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  • 日臺 健雄
    アジア動向年報
    2015年 2015 巻 51-68
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2023/02/10
    解説誌・一般情報誌 フリー HTML
  • クリミアの事例
    末澤 恵美
    選挙研究
    2016年 32 巻 2 号 34-44
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2019/12/01
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    2014年3月16日,ウクライナの
    クリミア自治共和国
    で,ロシアの一部となるかウクライナに残るかを問うレファレンダムが実施された。ウクライナ政府はレファレンダムを無効としたが,クリミアは9割以上がロシアへの編入に賛成したとして独立決議を採択,ロシアと同国の一部となる条約を締結した。クリミアでは1991年と1994年にもレファレンダムを行っており,ウクライナからの分離運動を展開していったが,その特徴は,ロシアとの「再合同」を最終的な目標としていたこと,ソ連という特殊な国家の負の遺産が介在していたこと,自決権の行使をめぐる問題が「入れ子」のように重層的な構造であること,そして対外的な要因が影響していたことなどである。本論では,これらの点を明らかにすることによって,2014年のクリミア・レファレンダムがもつ意味を考える。
  • 半谷 史郎
    ロシア史研究
    2004年 75 巻 85-100
    発行日: 2004/11/10
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    В январе 1957 г. был восстановлен ряд автономных территорий народв, мародов, подвергшихся депортации в 1943-1944 гг. Это было результатом сложных исторических процессов, начало которым положил секретный докла Н.С. Хрущева о культе личности на ХХ-м съезде КПСС (февраль 1956 г.). Однако, согда остался неразрешённым ряд вопросов, касающийся народов, не упомянутых в докладе. В отношении крымских татар, немцев и корейцев - не только игнорировалась идея предоставления автономии, но вообще даже не дозволялось возвращение в прежние районы проживания. Цель настоящей работы - выяснить, что явилось помехой для реабилитации последних, в частности, имея в виду успешные опыты восстановления автономий в слчае с рядом народностей Северного Кавказа. Особое внимание автор уделяет трём ключевым моментам - во-первых, принципам, которыми руководствовалась центральная власть; во-вторых, отношению к приёму некогда депортированных в регионе, где предполагалось восстановление автономии; наконец, в-третьих, тенденциям стихийных движений в среде соответствующей народности.
  • 末澤 恵美
    ロシア・ユーラシアの社会
    2020年 2020 巻 1049 号 46-60
    発行日: 2020年
    公開日: 2023/03/08
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 三船 毅
    選挙研究
    2015年 31 巻 2 号 145-151
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2018/04/06
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
  • ―「ユーロマイダン革命」以後の社会調査データをもとに―
    保坂 三四郎
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2016年 2016 巻 45 号 119-134
    発行日: 2016年
    公開日: 2018/06/02
    ジャーナル フリー

    Are there any experts who successfully predicted how the Ukrainian crisis would unfold after the Euromaidan revolution? On the one hand, the “Russian spring” project obviously failed: Vladimir Putin’s call for consolidating “Novorussia” did not catch the hearts of people beyond the limited part of Donbass. For example, after the launch of anti-terrorist operations in spring 2014, even such a Russified eastern city as Dnipropetrovsk turned blue-and-yellow, full with volunteer citizens supporting the government forces, thereby exhibiting the rise of Ukrainian patriotism. However, that was not the end of the story. During the national parliament elections in October, 2014 in the same Dnipropetrovsk Oblast the Opposition Bloc consisting of former Party-of-Regions members that did not endorse the Euromaidan surpassed the president’s party, Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Other eastern regions such as Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia mirrored Dnipropetrovsk in their electoral behavior. These snapshot observations speak for themselves: the social and political dynamics in Ukraine is much more complicated than is routinely described with the popular “east-west divide” discourse.

    Quantitative research on the mass attitudes in Ukraine often opts for versatile “regions” to explain the social and political cleavages. Most of them, however, treat regions as proxy for historical and cultural attributes common to localities, ignoring the heterogeneous distribution of personal historical memories in a given geographical space. This study tests the explanatory power of individual acceptance of national history in shaping the attitudes toward the Euromaidan, utilizing ordered logit model on nationwide survey data collected from December 2014 to January 2015.

