How are the following three propositions related to each other in the Phaedo? A Something is beautiful. B Something has(echei)beauty(immanent form or character). C Something participates in (metechei) beauty (transcendental Form). Some scholars(e. g. Vlastos, Fujisawa)identify A with B and consider C is the cause(reason) (aitia)of both A and B, but in my view this interpretation is open to further discussion. Plato does not identify A with B, but rather thinks B may also be the cause of A. This paper further considers this point. If anything else is beautiful besides beauty itself, it is so only because (dioti) it participates in that beauty(100c4-6). This sentence suggests that C is merely the cause(dioti)of A, and in the following passages of the Phaedo it is never said that B is caused by C. Simmias overtops Socrates because (hoti) Socrates has smallness in relation to Simmias' largeness(102c2-5). "Simmias overtops Socrates" is similar to "Socrates is smaller than Simmias" and "smallness" is immanent form. If so, the import of this sentence is that B is also entitled to be the cause(hoti)of C. In this respect, the next sentence is important. Nothing else makes a thing beautiful except beauty itself, whether by its presence or communion or whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be(100d4-6). The meaning of the word "presence(parousia)" is close to "echein" and "communion(koinonia)" to "'metechein". Of course the immanent form (beauty)does not appear clearly in this sentence, but the ambigious expression "whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be" alludes to it. If this understanding is correct, the role of this sentence is to suggest that A can be caused by either B or C. At 103c10f. Socrates introduces some other items, namely, "fire", "snow", "three" etc. The status of these is controversial, but I take them as immanent forms, because at the advance of their opposites, say, "cold", "hot", "even", they get out of the way or perish. Since immanent forms, "largeness", "smallness", are prescribed similarly at 102d5-103a2, "fire", "snow", "three" must be immanent forms(cf. Keyt). At 104d1-7 these items are defined thus : There would be those that compel whatever they occupy to have not only their own form but the form of some opposite as well(d1-3). Anything occupied by the form of three must be not only three but also odd(d5-7). This definition suggests that when something is occupied by "three" (immanent form), it is compelled to have not only "three" but "odd", so that it must be not merely three but odd. That is to say, in these two sentences too, it is suggested that possession of an immanent form causes predication. This becomes more obvious at 105b5-c6. In this passage, "fire", "fever", "one" are immanent forms. And it is clear that their immanence in something is the cause of predication. If the above consideration is correct, we can conclude that in the Phaedo A(predication) is caused either by B (possession of immanent forms) or by C (participation in transcendental Forms), but C is never the cause of B. Why, then, is B introduced in the argument? Is it necessary to Plato's argument? To answer these questions we must consider two points. One is that this argument is subordinate to proof of the immortality of the soul. In the argument soul is parallel to immanent forms. A body lives by the immanence of soul with it(105c9-11). As "three", which brings "odd" to something, can not admit "even" (104e8-10), so soul, which brings life to body , can not admit death, and therefore is immortal(105d3-e9). To prove this, Plato has to introduce B, namely, immanent

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(I) In Phaedo 99e 4-100a3(shown in the letter E hereafter)Socrates adopts the method of "studying things in words(logos)" instead of that of "studying things in facts(ergon)" in the inquiry for causes. Socrates puts it in this way: "I hypothesize in every case the logos that I judge to be most powerful." It should be noted that this beginning part of the famous passage on the hypothetical method (100a3-9, shown in the letter A hereafter) is intended as the explanation of that method of "studying things in words." According to one influential intepretation (R. Robinson, R. Hack forth, N. Gulley) , the logos in A means a proposition and the logos in E is loaded with the same meaning as in A. And owing to their common assumption that the virtue of the hypothetical method lies in the mere formal analysis of propositions, their interpretation is fated to have its difficulty. The fact is that Socrates says A to explain E, so I have come to the conclusion that the logos in A is just synonymous with the logos in E in the light cast from the logos in E. Hence the first point of this paper is to point out the difficulty of defining the logos in A in terms of the logos in E, following what Socrates says. To refute their interpretation in this way, we must understand correctly the implication of the comparison of the two methods of "studying things" in E, one of which is by observations based on sense-experience and the other is by reasoning about logical relations of concepts or propositions. The crucial point is why Socrates thought a world of words to be more reliable than that of facts as to where Forms should be inquired for. The reason I put up for it is this. When a thing appears F(e. g. large, beautiful, good) , we cannot think that there lies in a world of facts some quality or relation that strictly corresponds to the word 'F'. We must trace the cause of this appearance to the very utterance of the word 'F', which never copies a fact, but operates ante rem. So the point of the comparison is not just a simple juxtaposition of the two methods, but rather the contention that the method of "studying things in words" is logically prior to that of "studying thing in facts", since the existence of so-called facts depends on certain kind of words. Due to the lack of this point, it follows from their intepretation that the logos hypothesized in A is compatible with the hypotheses derived from the "studying things in facts", such as "soul is an attunement" or "justice is repaying one's debt". Thus I conclude that the logos in A is nothing but that in E in significance and translate both logoi by 'word'. (II) These considerations lead us to the following conclusions about the Theory of Forms as Paradeigma. (i) To interpret the hypothesis "There is something beautiful itself by itself" (100b5-6, shown in the letter B herafter)as referring to an objective reality ante verbum is to stand at the antipodes of the Socratic method of "studying things in words." For the Socratic method assumes there is no objective, identifiable reality ante verbum. (ii)To assume that Form F is the criterion of the meaning of the word 'F' is also to miss the point of the Socratic method. For the rejected method of "studying things in facts" assumes that in the realm of facts is there some quality or relation that functions as the criterion, and Socrates showed this assumption leads to perplexities. So the hypothesis in B does not state that there is a Form ante verbum which functions as that criterion. In Phaedo Forms are introduced primarily not as criterions but as causes (aitia) how we allow facts to come into existence by uttering certain kind of words. Therefore the hypothesis in B should be understood as the basic postulation in

