本稿は今年8月に発足したロウハーニー第二期政権のとりわけ外交政策を1979年以来のイラン・イスラーム共和国政権の政治的展開の帰結として位置づけることを目的とするものである。革命後のイランは現在に至るまで西側諸国の新自由主義的な経済政策に対して一定の距離を堅持してきた。またパレスチナ問題に対する明確な対パレスチナ支持の姿勢も今後長期にわたりその基本線が変わることはないだろう。だがそのニュアンスについて可変的であることは、イスラエルを「シオニスト国家」と呼ぶことを慎重に回避し続けるザリーフ外相の発言などからも伺える。

米国における2017年の年初のトランプ政権の発足にも拘らず、イランとP5+1の間のJCPOAがトランプ大統領によって破棄されるという可能性は極めて低い。だが革命以来のイランの非同盟諸国重視の外交姿勢は現在に至るまで続いており、南米のベネズエラ・ボリビア・ブラジル・キューバといった諸国との緊密な関係もロウハーニー政権においても維持されることは明白である。

革命後のイラン外交は決してシーア派重視あるいはイスラーム重視に傾斜することなく、それはあくまでも国益重視の姿勢に貫かれてきた。政策的な選択についても2009年以降は国際社会との協調の方向に大きく転換しているが、ただそれが西側と共通の人権擁護の理念に基づいていないという問題は依然としてある。

いずれにしても5月の選挙の結果、ロウハーニー政権は政策的な合理性･優位性について国民の信託を受けたものと理解すべきである。ある種の市民社会が育ちつつあるイランの国内政治において、いわゆる「保守派対改革派」の単純な図式はますます意味を失いつつある。イランは今後将来的に非イデオロギー的・非革命的な通常の国家として、日本を含む国際社会の一員としての道を歩むことが期待される。

（文責・鈴木均）

2017年5月の第12回イラン大統領選挙で再選を果たしたロウハーニー大統領は、アフマディネジャード大統領を挟んでハータミー大統領（1997年-2005年）の時代からの内政･外交上の改革政策を継承しつつ、政治手法としては従来と異なった新たなアプローチを取っている。それは①共和主義、②経済発展、③経済的公正、④政治的自由の4つの公準をめぐるイラン近代史の100年間の試行錯誤の帰結として捉えることが可能である。

共和主義との関係でいえば、ロウハーニーはハータミーと同様に改革派的な立場ではあるがハータミー程に急進的ではない。経済発展については1980-90年代のラフサンジャーニーの時代に特に追及され、ロウハーニーもこれを重視している。経済的公正はアフマディネジャードがとりわけ強調した公準である。政治的自由は特に対外関係において1950年代のモサッデク首相の時代と1979年の革命期に前面にでた政治原則である。

我々はこれらの政治的な原則を、「イラン主義」と「イスラーム主義」の2つの軸のあいだのどこかに位置づけて考察することができる。ロウハーニーの政治的な立場について要言すれば、彼はこうした公準のいずれかに傾斜することなく、イラン社会の政治的･文化的および政治経済的な変容の帰結としての「下からの改革要求」に注意深く配慮した「中庸」の選択を重ねてきていると結論づけられる。

総じて現在のイランでは伝統的な社会的･文化的価値体系と近代的な価値体系とのあいだでイランなりの共存の形を模索する過程が続けられている。それはロウハーニー政権下においても変わることなく、社会生活のあらゆる局面で公的空間と私的空間における女性の行動規範の問題をはじめ様々な新たな問題が提起され、議論と再検討が進行中であるといい得るのである。

（文責・鈴木 均）

エジプト政治を扱った本論稿で主に論じるのはホスニ・ムバーラク元大統領の罷免以降の政治過程における司法界の存在である。エジプト司法界はムバーラク体制崩壊後の選挙における不正への介入を通じてエジプト政治の主役に躍り出た。

エジプト司法界はこの間民主化を希求する国内の様々な政治主体やその政治過程に対して絶大な影響を与え続け、他方でムスリム同胞団の統治期には非イスラーム主義的な世俗主義勢力側もまた同胞団の権力行使に対抗するべく司法的な手段に訴えることが度々であった。だがこうした司法の意図的な介入がいかに2011年以降のエジプトの移行過程を大きく阻害し、やがて軍部が国内の全権力を掌握するに至ったかを分析し明らかにするのが本稿の目的である。

本稿の構成としては、（1）2011年以前のムバーラク体制下におけるエジプト司法界の独立性とそれが体制末期に次第に体制側に取り込まれていく過程を検証し、（2）ムバーラク体制後から同胞団系のムルシー大統領の罷免に至るまでの間に司法界がいかにエジプトの政治プロセスに関与したかを具体的に跡付け、検討を加える。

以上の議論を通じてエジプト司法界が政治的移行過程における各政治勢力間の合意形成をいかに阻害し、選挙の結果に基づいた実効性ある議会制度と政治組織の定着を妨げ、その結果としてエジプトにおける権威主義的支配の復活を助けることになったかが明らかとなるだろう。

Although Egypt has seen improved political stability and public order under the Sisi administration, the economy remains stagnant. The average economic growth rate during the first three years of Sisi’s presidency was 4.5 percent. More recently, Egyptians have suffered the highest inflation rates in decades due to the devaluation of the currency in November 2016. Will the bold economic reforms of 2016 lead to sustained economic growth for Egypt? This article argues the probability of reduced long-term economic growth prospects under the Sisi regime’s governance and economic policies.

