This article introduces to Japanese readers an analysis of the Soviet Union’s postwar pronatalist policy and its effects on gender and society as published in Mie Nakachi, Replacing the Dead: The Politics of Reproduction in the Postwar Soviet Union (Oxford University Press, 2021). In particular, it highlights the evolution of the 1944 Family Law’s formulation and implementation, explaining how the introduction of this policy eventually led to the world’s first legalization of abortion based on the recognition of women’s right to abortion in a country where no feminist movements were allowed.

On July 8, 1944 the Soviet government promulgated the new family law. This was in response to the unprecedented scale of demographic crisis the Soviet Union faced after WWII: the loss of 27 million people and an extremely skewed sex imbalance. Millions of women had lost their past partners or future mates in the war. In order to recover from this crisis at an accelerated pace, N. S. Khrushchev, the leader in Ukraine during the war, drafted a pronatalist proposal and sent it to Moscow, where after multiple revisions it became the postwar family law.

One of the most significant and questionable features of Khrushchev’s brainchild was the encouragement of the birth of out-of-wedlock children. In order to achieve this goal, the law encompassed several fundamental changes, such as making only registered marriage legal, denying out-of-wedlock children the right to be registered under their fathers’ names, and releasing fathers from legal and financial responsibilities for their out-of-wedlock children. In consequence, women’s standing in gender relations suffered. Moreover, equality between children born in marriage and those born out-of-wedlock, established after the 1917 Revolution, would disappear.

Eleven years later, in 1955, the Soviet government re-legalized abortion. Does this mean that the pronatalist policy had ended? If so, did Soviet demography recover from the war, thanks to the postwar pronatalist policy of 1944? Or was this reform a part of the broader de-Stalinization process?

This article discusses the policy’s effects on demography, gender relations, and family and argues that the most important context for the reversal of the Stalinist criminalization of abortion in 1936 was not the death of Stalin in 1953, but the ongoing criticism of postwar pronatalist policy coming from Soviet professionals, particularly doctors, female party members, and women, a drumroll that had already begun in the late 1940s. Mariia D. Kovrigina, the first and last female All-Union Health Minister, promoted the idea of women’s right to abortion, which became the core of re-legalization. However, this historic development was muted due to the special, typically Soviet, circumstances of this process. In this way, this article points out possibilities as well as limitations for the reproductive rights movement under state socialism.

This paper discusses female allegorical statues, that is, Motherland and the Lamenting Mother, as Soviet monuments and memorials about the German-Soviet War of the Second World War. In general, we do not meet female citizens in public monuments because modern nations purge women from public spaces to private areas, that is, family spaces. Instead of individual women, they use images of allegorical women, for example, the Archaic goddess Nike/Victoria as a symbol of an imagined community and Marianne in the French Republic.

In Soviet war monumental/memorial space, we meet such a symbolic gender structure: Red Army soldiers and allegorical females. In this case, we consider the Archaic goddess featured in Motherland and the Lamenting Mother statue. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the process of restructuring war memorial spaces, newborn nations have removed male statues, for example, Lenin, revolutionists, politicians, generals, academicians, artists, and Red Army soldiers, which commemorate great Soviet hegemony. In contrast, female allegory stays in public spaces even today because female unindividual statues are an empty medium that can introject any concept.

It was found from the result of fieldwork in the former Soviet Union that Motherland, which has occupied a position as national symbol in the Russian Federation, has lost power to unite nation and people. In fact, the Motherland statue had not been built in Estonia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, or Central Asia. Regarding Latvia, Moldova, Belarus, and Georgia, we meet small-size variants. On the other hand, Lamenting Mother statues, who mourn for the war dead, have been raised in the whole country, even today. Local communities find space to share the pain of loss of relations and friends, homes, property, and life, in memorials in the shape of the Lamenting Mother, who is similar to the Holy Mother.

