This paper considers the development of prefectural-government policy on trade association from the late Meiji era to the Early Taisho era, focusing on the shibori industry in Aichi prefecture.

Shibori production accounted for about 10％ of all dyed goods, but from 1911 on, as the output of other similar goods increased, shibori output began stagnating. Shibori was manufactured in Kyoto, Aichi, and Fukuoka prefecture. Almost all cotton shibori, which was cheap, was manufactured in Aichi prefecture.

The Nagoya Kokusan Shibori Trade Associations and Arimatsu Shibori Trade Associations, both in Aichi prefecture, were established in 1901 and 1905 respectively. These trade associations planned at the outset to undertake inspections of shibori goods but failed to do so for their first several years.

An examinations of expositions and shows in the 1900s reveals that shibori in Aichi prefecture was superior in its introduction of new technology but inferior in its dyeing quality. The two trade associations tried to improve the quality of shibori but to no avail. In 1908, Aichi prefectural authorities had the trade associations establish the Aichi Prefectural Shibori Federation of Trade Associations and enabled the unified organization to deal with the problem of dyeing and regulate the use of low-grade dyes.

In 1909, the Aichi authorities revised the regulations to give the two trade associations the power to inspect shibori products. From late Meiji era into early Taisho, the two trade associations and their joint Shibori Federation held lectures and workshops to improve the quality of shibori. The Aichi authorities used these activities to teach specific skills, utilizing prefectural facilities such as the commercial museum and officials who had professional knowledge of dyeing and design. The effect of the inspections, lectures, and workshops began to become evident after about 1915, and the output of shibori, which had stagnated for several years, began increasing again. In summary, Aichi’s prefectural government began in the Meiji era to intervene in the shibori trade associations to promote quality improvements. In the early Taisho era, as the trade associations themselves began undertaking such improvements voluntarily, the prefectural government turned to a policy of indirect support for the associations.

This study suggests that prefectural-government policy, by guiding trade associations to construct regimes for improving product quality, played an important role in the maturation of local trade associations and local industries successfully.

This paper clarifies the response of Japanese small- and medium-sized industries to international competition in the period between World War I and World War II. It focuses on producers of Japanese matches and their role in exports and local production for the Chinese market. Growth in this industry had been driven by exports throughout the Meiji era (1886‒1912). However, Japanese match production lost its competitiveness during the interwar period because of the growing competitiveness of less-developed countries and the establishment of international trusts. In the match industry, however, two mechanisms eased this situation. The first was the maintenance of domestic production through the introduction of foreign capital, and the second was local production through foreign direct investment. In the latter case, a number of manufacturers became local producers in China, which was a conventional export market. They increased their profit margins in the 1920s, compensating for the slump in Japan. The Japanese share of match production in China was by no means large. However, from the perspective of individual manufacturers, it was equivalent to the value of products exported from factories in Japan. Therefore, sluggish product exports and loss of overseas markets were not necessarily damaging to Japanese manufacturers. At the same time, Japanese manufacturers faced not only competition with Chinese manufacturers but also difficulties such as a series of boycotts of Japanese products. Furthermore, during the chronic recession in China in the 1930s, the entire match industry, including Chinese manufacturers, was on the verge of collapse. The match industry responded to this situation by forming a production and sales cartel through the mediation of Chinese merchants who traditionally dealt in match imports from Japan. This led in turn to the cooperative coexistence of Japanese manufacturers and Chinese manufacturers, which can be understood as the final phase of Sino-Japanese business relationships before the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The development of the Japanese match industry in China clearly differs from that of the cotton spinning industry, which is usually assumed to typify the prewar period. To understand the development of Japanese small- and medium-sized industries, which took place on a transnational scale, we must both product exports and local production.