    The author ran principal component analysis on the responses to the seven major historical events in Ukraine, and identified anti-Ukraine historical component, which denies the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as well as the collapse of the USSR and the country’s independence. In the ordered logit estimation with these principal component scores, the effect of the regional factor was mediated by historical memory in all eastern regions including Donbass, Sloboda, Lower Dniepr and Black Sea. However, explanatory power of the regional variable persists in Podolia and Left bank. This finding suggests the further need for studying interaction terms between historical memory and regions.

    Furthermore, two-stage least square estimation with instrumental variable was conducted to verify the effect of historical memory on the attitudes to the Euromaidan, which rejected the above hypothesis at a five-percent significance level. This implies that causal arrows run reciprocally between these two variables.

    The analysis also discovered the carriers of ambivalent “hybrid” memory, who miss the Soviet Union but welcome the independence simultaneously. These findings provide valuable insights into the amorphous nature of the eastern regions that embrace multilayered historical memories, and highlight key challenges for post-Maidan national (re)integration.

  • 「全欧州」から「ロシアなき欧州統合」へ
    松嵜 英也
    防衛学研究
    2023年 2023 巻 69 号 77-94
    発行日: 2023年
    公開日: 2024/10/20
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国際社会における人間の移動
    中西 治
    国際政治
    1988年 1988 巻 87 号 139-152,L14
    発行日: 1988/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since Gorbachev and his government launched the “Perestroika” reform, dissident movements and flows of people in the Soviet Union have attracted greater academic as well as practical attention. Yet, studies of these questions remain uncultivated, and few such studies exist in Japan. In order to clarify the current state of dissident movements and flows of people in the Soviet Union and to understand the degree of maturity of Soviet society, this article first surveys the different streams of the dissident movements, locating Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn in these streams. The former was exiled to the city of Gorki and later released, whereas the latter remains exiled outside the country. With this comparison in mind, the author then considers the questions of freedom of residence and of movement in the Soviet Union. Finally, the issue of Crimean Tatars, who have been exiled as a whole ethnic group, is considered in relationship to Perestroika.
    Sakharov, who acknowledges Marxist-Leninist theory as the legitimate ideology of the Soviet state, demands democratization and reform of the government. In short, he is a reformer within the regime. Solzhenitsyn, by contrast, is a true radical reformer who denounces Marxist ideology itself. One of Sakharov's demands has been liberalization of the people's freedom of movement and residence.
    Unlike the constitution of a capitalist country such as Japan, the Soviet constitution does not grant freedom of residence, movement and choice of occupation, or the freedom of emigration and denaturalization. As is well known, every Soviet citizen is required to carry a passport. One's choice of occupation, residence and movement, both international and domestic, was severely restricted, even after a 1974 reform slightly simplified the passport regulation. In August 1986 the immigration law was revised to liberalize somewhat the Soviet citizen's access to international travel after the beginning of 1987. Historically speaking, the Helsinki declaration of 1975 led the Soviet Union to take some measures to liberalize the freedom of residence and movement in the 1970s. But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, intensified international tensions caused a tightening of the Soviet borders. With the Perestroika since 1985, restrictions governing residence and domestic and international movement have been somewhat loosened.
    In June 1945, at the same time as several similar autonomous republics of Soviet national minorities, the Crimean Autonomous Republic ceased to exist, and the Tatar people were exiled to other areas. This Stalinist misatke was criticized by Khrushchev and the Tatars now demand to return to Crimea. The Soviet government has tried to allay Tatar dicontent by giving them a certain degree of cultural freedom, but it is doubtful if this policy will succeed. The current government will sooner or later be tested on this question too. On the whole, however, the Gorbachev regime seems aware that Perestroika inevitably requires granting more freedom of movement to the Soviet people.
  • 竹村 豊
    国際教養大学 アジア地域研究連携機構研究紀要
    2015年 1 巻 97-105
    発行日: 2015/06/30
    公開日: 2018/04/27
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
    第二次世界大戦終結70周年の年にウクライナ問題の先鋭化は欧州における戦後処理(ヤルタ体制)、東西冷戦、ベルリンの壁撤去、ソ連邦の崩壊、EU/NATOの拡大と続く個々の出来事に内包された諸問題に因って引き起こされたものである。ウクライナ・ポロシェンコ政権を支持する米国、EUと対立するプーチン政権は欧米のみならずオーストラリア、日本からも経済制裁を受け、日増しにロシアが世界経済から孤立しているにも関わらず、プーチン大統領の支持率は80%を超えている。元々、ソ連時代からロシアは政経一体型の経済運営であるが、クリミア・ウクライナ問題に絡む一連の高い代償を払いながら強引に自らの政策を進めようとするのは、プーチン大統領の経済政策のルーツがオリガルヒ(新興財閥)との戦いであり、この戦いを通じて今日「国家資本主義」と言われる経済運営が形成されたのである。今後のロシアの資源・エネルギーを中心とする対東アジア経済政策をみる上で経済原則に依らない政治的、戦略的な意図を見ておかなければならない。
  • ―3つの難問―
    東野 篤子
    国際安全保障
    2023年 51 巻 2 号 1-9
    発行日: 2023/09/30
    公開日: 2024/10/18
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 公開の背景とその魅力
    保坂 三四郎
    ロシア史研究
    2020年 105 巻 78-94
    発行日: 2020/10/25
    公開日: 2024/03/31
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高橋 ミレイ
    人工知能
    2024年 39 巻 5 号 742-752
    発行日: 2024/09/01
    公開日: 2024/09/01
    解説誌・一般情報誌 認証あり
  • 内陸アジア史研究
    2017年 32 巻 99-114
    発行日: 2017/03/31
    公開日: 2025/04/21
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 平野 高志
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2024年 2024 巻 53 号 15-28
    発行日: 2024年
    公開日: 2025/06/04
    ジャーナル フリー

