The Journal of Political Economy and Economic History
Online ISSN : 2423-9089
Print ISSN : 1347-9660
Volume 53, Issue 2
Displaying 1-12 of 12 articles from this issue
  • Article type: Cover
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages Cover2-
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
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  • Jin MATSUKA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 1-14
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper analyzes the influence of the separation of Prussian Poland from Germany on the economic situation of the border area between Germany and Poland in the first years of Polish Independence. It describes the period from the end of the First World War to August 1923, when the Polish government banned the German minority movement Deutschtumsbund in Bydgoszcz/Bromberg. This research is mainly based on materials from the National Archive in Poznan, but also uses German archival resources and daily newspapers in both languages published in Poznan. Those two Polish western provinces (Wielkopolska/Grospolen and Pomorze/Pommerellen) were integrated into Russian and Austrian Poland through the Wielkopolska Uprising (Powstanie Wiekopolskie) and the Versailles Treaty. However in the process of the uprising many Poles and Germans were involved in violent incidents. Taking this political background into consideration, this paper examines the economic crisis caused by this separation in the border area, where ethnical minorities such as Mazurian, Kashub and Silesian people lived. They were treated by German authorities as groups having a strong German cultural influence and an integral part of the German nation, but were also considered by the Polish national movement as an indispensable part of Polish nation due to their common linguistic, cultural (or religious partly among Silesian and Kashub) characteristics. I term these 'ethnically intermediate groups' between Germans and Poles. This economic crisis was in particular caused by, firstly, the strong devaluation of the Polish currency -the marka polska- in relation to the German mark. Secondly, and as a result, the price of crops in former Prussian Poland became much lower than in Germany (until 1922). The different velocities of postwar inflation of these two currencies, divided railway networks and difficult border control were among the factors that increased smuggling of goods and foreign currency. I also describe how such chaotic circumstances harmed the intensive agriculture of former Prussian Poland, stimulating ethnic antagonism. Further, the separation of citizenship between the two nations living in this border area deprived German farmers of their land through agricultural reform. Deutschtumsbund accused the government of violation of international treaties protecting minority rights in the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The Polish government lost the case and Polish society became more hostile towards the German minority. Finally, this economic crisis was used as justification for the Polish assimilation policy of the 'ethnically intermediate groups' and the nationalistic radicalization of German minority.
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  • Jaedong CHOI
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 15-31
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, there was a ten-fold increase in fire incidents in rural Russia. In particular, from the beginning of the 20th century until right before WWI there was a two- to three-fold increase in fire incidents in comparison to the end of the 19th century. Arson was the cause of some 30 percent of these fires, but in some regions and provinces over 50 percent were caused by arson. Fires did not necessarily lead to bankruptcy for Russian peasants, but were an opportunity to receive a significant payment of insurance money that enabled them to reset their economic situation. Peasants in Moscow province actively purchased coverage in the higher zemstvo additional insurance program, the zemstvo voluntary insurance program and from fire insurance companies. As a result in 1904, more than 40 percent of those who purchased zemstvo compulsory insurance coverage received 70 to 80 percent of the registered value of the insured asset, the value of which was frequently overestimated two or three times. 50 percent of policy holders of zemstvo compulsory insurance received payouts in 1909, while more than 60 percent did so in 1914. Farmers in Russia did not consider it a shame or a crime to cause arson, if it was not harmful to others. They saw arson as a quicker and more secure way to resolve the economic difficulties of rural management than bringing issues to the courts, which took into consideration various interests, or by bringing issues forward for an administrative procedure. It was not only quicker and easier to receive a large insurance payout for fire and arson, but insurance payouts also resolved the problems more quickly. In addition, there were very few cases where a suspect of arson was tried and punished as a criminal. During WWI and the Russian Revolution in 1917, there was a sharp decrease in the number of fire incidents. The primary reason for this was that the economic gain from insurance payouts decreased remarkably due to the sudden rise of prices for building materials and of worker pay. For this reason, in contrast to the 1905 Revolution, farmers seeking to restart their businesses during the revolutionary period beginning in 1917 were extremely careful about fire and arson.
