In modern Japan, half of the total labor force belonged to the agricultural sector. Moreover, it contributed to industrial development since it was closely connected with the nonagricultural sector. Female workers accounted for half of the total workers in the agricultural sector and for 60 percent of the female workforce. It had been proposed that a woman allocated her time not only for housework but also for farming and sideline occupations in order to increase the efficiency of resource allocation of household economy. Recent investigation has demonstrated that a woman's farming hours continued to increase with agricultural integration, which is a feature of agrarian labor supply in modern Japan. Married women in farming households decreased their domestic labor hours and increased their farming hours in interwar Japan. However, nothing has been speculated regarding how women could reduce the number of hours spent on housekeeping and what were the means of reducing housework. This paper examines the impact of childcare centers on female labor supply of rural households in interwar Japan. I use the following two approaches to estimate the impact of childcare on female labor supply. First, by comparing the number of children receiving childcare in Kyoto obtained through national census, I find that almost every household with an infant in the area, where a nursery was established, left their children with the institution. Moreover, historical documents suggest that their demand originated from the incentives of securing steady labor supply in order to deal with household vulnerability to climaterelated risks, and of receiving good care in terms of sanitation and education at a low price. Second, using longitudinal data on agricultural households from Noka Keizai Chosabo (Agricultural Household Survey), I estimate the female labor supply function and test the basic unitary household model, considering external child rearing. These results indicate that women whose children receive childcare are more likely to solve the trade-off between nursing and working, and work outside. The key finding in this paper is that childcare significantly eases women's burden of nursing and assures them to pursue farming and sideline occupations. This result shows that the outsourced care in social work is an important evidence to explain the long-term increase of female labor supply and the efficient resource allocation of household economy by women. Another implication of the result corrects the common view in the history of social welfare, which assumes that childcare centers is not conformable in terms of nursing and life of farm.

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This paper clarifies the relationship between Germany's capital exports and the revival of its domestic capital market, by examining how Germany's role as a capital exporter changed as a result of the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange controls. The focus is on Germany as an Article XIV member country of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). When Germany joined the IMF in 1952, the country had surpluses against the OEEC region and bilateral-agreement countries, and deficits against the dollar zone. Therefore, Germany's goal in promoting the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange controls was to eliminate regional gaps in restrictive and discriminatory measures. As of 1956, its import liberalization rates viz. both the OEEC region and the dollar zone exceeded 90%, and bilateral agreements were being eliminated altogether. Germany's trade and foreign exchange liberalization were thus almost complete. What is peculiar in Germany's case is that the country's cumulative current account surpluses were deemed problematic. The latter 1950s saw harsh international criticism of Germany's accumulation of gold and dollar reserves, and the country was pressed to export capital as a "surplus nation's responsibility" (richesse oblige). The United States and the IMF were particularly strong in urging capital exports. Germany itself was reluctant to be regarded as a capital-exporting country like the United States but promoted capital exports nonetheless in the face of the international pressure. The requests for German capital exports gradually shifted from short- and medium-term to long-term. The country assisted developing countries through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), both making loans and releasing the Deutsche Mark (DM) portion (18%) of Germany's capital contribution to the organization. These actions coincided with the revival of the country's domestic capital market at the end of the 1950s and contributed to the global liquidity supply through the issuance of DM-denominated IBRD bonds and the involvement of export industries and commercial banks in IBRD activities. The gold and dollar reserves that Germany accumulated were put back into circulation through such capital exports and thereby became a source of liquidity.

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This article examines a case in which an electricity service district in Chiba Prefecture was transferred from Tokyo Electric Light (Co.) to Keisei Electric Railway (Co.) (hereafter referred to as the "Chiba Case"). It focuses on two points: first, the principal features of the 1931 Revised Electricity Business Act (hereafter referred to as "The Revised Act"); and second, changes in the relationship between the Revised Act and State management of electric power. The research is based mainly on the diary of OOWADA Teiji, who was a Ministry of Communications (MOC) bureaucrat. The agreement to transfer the electricity service district from Tokyo Electric Light to Keisei Electric Railway was concluded in 1934, but in 1936, the Ministry of Communications decided not to approve it. The 1931 Revised Act had originally established electricity service district monopolies, as well as systems for approving electric bills, granting permission for mergers and transfers, and so on. Under the Revised Act, public regulation over the monopolies was strengthened. Five major electric power companies imposed self-regulation by organizing the Electric Power League (cartel). The driving force behind the Revised Act was HIRASAWA Kaname, an MOC bureaucrat who was specialized in electricity administration. The evolving regime reflected his ideas. He insisted on electricity service district monopolies and on the system for approving the electric bill (the introduction of the fully distributed cost method). He also respected the spirit of enterprise, however. His supervision of the electric power industry was therefore not oppressive but rather encouraged self-regulation by the companies. Meanwhile, OOWADA, who had opposed HIRASAWA, played an important role in establishing State management of electric power (1938). OOWADA insisted that the electric power industry should not be managed by private enterprise but should be controlled directly by the state, to correspond with the move to total war and to revive farming areas. Similar views gained influence in the Ministry of Communications in the reforming climate of the times. Finally, TANOMOGI Keikichi, who had long sought state management of electric power, was appointed Minister of Communications. He removed HIRASAWA as chief of the electricity bureau and appointed OOWADA in his place. OOWADA and others dismissed HIRASAWA's policy as antireform: as a result, the Chiba transfer agreement was rejected. The Revised Act regime had aimed to balance an enterprising spirit with the public interest, but bureaucrats like OOWADA criticized it as insufficient for establishing state control of electricity. Some previous studies have argued that the Revised Act regime paved the way for State management by tightening public regulations. However, the above case reveals the discontinuity between electricity management under the Revised Act and State management. The rejection of the Chiba Case was a sign of the changes taking place in electricity administration at that time, and thus suggests a universal problem in the relationship between the spirit of enterprise and the public interest.

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