Many students of the New Deal have focused largely on the elites inside the New Deal bureaucracy formed after Franklin D. Roosevelt came to power, who presented a range of policy visions. This scrutiny of the mood and frustrations at the grass-roots level during the depression has established that those elites who could understand and echo the true feelings of the people in both metropolitan and rural areas were accepted as genuine representatives of the people. I describe these elites as "elites taking the side of the people." Economically, the New Deal started as a mixture of reflationary policies, abandoning the gold standard, devaluing the dollar by up to 40%, and refusal to participate in currency stabilization at the World Economic Conference in London in order to raise domestic price levels. Farmers in the Midwest desperately needed inflation, because many had suffered land foreclosure and they could not hope for the better future without drastic government measures. They found in Milo Reno, the leader of the Farmers Holiday Association, their genuine spokesman. Additionally, economist Irving Fisher tried to persuade Roosevelt of the validity of his debt-deflation theory, in which effort he considered he had been partially successful. Unlike Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt departed from the gold standard myth rather early and adopted an expansionary financial policy. Just like Hoover, however, Roosevelt was a firm believer in the doctrine of the balanced budget. Although among other policies his agricultural and work relief expenditures were powerful enough stimuli to bring about business recovery after 1933, at the same time he resorted to heavy tax increases. Consequently, the net contribution of the Roosevelt budget to national income was not large enough to prevent further recession, and after the 1937-38 recession, there was nationwide debate on how to escape from this situation. Farmers and organized labor did not participate in this debate, but economists and politicians in and around the administration and representatives from major trade associations did, and Roosevelt was persuaded to order a major expansion of relief and public works in 1938 and after. Further, it may be wrong to judge the role of the New Deal expenditures as too small, because as a result of the experience of severe depression individuals and corporations alike made every effort to clear their debt, leaving government borrowing from banks the only available substitute engine for economic recovery.

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　カレツキの「インフレーション理論」は，Kalecki (1938) とKalecki (1954) から導出され，「二分法」としての性格をもつ。Kalecki (1938) は，「カレツキ体系」を形成するうえでの「ミッシングリンク」と見なされるものであり，それを進化させたものが Kalecki (1954) の第1章である。カレツキ体系では，「物価」とは「諸価格の平均」であるとされており，「ある一定期間における物価の上昇」が「インフレーション」として定義される。Kalecki (1938) の「二分法」を否定するKalecki (1954) の「二分法」では，不完全競争から寡占へと理論の発展を遂げている。物価水準は「価格方程式」の加重平均により示されて，インフレーションの発生が捉えられる。「物価騰貴」が起きるのは，一般的に原料や設備の不足が，需要に比して供給を厳しく制限していることによる。この理論により見出されるインフレの問題とは，利潤と賃金の間の所得分配の比率の変化であり，「所得再分配効果」である。つまり，賃金の購買力が低下し，有効需要の不足が起こり，産出量や雇用が減少し，「スタグフレーション」が発生しかねないないというものである。この理論による洞察は，物価水準の上昇のもとで，貨幣賃金が上昇しても，実質賃金は低下しないということであり，また，趨勢的に上昇する傾向にある独占度のもとでの，労働の資本にたいする抵抗の決定的な重要性である。これらに，政策的含意が見出される。

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戦前期の林業経済学の動向への注目はこれまで乏しく、戦前期には見るべき林業経済学の研究・教育はほとんど存在せず、戦後に勃興した林業経済学が林政学を打破した、という評価が定着している。本稿では、これまで十分に評価を受けてこなかった戦前期林業経済学について、学術文献を発掘し、諸相および断絶の理由を明らかにすることを目的とした。その結果、フィシュバフ著・首藤訳（1879）、ウェーベル著・望月訳（1896）、小出（1910）、川島（1917）など複数の文献が見いだされた。これらの文献には、ドイツ語圏の学術の影響や、私経済論と公経済論の混合といった特徴がある。また、国内外の林学者と経済学者の文献が引用されたものもあり、一定の水準を持つ林業経済学が戦前期に展開していたことが確認された。こうした戦前期林業経済学は、担い手の逝去による人的断絶と制度化が果たされなかったことによって、戦後に継承されなかった。マルクス経済学を主流とする戦後林業経済学は、このような状況の先に成立した。