    In 2014, Russia’s occupation of Crimea was accompanied by an extensive information campaign aimed at mitigating international condemnation. A central element of this campaign was the deployment of historical narratives claiming Crimea’s longstanding ties to or belonging to Russia. These narratives emphasized Russia’s role as the legitimate successor to Kyivan Rus and positioned Crimea as a sacred site of Christianization. Furthermore, they portrayed Crimea’s history as predominantly Russian, with the temporary exception of the period leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the 18th century. These narratives were used to support propaganda suggesting that the majority of Crimean residents supported Russia’s attempted annexation, thereby influencing international opinion.

    In contrast, since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, scholars have worked to distance Ukraine’s historical narratives from Soviet imperial frameworks. However, Ukrainian historiography has primarily focused on ethnic Ukrainian perspectives, sidelining Crimea as a peripheral topic. This marginalization stemmed from perceptions of Crimea as an “other” rather than an integral part of Ukrainian history. Consequently, the deconstruction of Soviet-era narratives about Crimea lagged behind efforts to reevaluate broader Ukrainian history. As a result, many Soviet-influenced perspectives on Crimea persisted uncritically within Ukrainian society.

    Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea served as a wake-up call, prompting Ukrainian society to critically examine Russian-imposed narratives about the peninsula. This led to growing awareness of the colonial and imperialist elements embedded in these narratives. Over the past decade, Ukrainian scholars have actively worked to reconstruct Crimea’s history from a decolonial perspective. This effort has been fueled by increased interest in Crimea’s past and its role within Ukraine’s civic identity. The focus has shifted from viewing Crimea as an external entity to recognizing it as an integral part of Ukraine’s historical and cultural landscape.

    Ukraine’s response to Russia’s aggression has also catalyzed broader changes in its national identity. The concept of a civic Ukrainian identity has expanded beyond ethnic definitions, encompassing diverse groups, including the Crimean Tatars. This inclusivity has heightened interest in the history of the Crimean Khanate, which is now being framed as an integral component of Ukraine’s historical narrative. In educational contexts, Crimean entities are no longer portrayed as foreign but rather as part of Ukraine’s shared heritage.

