Discussions on the commencement of the Pacific War were conducted in conferences (which included Japanese government and military participants) held from autumn to early winter of 1941. In this paper, conference discussions related to the food supply issue are examined. Customs statistics from the mainland, Korea, Taiwan, as well as data from the Ministry of Agriculture, reveal that there were many weak points in the food supply and demand situation, not only with respect to rice but also wheat, other cereals and soybeans. Under such conditions, why was the final decision to engage in war? It was found that the administration of the conferences was a significant factor. At that time, there was no unified food organization in the “Empire of Japan,” and no qualified experts in the field attended the conferences. Moreover, the conferences lacked the tradition of discussing worst-case scenarios. This and other aspects of the conference structure led to a failure to appropriately consider the consequences of an inadequate food supply.
View full abstract