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  • Takeyasu FUJIKI
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 32-46
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    By the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, the Clinton administration reviewed its China policy and introduced a new framework, that of Comprehensive Engagement. Under the Comprehensive Engagement framework the US government negotiated continuously and simultaneously three important issues, the military, the economy, and human rights, in order to integrate China into international society. But Republican conservative and Democratic liberal factions of Congress opposed and delayed the Clinton administration's China policy. The former expressed concern over the rise of China in East Asia, while the latter noted human rights violations in China. Moreover, various interest groups intervened in the policy process with their demands. They criticized the Clinton's Comprehensive Engagement for its appeasing stance, the lack of strategic and long term consideration, and its mainly economic focus. As a result, Clinton's Comprehensive Engagement was frequently criticized as being ad hoc and inconsistent, because US China policy was distorted by the diffusion of political issues and the strong influence of domestic politics after the Cold War. This paper analyzes the policy process of the US-China agreement on China's WTO accession, which is the most important result of Comprehensive Engagement, and a bill granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China, which is a precondition of the former. This process is examined from two points of view. One is the external aspect: negotiations with the Chinese government. The US tried to promote democracy and a market economy in China through accession negotiations with China. Another is the internal aspect: intervention of economic interests in the policy process and bargaining between the administration and Congress. In domestic politics, the Clinton administration needed to bundle the various interests of Congress into one integrated policy: Comprehensive Engagement. The House and Senate, Republican controlled since 1995, were able to restrain implementation of the Clinton administration's policies. In conclusion, this paper shows the consistency of the Clinton administration's Comprehensive Engagement and that there was an agreement between the Clinton administration and Republican leaders.
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  • Shuhei KODAMA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 47-62
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    The purpose of this article is to examine the direct investment of Japanese cement companies in Manchuria. In second half of the 1920s, the Japanese cement industry was experiencing cutthroat competition, and many companies were in financial difficulties. As a result the companies in that industry established a cartel, the 'Cement Rengokai', and placed price, production and sales under its control. But in spite of this effort, the situation continued to deteriorate. Oddly, the scale of investment in plant and equipment far and away surpassed the scale of demand. The reason for this was the cartel's method of control. Originally, cement companies competed by building additional plant. Further, control was based firstly on production capacity. Secondly, the cartel divided the Japanese market into eight blocks. If a company didn't have a plant in an important block, for example Chukyo and Kyushu, this put the company at a disadvantage. Consequently, each company competed with others to build additional plant in order to expand their profit. As a result, the cartel's control measures brought about new and serious competition in the cement industry by expansion in plant. The 1931 'Major Industries Control Law' prohibited plant expansion to ease this competition. But, on the other hand, this law deprived cement companies of their means of competition. This time Japanese cement companies turned their attention to the Manchurian market. In Manchuria, cement demand was expected to increase greatly to equip infrastructure, and the 'Major Industries Control Law' did not apply to Manchuria. As a result, companies competed through expansion in plant in Manchuria. In Japan, the main competition was between those companies in the cartel (Asano, Iwaki, Ube and others) and Onoda Cement Corporation (an outsider). This competition extended to Manchuria. Onoda and the cartel companies each built plant in rapid succession. Onoda built new plants in Anshan and Shanton. The cartel companies established the Daido Cement Corporation. After the Government of Manchuria prohibited the establishment of new plants in 1935, these companies purchased existing companies without operations, such as the Manshu Cement Corporation and Harpin Cement Corporation. Manshu Cement was purchased by the cartel and Harpin Cement was purchased by Onoda. As a result, the cement industry in Manchuria faced even more cutthroat competition than in Japan. Finally, after 1937, new controls were tried covering not only Japan but also Manchuria.
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  • Hiroshi NISHIKAWA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 63-64
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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  • Kazuyuki WATANABE
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 64-66
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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  • Toshihiko IWAMA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 66-68
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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  • Shinji ASADA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 69-70
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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  • Mitsuru KITAZAWA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 71-73
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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  • Hirofumi TAKAHASHI
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 73-74
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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  • Hiroshi NUNOKAWA
    Article type: Article
    2011 Volume 53 Issue 2 Pages 74-76
    Published: January 30, 2011
    Released on J-STAGE: August 30, 2017
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