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Plato's aetiological search in the Phaedo (95e7-102a9) has been recently interpreted as a conceptual reformation of the term 'aitia'. Accordingly, many scholars attempt to look into the presuppositions of the Platonic aitia, in particular his three tacit principles of aitia, in order that they may adduce evidences of a semantic modification. In this paper, I criticize the above interpretation as misleading and call attention to Plato's original criticism of the physical aitiai (96e5-97a5). Plato there avows his lack of understanding that 'where one is added to one either the one to which it is added or the one that is added becomes two, or that the one added and the one to which it is added becomes two because of the addition of the one to the other', and wonders (thaumazo) that 'when each of them is separate from the other, each of them is one, nor are they then two, but that, when they come near to one another, this is the cause of their becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer to one another' (tr. by Grube). His perplexity here strikes us as odd, but that the physical conjunction stated in the passage is a typical formulation of change for natural philosophers provides a good account for it. This is because by the disavowal of understanding the phenomenon, he can be considered as indicating the inexplicability of change on the natural philosophers' side. For this reading, I offer the following reason: having no explicit account of the ontological status of properties such as 'two' or 'beautiful', natural philosophers are compelled to admit that any property belongs to some physical thing by itself, so that there is no room for 'property change' in their world, as Aristotle also points out in G.C. I. 314b15-28. This is because if the thing that is intrinsically one becomes two, it would be one and two by itself, which sounds absurd immediately. Similarly, every change to opposites would be impossible on that physical conjunction model (cf. perdurantist's attack against endurantist in contemporary metaphysics). Plato thus introduced Forms, such as 'the beauty itself, and replaced physical conjunction by formal participation with a view to providing a coherent account of change. By doing so, he makes an ontological claim that Forms and participations can solely bring about change. It is therefore this ontology-centred argument that led Plato to the formal aetiology, whereas a conceptual concern is to be considered marginal. In other words, the alleged conceptual reformation of 'aitia' was in fact supervened upon the onto-metaphysical reflexion on change, stimulated by his ingenious 'wonder'.

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The method of hypothesis in the Phaedo consists of setting up a hypothesis and regarding as true whatever seems to accord with it, and as false whatever does not. It has been disputed what relation the “accord” expresses. In my opinion, it is not the deducibility (Robinson), and it is not the relation between a theory-hypothesis and its applications (Gallop, Rowe), either. So I propose a new interpretation in this paper : it is the relation between the premises and the conclusion of a rational inference. A inference is called rational when its premises give good reasons for believing the conclusion.

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ヘブライおよびギリシア文学史には,死を目前にした人物の「訣別の辞」が数多く見出される.このような場合には,両者を文学様式と機能の視点から此較してヘブライ文学史の側でのその特性を解明することが聖書の様式史的研究方法にとって避け難い課題となる.しかし私の見るところでは,この研究方法が今世紀前半にドイツで提唱され,以後の聖書学の方法的基礎となったのち今日まで,「訣別の辞」の素材の辞典的な収集はなされたが,上のような視点からの立ち入った研究が行なわれたことはない.本稿は聖書の様式史的研究が残しているこの領域的な不備を,『ヨハネ福音書』13-17章のイエスの「告別説教」とプラトンの『』を各々の文学史的前提も顧慮しつつ此較することによって多少でも補おうとする試みである.