We are here concerned with the implications of social and cultural context of these two female allegories. In the first chapter, we focus on the period of Khrushchev. Stalin had oppressed all war memory and, after his death, people began to narrate personal experiences about war and build memorials for the dead in burial places. We cannot find a clear distinction in early female allegory statues. The 20th anniversary of the Victory, that is, the year 1965, brought a fundamental change in war memorial-commemoration spaces. In those days, Nike-type statues were raised as national symbols to unite the nation and people, such as The Motherland Calls at the top of Mamai Hill to commemorate the Battle of Stalingrad. In the second and third chapters, we illustrate distribution, location, size, shape of Motherland and Lamenting Mother statues in detail. Next, in the fourth chapter, we classify Lamenting Mother statues according to type of icons of the Holy Mother: Eleusa, Pieta, Our Lady of Sorrows, and Orans. We consider that the cult of the “Lamenting Mother” is based on the faith of the Holy Mother. Next, we surmise that early Christianity had united the faith of the Holy Mother with the cult of local great mothers in the course of Christian religion in Europe. Similarly, Islam assimilated local great mothers in Central Asia. It is possible that Soviet people, including Muslims, had a basis for accepting the Soviet secularized Holy Mother. And, finally, we examine threat factors inherent in the Lamenting Mother-type statue.

This paper uses micro-data to show differences in normative attitudes towards the division of labor in households between former socialist countries and OECD countries. The results reveal a gap between the OECD countries and the former socialist countries in general. Among the latter, Russia tends to be more accepting traditional norms than the OECD countries, and the trend is stable.

The phenomenon of the positive correlation between female labor participation rate and total fertility rate in developed countries has long attracted attention in demography from the viewpoint that "work-family harmony" can have a positive impact on fertility. In the data examined, we extract (1) a clear negative correlation between fertility and the attitude of "accepting" the traditional norms of division of labor between men and women in the household, and (2) an clear negative correlation between fertility and the weak division of labor between men and women in the household. In this respect, the widespread acceptance of the traditional domestic norms of division of labor in the former socialist countries, where the social division of labor was considered to be the most advanced under the socialist regime, is striking.

Looking at Russia, the picture emerges that there is no clear correlation between age group and education level and the traditional division of labor. Note that comparing highly educated women's group across different time points is not an appropriate approach, since the data cover a period of about 20 years and the heterogeneity of respondents classified as the same group on the basis of educational level increases over time. However, it could be interpreted as casting a shadow on possible future prospects, such as whether the rise in educational attainment contributes to the achievement of gender equality.

The article documents and compares the childcare support policy reforms in Central Eastern Europe implemented after the Global Financial Crisis. On the one hand, Estonia and Poland have maintained or expanded their childcare support policies after the crisis. Especially, Poland has expanded both cash benefits for families and public childcare during this period. On the other hand, Hungary and Slovenia have decided to cut back on childcare support measures during this period. While Slovenia was forced to cut back on childcare support due to the financial crisis, Hungary has intentionally adopted policies of focusing on the middle class with children by expanding tax credits and reducing cash benefits. As a result of these policies, the employment situation for women improved in Estonia, but it worsened in Slovenia, and the situation remained largely unchanged in Hungary. As for Poland, despite the expansion of measures to support childcare, the employment situation of women has not improved. This situation is provably caused by the fact that the ruling party of Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) emphasizes on the traditional role of women based on Catholic values.

Since the last month of 2016, after the assumption of the self-proclaimed presidency of Vadim Krasnoselsky, Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika (PMR, Transnistria) has implemented full-fledged “State Program of Patriotic Education in PMR” and its legal-administrative decisions concerned, in addition to pro-Kremlin patriotic policy. It is worthy to note that the political outcomes were abided on the 5-year State Program of Patriotic Education of Citizens of Russian Federation and have obvious similarities to patriotic educational programs which were introduced in Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea, and other areas.

