This paper examines Russian gas export policy and interaction among Russian national government, Gazprom and other actors in the negotiation on sales of Russian gas to China. How do Russian domestic actors participate in policy decisions and implementations? What kinds of roles are expected to Gazprom in political sphere? And also, to what extent can Gazprom’s action be subject to the restriction of Russian government’s decisions? These questions are significant to identify Russian energy governance in gas policy field.
Of course, the trend of an international energy market affects on corporate decisions of Gazprom. There are arguments that the decisions of huge state-owned company lead Russian gas policymaking. However, Russian government has found strong significance to long-term energy policy since beginning of the 1^st Putin’s administration. Putin’s administration prefers to build centralized and “vertical” political system, this approach was also applied in economic arena. As a result, Russian government strengthened stock controlling for state-owned companies, and carried up reshuffle of the top-management. These facts show that Gazprom’s corporate decision depends on Russian domestic political games.
Russians promotes industrial development in the Far East and the East Siberia through strengthening of energy cooperation with the countries in Northeast Asia. They expect to lay down gas transport infrastructures in the Far East and the East Siberia with expansion of the gas export to the countries in Northeast Asia as the driving force, and to build the basement of economic development through fostering resource-processing industries. The key document is “the Eastern Gas Program” which the Russia government and Gazprom established together. This is a policy document of regional development and the gas export for China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Gazprom were assigned for a resources development coordinator in the Far East and the East Siberia.
Though Gazprom gained dominant position for regional development in the Far East and the East Siberia,it bore too heavy burden at the same time. “The Eastern Gas Program” gave top priority to secure gas for economic development in the Far East and the East Siberia. Therefore, Gazprom had no choice but to suggest export of West Siberian gas to China, so that it secured promising new gas fields in the Far East and the East Siberia for domestic use. This caused competitions over gas business interests in Russian domestic political process.

抄録全体を表示