    The ongoing reconstruction of Crimea’s history signifies a departure from ethnocentric historiography. While elements related to Russia and its colonial legacy are gradually being scrutinized or rejected, this process has also encouraged a more inclusive understanding of Ukraine’s multicultural past. If successful, this integration of Crimea’s history into Ukraine’s national narrative could serve as a model for incorporating the histories of other ethnic minorities. Such an approach would demonstrate the adaptability and inclusiveness of Ukraine’s national historiography, contributing to a broader understanding of its complex and diverse identity.

    In summary, Ukraine’s efforts to decolonize Crimea’s history and integrate it into its national narrative reflect a broader transformation driven by resistance to Russian aggression. This process not only redefines Ukraine’s relationship with Crimea but also challenges longstanding imperial narratives, fostering a more inclusive and pluralistic vision of Ukrainian history and identity.

  • 生田 泰浩
    ロシア・東欧研究
    2014年 2014 巻 43 号 121-134
    発行日: 2014年
    公開日: 2016/09/09
    ジャーナル フリー

    The perspective of a split of modern Ukraine into the East (Donbass) and the West (the rest) remains one of the most pressing issues in the discussions over pessimistic scenarios of the current unfolding crisis. While the US and the EU have imposed an array of sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in the Donbass region, the first Minsk ceasefire has failed on the ground. From this point of view, this study aims, firstly, to clarify the actual conditions that explain the so called “east- west division” in modern Ukraine, based on an analysis of previous research and qualitative data, and putting a particular focus on the timeframe from Euromaidan to the war in Donbass. In the following section, this study aims to explore the actual conditions prevailing in Ukrainian society and in people’s minds as a result of the changing dynamics themselves, using reference data from the Kyiv International Institution of Sociology and the Razumkov Center, in addition to the questionnaire survey that was conducted by the author.

    The actual information provided by statistics and sociological research indicates that the issue of the country’s split is a kind of myth and is basically a product of an artificial concept inspired mainly by both internal and external political actors. In other words, the division in Ukraine stems from political struggles rather than an east-west divided society originating in the cleavage of Ukraine as well as in Europe and Russia. Indeed, at the time of the Euromaidan demonstrations in Kyiv, protestors made it clear that the challenge was not between one region and another, but between the corrupt elites and the people, whatever region they are from. It is obvious that Euromaidan, in essence, was aimed at achieving the drastic political reforms, however, the Crimean and Donbass crisis should be defined as a political phenomenon, which includes the external factors.

    Although the current situation should be defined using the above-mentioned elements, some analysts still argue that the crisis has exposed deep divisions in Ukrainian society between the European-oriented west and the Russian-oriented east. However, this understanding is not adequate, and it maybe more correct to state that no single factor can capture or explain this crisis. What is happening in Ukraine is complicated and is driven by many factors. This means that we should take into consideration changes in the social environment of Ukraine as well as the other factors that exists in Ukrainian society and that caused the “division”. In this process, it becomes clear that the consciousness of civil society has produced some positive changes in demonstrating a sense of solidarity. On the other hand, political and economic issues significantly influence the Ukrainian society, and they are the conceivable cause of this divided society. Nevertheless, this study is still ongoing and needs further consideration before revealing what the causal co-relations and its final conclusions are.

