understanding of what is a language, and his proposal to consider those varieties of language—in the linguistic sense of the term—which are mutually comprehendible to be dialects is impressive as regards its simplicity. Unfortunately, in practice it leaves a number of problems unresolved. This paper analyses the linguistic status of the Slavic languages and dialects used within the territory of present-day Poland, drawing upon both linguistic and sociological data.

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This paper addresses the following questions. What is the essence of “energy politics” in the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1970s? How did political actors influence the two countries' energy policies? What factors underlined economic complementarity in Japan-Soviet relations during the same period? Finally, what was the significance of bilateral energy cooperation on the overall structure of their relations during this period?
This paper analyzes major political trends as well as energy institutional establishments in the two countries during the 1970s, which was marked by the two countries' economic rapprochement and first initiatives for energy collaboration. It underlines the complementarity as well as the linkage between domestic and foreign policies in Japan and the Soviet Union based on case studies of major joint energy-development projects, such as Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Project as well as the Tyumen Oil Project and Yakutiya Gas Project.
Finally, focusing on the late 1970s, the paper considers the two countries' domestic political factors and international developments leading to the downturn in Japanese-Soviet trade relations that had a detrimental effect on bilateral energy cooperation during the same period and beyond. The paper also highlights the impact of the Kuril territorial dispute on the two countries' economic relations, which became the basis of the Japanese policy of “the inseparability of politics and economics” (seikeifukabun) adopted toward the USSR throughout the 1980s. In conclusion, the dynamics of bilateral energy politics and their impact on the overall Japanese-Soviet relations are analyzed.

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