The patriotic policy in PMR was officially launched at the establishment of self-proclaimed independence in September 1990 in the aim of promoting national solidarity among inhabitants as “Pridnestrovians,” which was essentially created along the Soviet national line. In contrast to the policy, however, the PMR Patriotic Program and subsequent related decisions after 2016 more focused on national awareness as “Russo-Pridnestrovians” which had inherited an indivisible historical legacy from Russian civilization. To recognize internal-external PMR policy and geopolitical relation between PMR and Russia, this paper deals with “State Program of Patriotic Education in PMR” and its related political decisions for the purpose of fostering patriotic awareness among “Pridnestrovian” youth. Eye-grabbing patriotism and patriotic movements followed Soviet nostalgia by retired veterans and elderly people are not main objects of this paper; rather, inconspicuous state-planned patriotic activities through school regular education, cultural festivals, academic-cultural exchange based on the state program are focal themes. The theory of “everyday patriotism,” which is penetrated in daily life without discomfort among subjects, leads to understanding this political phenomenon.

From that perspective, Russian authority tends to control specific territory through cultural-social associations, NGOs, thinktanks or any other “non-political” organized bodies. In PMR, a patriotic youth organization “Unarimia” and a thinktank “Dnester-Prut Information Analytic Center”, a Pridnestrovian branch of RISI, had been activated under official support by the PMR state patriotic programs. This paper also focuses on the process and content of the state patriotic program and the effect and result of their patriotic activities toward “Pridnestrovian” children and youth by above mentioned organizations.

Why did Russia abandon the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which was Russo-Turkish alliance, and accept the Straits Convention, which was signed by 5 powers on 13 July 1841? Previous studies have cited three reasons for this: (1) Russia’s weakened influence over the Ottoman Empire, (2) Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode’s orientation toward the Concert of Europe, and (3) France’s isolation. However, how did Russia evaluate the ability of its alliance partner? Using a commitment problem as an analytical framework, this study will clarify the security problems which Russia perceived in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and how it attempted to rectify them through the Straits Convention.

In the first half of the 19th century, Russia, seeking to keep the Ottoman Empire vulnerable, gave military support to the Empire, which was reeling from the First Egyptian-Turkish War. After being approached by the Ottomans for an alliance, Russia signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi with the aim of expanding its influence over the Ottoman Empire and prohibiting the passage of foreign warships through the Dardanelles. However, this treaty not only caused a fierce opposition from Britain, which Russia had not expected, but also threatened the security of the Black Sea coastal region, which she had hoped.

What did Russian policymakers think of these security threats? First, the Russian Military Officers questioned the Ottoman Empire’s military capabilities and believed that they would have to occupy the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the event of a war with Britain, regardless of the intentions of their allied partner. Nesselrode also saw the Ottoman Empire as incapable of resisting British and French pressure and recognized that the conflict with Britain posed a serious threat to Russia’s security environment. And when the Second Egyptian-Turkish War broke out, Russia began to fear that it would be drawn into a war with Britain in the Straits region.

In this situation, Russia tried to defuse the situation by participating in the conference of the five European powers. Russia approached Great Britain to abrogate the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and conclude a new agreement that would prohibit the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russia believed that a new agreement, based on the Concert of Europe, would be more credible in its commitment to prohibit the passage of warships through both straits than the Russo—Turkish bilateral alliance. Although it was also Russia’s goal to isolate France at the London Conference, Russia believed that its commitment to the ban on passage through the Straits could be maintained with the agreement of the four powers, regardless of France’s consent. It can be said that the abrogation of Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was the result of seeking a more reliable guarantee to replace the Ottoman Empire, which was uncertain about its commitment to the Dardanelles blockade, besides easing tensions with Britain.

This article explores the pivotal but largely unwatched 1985–1986 Soviet diplomacy over the Stockholm Conference, also known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), in terms of its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains why and how the Soviet Union made concessions to Western proposals in the Stockholm negotiations after Gorbachev took office. Regarding the most contentious issue of the on-site inspection, the following three people — the new General Secretary, the Foreign Minister with no diplomatic experience, and the diplomat on the ground — collaborated to create the unprecedented Soviet decision. The long-held Soviet secrecy collapsed because the triangle stifled both the conservative KGB’s and military’s opposition.