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Does the demonstration of recollection with the slave boy in the Meno really constitute the proof of recollection thesis? Socrates seems there to be asking leading questions I take it that Plato intended to make it uncertain whether the boy is really recollecting his second denial of knowledge 'ou manthano' (85A4-5) can mean 'I am not learning', suggesting that he is not recollecting We can never know the truth about his learning, because the demonstration is a Gorgian type of epideixis (81B1-2), which produces only persuasion However, it is one thing to know whether the boy is recollecting, and quite another to know whether learning is recollection The demonstration is meant to make Meno recollect the latter truth (81E6-82A3) Throughout the demonstration Socrates addresses questions to Meno, thereby making him consider whether the boy is really recollecting (82B6-7, E12-3, 84A3-4, C10-D1) Socrates' remark after the demonstration is that Meno knows that the boy will regain knowledge (85C9-D1), which means that Meno has been successfully made to recollect that recollection thesis is correct According to Cebes' explanation in the Phaedo (73A7-B2), recollection is helped by the use of proper questions and diagrams, and according to the Republic (510D5-511A1, 529D7-530A), mathematicians should not seek truth in diagrams or models made by such masters as Daedalus, but make use of them simply as images The boy's learning is a beautiful image of true learning created by Socrates, an offspring of Daedalus We should not seek truth concerning learning in this image, but make use of it to find truth about true learning Socrates' proper questions with the help of this image made Meno recollect that learning is recollection However, inquirers are rather misled by perceptual images when the object of inquiry has no lustre in its earthly image(Phaedrus 250B), as is the case with virtues, knowledge, education and learning In order to establish that learning is recollection, it is then necessary to have recourse to another kind of proof, in which one relies on rational thinking Plato embarks on this task in the Phaedo Recollection itself can be taken to be an image or metaphor (eikon) of learning, presented by Socrates, just as the torpedo is an image of Socrates, presented by Meno (80A-C) But they are different in that while the latter is intended to stop inquiry, recollection is a metaphor that stimulates inquiry and helps to develop new ideas expressible in literal paraphrases ('the illustrative thesis' in E E Pender, Images of Persons Unseen, Sankt Augustin 2000) In the Phaedo Plato continues his quest for the truth about learning, with the help of recollection as the image of learning, and thereby develops such new ideas as the existence of Forms and the immortality of the soul His further inquiry about knowledge, the object of learning, in the Theaetetus is taken to be its further continuation

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To show that he has no gift for natural science, Socrates successively cites at Phaedo 96C2-97B7 several cases revealing a way of conceiving aitia. These cases have perplexed commentators and have often been regarded as a confused treatment of problems of a completely different nature (Hack forth, Crombie, Annas, etc.). Rejecting such an interpretation as well as those so far submitted by other scholars(e. g. Vlastos, Gallop) , this paper tries to elucidate the continuous sequence of thought presented in this passage as follows: Socrates begins by giving a simple example of the scientist's type of explanation, namely,(1)a human being grows, i. e. becomes larger, since eating and drinking cause the appropriate matter to be added to each part of the body(96C7-D5). Now, if this explanation of "becoming larger" in terms of "coming to be added"(προσγιγνεσθαι)is correct, it must be the case, more basically, that "being larger" is due to "being added" (προσειναι) of extra magnitude : (2) one person is larger than another, because an extra length(e. g. of a head)is added(96D8-E1), and(3)ten is greater than eight because of an extra two being added(96E2-3). However, Socrates could not accept these explanations, nor could he even accept (4) the simplest explanation that the aitia of things' becoming two is the addition or propinquity of one to one(or, for that matter, division of one) (96E7-97B3), and thus finally he abandoned such a method of investigating aitiai(97B5-7). Thus we can see that Socrates(Plato) is examining the conception of aitia stated in(1) , simply by shifting to more and more basic levels of thought, (2) (3) and(4), without the slightest "confusion" alleged by critics. All these "puzzles" are resolved seriatim by applying the theory of Forms to each(100B-101D). However, various objections to this method have been raised by scholars : the theory is wholly uninformative(Shorey, Vlastos, Crombie, Gallop) ; contrary to our expectation of an explanation of the coming-to-be of concrete things rather than the acquisition of attribures by already existing things, we actually find that the theory is concerned only with the latter(Hack forth, Gallop). Defending the theory of Forms against these and other objections, the present writer argues why only Forms should have the full status of aitiai of "being", and that the theory thereby offers a firm foundation for a correct understanding of the problem of "coming-to-be", even though the theory is not a wholly adequate explanation for the alteration implied in the concept of becoming, as Aristotle pointed out(De Gen. et Corr. B9, Metaph. A9). While it admittedly leaves several points for future discussions including the point cited above, the Phaedo passage of 95E through 101D can and must be regarded as laying a solid foundation for Plato's later natural philosophy and cosmology as fully developed in the Timaeus and Laws Book X, which, with Psyche(the source of all motion and alteration in the universe)and Forms(the principle of(meaning) and(value) )as its most basic factors, undoubtedly incorporates a view of nature that we need today.

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本研究では, 交通システムの整備やそのマネジメントなど,「ヒトの移動」に関わるあらゆる行政を「モビリティ行政」と呼称し, その仕事はいかなるものであるべきかを, 伝統的な政治哲学の視点から考察を加えた. その結果, 本研究では以下の4つの命題を演繹した. 第一に行政は社会善の増進を期するべきであり, 第二にそのためにはモビリティ行政は場合によってはモビリティの質的改悪が求められることもあり, 第三にモビリティ行政は人々の幸福の相対的増進に寄与すべきであり, 第四にその具体的な戦略として交通システムの整備と運用の改善に関わるモビリティ・デザインと, 人々の態度と行動の変容を期するモビリティ・マネジメントを適宜組み合わせていくことが不可欠であることを指摘した.

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