  • 合六 強
    国際安全保障
    2020年 48 巻 3 号 32-50
    発行日: 2020/12/31
    公開日: 2022/03/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 荒田 洋
    土地制度史学
    1965年 7 巻 4 号 61-71
    発行日: 1965/07/20
    公開日: 2017/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 池田 嘉郎
    ロシア史研究
    2010年 86 巻 31-47
    発行日: 2010/05/27
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    Данная статья посвящается анализу специфики городского управления в СССР в годы НЭПа. Главным источником являются архивные материалы НКВД РСФСР, сохраненные в ГАРФ, в особенности стенографические отчеты совещаний народных комиссаров внутренних дел РСФСР (1924) и СССР (1924, 1926). В результате проведенного анализа показывается следующее. Во-первых, в области городского управления годы НЭПа замечательны тем, что большевисткое правительство тогда впервые столкнулось лицом к лицу с заданиями городского управления по-настоящему, постольку в предыдущие годы революции и гражданской войны городская жизнь как таковая пришла в упадок. Во-вторых, городская политика НКВД была направлена на создание и закрепление, хотя постепенно, некапиталистической, <<публичной>> сферы в нэповских городах. В особенностях в областях коммунального хозяйства и борьбы с <<паразитическими элементами>> был ярко выражен их идеальный образ советского города. Во-третьих, через опыт городского управления большевики нашли ценное понятие для определения новых отношений между городской сферой и собой при условиях НЭПа - <<Советская общественность>>. Обеспечив большевиков основной логикой мобилизации <<общесвенной>> поддержки, это понятие помогло им в скачке от НЭПа к сталинизму.
  • 志田 恭子
    ロシア史研究
    2007年 81 巻 13-29
    発行日: 2007/11/07
    公開日: 2017/07/25
    ジャーナル フリー
    The categories of domestic and diplomatic policies have been kept apart in extensive studies on the history of the Russian Empire in general. Internal policies toward the local regions, actually, were affected by foreign affairs in many cases. This paper attempts to prove that the analysis of diplomatic factors is helpful when studying the local rules of the Russian Empire by examinating two topics : Crimea' s Christianization and the Iviron monastery question. In concluding, 1) "The Athos Factor" promoted the Christianization of Crimea. Various internal and external factors (the predominance of Crimean Tatars in the region, Athos's religious authority and national conflict between Greek and Russian monks etc.) drove the local Archbishop and people to plan and accomplish the "Russian Athos" project in Crimea. 2) The friction between Greek and Georgian monks for possession of the Iviron monastery in Athos endangered not only Russian diplomacy to Holy places abroad, but also the rule over Georgia within the empire. Troubles in Holy Lands were capable of threatening domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Empire, which was engaged in an Orthodox policy toward "Eastern Christianity" and held extensive lands of foreign monasteries in it's territory.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    湯浅 剛
    国際政治
    2000年 2000 巻 125 号 96-114,L14
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are two channels for Western countries to participate in the regimet-ransition movements in the former Soviet Union States (FSUS): Interstate bilateral relationships on the one hand and international organizations for transition support like OSCE/CSCE (Organization/Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe), IMF and EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) on the other. These Transition-Support Organizations (TSO), which include FSUS as member states, had a common purpose during the 1990's: How to stabilize the transition to the new politico-economic regime (democracy and market economy). These norms, with the background of the Western ideas, are important even for the FSUS to establish the legitimacy of their rule.
    TSO in this article, especially OSCE, can be defined as organizations that mainly use soft powers in contrast with a hard-power organization like NATO. Although they cannot operate with hard power or resources which can have immediate and forcible effects, TSO try to infuse values and institutions of democracy and the market economy through soft-power methods such as monitoring elections, dispatching long-term missions for peace-keeping, advising and financing for institutional reforms.
    This article focuses on the following three points to examine the relationship between FSUS and TSO.
    First, the article explains what Western norms like democracy have for the maintenance of politico-economic order in FSUS. TSO attempt to introduce and stabilize democracy and the market economy, and present the support programs for FSUS in accordance with these norms, while FSUS also define themselves as democratic countries. This article points out the “dogmatization” of democracy in FSUS. The concepts like democracy and the market economy are utilized politically in FSUS although they have estranged from the reality just as the concept of communism did during the Soviet era. On the other hand, FSUS also accepted the Western concepts because they are afraid of being marginalized in the international community.
    This article also examines one concrete problem: How TSO have contributed to the maintenance of order in FSUS during the 1990's. At the beginning of the decade, economic TSO like IMF believed that FSUS would be able to shift their regimes smoothly if only TSO introduced some monetarist programs. However, the monetarist view can find few friends today in FSUS. TSO's task for the future in the region is to find an alternative policy that can take the place of the monetarism.
    Third, this article examines how the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs is treated by TSO. As OSCE members declared at the Budapest Summit in 1994, the member states including FSUS welcome the OSCE missions to promote democracy. However, if OSCE or other TSO try to strengthen their current level of involvement, FSUS may demand a redefinition of the principle. In this sense, TSO is always in the process of transforming their structure and their roles.
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