The Sisi administration has pursued a policy of social stability by restoring authoritarianism. The government has restricted citizens’ freedom of assembly, association, and expression through newly legislated undemocratic laws. As for the economic policy, its three main pillars include stabilizing the macro-economy, upgrading the social security program, and implementing ambitious infrastructure projects. While these policies are based on the standard market economy model, the military is now playing a critical role in economic activity more than ever before. That is, the Sisi regime has tried to control economic as well as political activities in an autocratic manner. Excessive military intervention in economic activity deters fair market competition, and, hence, innovation. As a result, Egypt cannot be expected to achieve sustained economic growth under the Sisi regime.

The number of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq had been reduced greatly under Barak Obama’s rebalancing strategy in Asia. During the same period, the number of U.S. soldiers in GCC states has been also reduced. There had been 35,953 U.S. soldiers in GCC states in 2011. This number was reduced to 16,311 in 2016, less than half of what it had been in 2011. The main reason for the drop was the reduction in the number of U.S. soldiers on U.S. military bases in GCC states who engaged and supported U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the number of U.S. soldiers was reduced, the U.S. maintained its military capability to ensure security for the GCC states, even strengthening its military power on U.S. bases in the UAE and Bahrain.

Washington has strong interests in fighting terrorism in the Middle East: providing security for Israel, and securing a stable supply of crude oil to the United States and other Western countries. As the U.S. military presence in the Gulf region has contributed greatly to securing those interests, Washington intends to maintain its military presence in the Gulf region.

Russia interfered in Syria in September 2015. However, Russia does not have military interests in the Gulf region, but economic interests such as arms sales and oil concessions. Russian influence without a military presence in the Gulf region is thereby limited.

This study aims to investigate the effect of introducing the value-added tax (VAT), which is expected to be implemented in January 2018, on the economy and government finance of the UAE in the future. For this purpose, we use previous studies on the introduction of VAT in the developing countries as a reference. Analysing the experience of the developing countries in which VAT was already phased in will be beneficial to anticipate the future of the UAE economy after the new tax introduction. At the same time, characteristics such as the dependence of government finance on oil revenue, the fiscal structure which consists of seven emirates and the federal government, and Abu Dhabi’s grip on the other emirates, will make the impact more complicated.

As a result of consideration, we first conclude that even if new taxes such as VAT are introduced in the UAE, tax revenue share is expected to be low in the UAE fiscal structure; thus, a significant increase in tax revenue will not be immediately expected. Second, if government revenues increase due to the new tax introduction, government expenditure may be easily expanded. Third, the introduction of VAT can cause inflation in the UAE, unless the government provides tax exemption for basic necessities. Finally, the introduction of new taxes will help to allocate a budget to the education and social welfare sectors in the less developed northern Emirates to eliminate regional income inequalities.

Since the 1990s, Israel’s industrial development has entered a new phase owing to active engagement in Information and Communications Technology- related ventures. In the first decade of the 21st century, Israel succeeded in presenting her image as a “startup” nation, attracting worldwide attention. Israel’s economy, which was highly industrialized, tried to adapt itself to economic and financial globalization. In 2010, Israel was accepted as a full member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 brought to the fore not only the instability of the global financial system as a whole but also the latent weak potential of economic growth, especially in developed countries that lacked innovative, leading industries. In this framework, microlevel initiatives in Israel carried out using active venture capital to explore new niches and new, innovative, high-tech fields attracted the attention of various countries. These fields include the wider areas of software development in ICT—such as big data analysis, cyber security, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things—in addition to biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. It is important to note that Israeli industrial development has been influenced not only by economic necessity but also by national security needs. This latter priority guided the selection and concentration of resources within Israel’s limited national budget and investment capacity.

Academic research and development also contributed to improvement in the technological aspect of the military industry. Technological know-how spillover from the military industry contributed to some extent to an emerging, domestic, microlevel high-tech industry. The military operations engaged in by the Israel Defense Forces in conflict zones in the Middle East, including operations in occupied territories, provided an opportunity to enhance the quality and practicability of weapons produced. The increasing volume of military grants from the US also supported the military industry in overcoming difficult financial phases. Therefore, Israel’s model of a “start-up” nation is not applicable directly to other nations, as the model was not neutral, owing to the state’s guidance and intervention on security issues. Although the new neoliberal macroeconomic circumstance is favorable to the “start-up” of new ventures, the indirect support by the state through various policies also contributed to the building of a positive environment for them. New markets for Israeli weapons and high-tech gadgets such as drones are expanding rapidly, particularly in huge emerging markets such as India and China. Although the export potential of military equipment is immense, it obliges Israel to be involved in delicate and complex international political relations among the importing countries. This is a new challenge in this unstable and risky world, as high-tech and military equipment always bears political implications beyond economic interests.

During the Oil Nationalization Movement of the early 1950s, Iran’s oil was boycotted by the British and major oil companies, which brought a lot of financial hardship to the government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. A few medium-scale oil companies tried to buy and transport it to the market, including Japanese Idemitsu Kosan. It was a very risky but highly profitable deal for them, because Iran gave large discounts to the buyers. However, after Mossadegh’s downfall and the establishment of the Zahedi government, the deal faced problems. Iran could not or would not easily accept the discounted rate requested by Idemitsu.

In approximately 1954, the Japanese government intervened to support Idemitsu, including by writing letters to the Foreign Ministry. Below is one of those letters, which has been translated from Farsi to Japanese, that was sent to Dr. Ardalan, the Foreign Minister of Iran, in September 1956. In the letter, Japan demanded that the Iranians keep their obligations and promises and offered a long-term oil deal with special conditions. In the article, I describe the background and details of the deal, explain the Japanese government’s position regarding the Idemitsu deal, and shed some light on Japan’s energy diplomacy.