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Within regulation theory the process of financialisation is defined by the hierarchical position of the financial system with respect to the other institutional forms, especially the wage labor nexus, inherited from the demise and crisis of fordism. Actually, financial liberalization, both at the domestic and international level, has triggered a cumulative flow of financial innovations, so powerful that they seemed to construct an unprecedented accumulation regime, finance led and directed towards households credit. Clearly financial innovations display quite distinctive features: they are the outcome of private profit strategies and they diffuse quite quickly since they are largely immaterial. Therefore financial innovations can have major consequences upon macroeconomic stability, due to the externalities in direction of the banking and monetary system. This has been occurring in the United States and United Kingdom that are the two main countries to explore the systemic crisis of a finance led accumulation regime. This crisis is then diffusing to the rest of the world due to the pervasiveness and overlapping of the new financial products, especially mortgage credit derivatives. This framework explains why so many experts should not have been caught by surprise when the subprime crisis burst out. They had argued that financial sophisticated products could overcome any obstacle to growth whatsoever: financing education, insuring against exchange rate crises, overcoming underdevelopment, fighting poverty at home and abroad. This dream of an omnipotent finance has been applied to the financing of real estate for the poorest fraction of the American population... in the context of a speculative bubble. The securitization of these mortgage loans has transferred the default risk to the entire financial system since the remuneration of financiers created strong incentives to overextend the volume of low grade credit, i.e. the subprimes. Consequently their crisis was the logical outcome this speculation and many previous episodes (the October 1987 stock market crash, the LTCM collapse, the Enron scandal, the internet bubble..) had made explicit all the ingredients of the collapse of the entire American financial system on September 2008. From a regulationnist point of view, this is an unprecedented mix a three crises. First a typical over accumulation in the real estate sector, that calls for a readjustment of price of houses. Second, the securitization has destroyed the very possibility of a correct valuation of risk and consequently of pricing highly complex derivatives: this is the novelty of the 2008 financial systemic crisis. Thirdly, the related freeze of the credit is putting an end to the very engine of American growth since the mid 80s, i.e. the permanent extension of credit to households as an alternative to income increases. Thus it is a major structural crisis, the unfolding of which remains quite uncertain: everything is up to the political strategies that will shape the interventions of public authorities. It is finally argued that it is possible and crucial to institute a social control over finance and especially an ex ante supervision of financial innovations. Until 2008, only the domination and arrogance of financiers were preventing such an aggornamiento, but the collapse of the naive belief about the superiority and viability of free markets opens a new epoch concerning the mutual relations between State, democracy and capitalism.

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あのクルーグマンをして、「世界で最も偉大な貨幣経済学者の一人」と言わしめ、女性経済学者のパイオニアとして大きな足跡を残した、アンナ・ジェイコブソン・シュウォーツの生涯とその研究について論じる。ユダヤ移民の子供として生を受けたシュウォーツは貧しいながらも両親の寵愛を受けバーナード大学に進学し、ゲイヤー教授との出会いから経済学者を志すことになるが、その道は決して平坦なものではなかった。

彼女はゲイヤー教授との出会いから、歴史データを丁寧に発掘し、読み解くという地味な作業の重要性を習う。後にNBERに職を得てそこで生涯経済学者としての仕事に専念することになるが、歴史分析を行う地道な彼女の研究姿勢に、ミルトン・フリードマンの目が留まり、共同研究を行うことになる。ここから彼女の研究者、マネタリストとしての道は大きく拓く。フリードマン自身、当時まだそれ程著名な研究成果を上げていなかったが、このシュウォーツとの共同研究はMonetary History（1963）、Monetary Statistics（1970）およびMonetary Trend（1982）の3部作として結実し、フリードマンの代表的研究となる「自然率仮説」の研究を生みだし、一挙にノーベル賞に繋がることになる。まさに、シュウォーツあってのフリードマンと言っても過言ではないであろう。フリードマンはその晩年に彼女との共同研究は最も理想的な研究であったと述懐している。本稿では彼女が最近のわが国のデフレ下の金融政策に多大の影響を及ぼしたマネタリズムの展開にどのように貢献したかを論ずる。

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