The Stockholm agreement, reached after two and a half years of negotiations, was the first multilateral East–West security accord since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the first arms control agreement involving the two superpowers since SALT II in 1979. It is also remarkable that its success was one of the first achievements for Soviet diplomacy in the ambitious Gorbachev period. However, the real significance of the conference lies in Soviet concessions in areas previously deemed unacceptable. The Kremlin, which had long adhered to secrecy, accepted the West’s proposal for on-site inspections.

This paper is organised into four main parts. The first chapter deals with the end of the Gromyko era after Gorbachev’s advent. From the beginning, the new leader had a vision of improving international relations but no concrete plan. Meanwhile, the old-fashioned Foreign Minister, who had long dominated Soviet diplomacy, showed continuity in foreign policy from the pre-Gorbachev period. The second chapter analyses the period immediately following Eduard Shevardnadze’s appointment as Foreign Minister. Shevardnadze, who had no diplomatic experience, strengthened the bottom-up mechanism of actively incorporating his colleagues’ views. The increased discretion of negotiators on the ground significantly impacted the future of Stockholm. The third chapter focuses on the discordance between the words and deeds in Soviet diplomacy following Gorbachev’s spectacular declaration in January 1986. While the leader actively announced new initiatives, actual Soviet diplomacy did not profoundly change course. This chapter also stresses that the Chernobyl nuclear incident was not the decisive impetus for reaching the Stockholm agreement. Finally, the fourth chapter describes the confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. The quiet war behind the Kremlin walls brought complex improvisation into the Soviet decision-making process and negotiation stance.

One of the pathologies of modern democracy is the crisis of representation (parliamentarism).

As a countermeasure against the dysfunction of representative democracy, ways to improve it have been argued in each country.

One of them is the vocational representation system.

This is a way to have the economic and social interests of a complex and diverse society represented in politics, and the idea is to form a representative system from vocational organizations rather than from region or interest.

Although this vocational representation system has diminished its influence in terms of its effectiveness after the war, it has not lost its meaning as an institutional theory.

The “Civic Chamber” of the Russian Federation discussed in this paper, which started its activities in 2006, was created to deal with the dysfunction of the parliament, and the way it was structured is reminiscent of the vocational representation system, but is it similar to the vocational representation system?

This paper aims to gain a perspective for evaluating this Civic Chamber of Russia by looking at the characteristics of its representative system, after tracing the amendments made to the law regulating this institution after its enactment.

As a premise for it, the author examined the process leading up to the establishment of the Civic Chamber, and then introduced the process of enacting the law that regulated this institution.

Then, based on the enacted law, the outline of the Civic Chamber was examined for its purpose, authority, composition and organization method, and commentators’ evaluation of this law was introduced.

The law governing the Civic Chamber enacted in 2005 has been revised many times since then, and this paper considered the revisions that have brought about major changes.

The following points were examined in order to gain a perspective to evaluate the Civic Chamber.

a. Is the Civic Chamber based on a representation system from social organizations?

b. Is it dependent on organizations?

c. Is it an advisory body?

d. Is it a democratic system?

e. Why are its components from organizations limited to social organizations and non-profit organizations?

From these points of view, it is necessary to pay attention to the trends of the Civic Chamber, including the verification of the effectiveness of the examination of legislative bills, etc. and the status of activities, and the following can be pointed out as the characteristics of this new institution.

The Civic Chamber in Russia was institutionalized by the Putin administration in response to the need for a system that complements political representation by incorporating social elements with the aim of restoring confidence in politics and social integration. In addition, it can be regarded as an attempt to create a representative of society that is neither a vocational representative having the aspect of representating interests nor a group representative as seen in the early Soviet elections, and in terms of making a system that relies on diverse organizations, it can be seen as a form of “associative democracy” as advocated by Paul Hirst. However, if it is likened to P. Hirst’s claim, it is “associative democracy from above”.