This article reconsiders the progress of the ‘Green Revolution’ or agricultural development in India in the 1970s and its relation to the oil crises. How could India achieve de-facto self-sufficiency in food production in the 1970s given the critical constraints of the oil crises? What factors contributed to the progress of agricultural development in the 1970s? In the middle of the 1960s, India managed to overcome a serious ‘food crisis’ through international aid, especially US food-aid under PL480. During this crisis, the Indian government changed policy priorities regarding economic development, turning from heavy industrialization to agricultural development. However, in 1973-74, India faced another critical economic situation, which led to the shortage of the most basic requisite for agricultural development: chemical fertilizers, a major product of the petrochemical industries. How could the Indian government overcome this shortage given the global economic crisis? The author pays attention to external economic aid to India, especially from the World Bank group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: IBRD and the International Development Association: IDA), led by its President Robert McNamara [1968-1981]. After the First Oil Crisis, India quickly overcame a critical economic situation by expanding exports and invisible incomes. India recorded exceptionally favourable balance of trades between 1974-75 and 1976-77. This steady growth again suddenly reversed in 1979 at the time of the Second Oil Crisis. At this critical juncture, Indian government skillfully took advantage of the largest lending of the IMF and maintained a unique independent stance against the ‘Structural Adjustment’ policies.

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The Vietnam War had hardly ended when intensive efforts to “correct” the war narratives were commenced within the United States. The challenge to the once seemingly established fact that the United States had suffered a humiliating defeat came to its peak in the middle of the 1980s. Revisionists such as the former and incumbent Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan aimed to cure the Americans of the Vietnam syndrome, and to help them regain their self-confidence and a sense of national integrity.
The withdrawal of American troops, the revisionists insisted, should never be portrayed as a surrender, instead merely as an American unilateral decision to leave Vietnam. The defeated, if any, were the South Vietnamese, not the Americans. The United States was actually a winner there, for it helped the anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam survive for two decades so that other nations in Southeast Asia could develop their economic and political strength. Moreover, American soldiers were always victorious in any encounter with the Communist guerrilla or regular forces.
The revisionists believed that the United States could have won at an earlier stage if only it had used its military power in an overwhelming way. The United States was on the verge of triumph by the end of 1972, almost forcing the leaders in Hanoi to accept American terms in peace talks through its massive bombing attacks in central North Vietnam. Then, suddenly, the revisionists argue, the U. S. Congress, intimidated by an unjustified fear of United States inability to win the war, threw in the towel.
Political leaders in Washington came under the attack of the revisionists. The United States lost this war for several reasons, namely because the government was unable to offer the American people a definite war objective, placed exceedingly unnecessary restrictions upon the military, failed to demonstrate sufficient will to win, and was unsuccessful in fully mobilizing the public behind the war effort.
American mass media, including television, was another target. The correspondents were criticized for being too young and too inexperienced to grasp the reality of battleground and sometimes too naive to shelter themselves from the influence of the Communists' propaganda. Hence, their reporting across the Pacific contributed to serious increases in anti-war sentiment back home, which in turn caused extreme damage to the American war strategy.
The majority of the American people were, however, far from being persuaded by such revisionist arguments. They knew that they had never fulfilled their objective of building a strong and viable anti-Communist regime in Vietnam, that they had been responsible for the South Vietnamese deficiencies, that winning in a shooting war had been irrelevant to the political future of the country, that the results of truce negotiations could hardly have been American triumph, and that blaming politicians and reporters merely was a means to protect the military from further criticism. That is why, to the regret of the revisionists, the memory of defeat in Vietnam still haunts the American people.

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　大学生を中心に若者による社会運動が多発した1960年代後半に対し，近年，社会的関心が高まっている．本稿は，今後，1960年代後半の日本の学生運動を検討する際の視座を導出するため，1964年にアメリカ・カリフォルニア大学バークレー校で起きたバークレー闘争の形成要因について，先行研究のレビューを通じて整理した．バークレー闘争の形成要因としてとくに重要なのは公民権運動である．公民権運動は当初のイシューを提供し，さらに公民権運動活動家だった学生を通じて，座り込みなどの公民権運動特有の戦略・戦術が導入されることになった．また，一般の学生たちが闘争に参加した動機には公民権運動への支持に加え，合衆国憲法が保障する政治的権利の学内での実現と「政治活動と言論の自由が守られる場」という大学像の追求とがあった．ただし，合衆国憲法に基づく権利保障の要求は，アメリカ社会における法と権利の重要性を活用した公民権運動の発想の延長線上にあった．この発想を基盤に学生の権利と学生生活へとイシューを展開させたことで，キャンパスの広範な学生を巻き込んだ運動が実現された．このようなバークレー闘争の形成要因は，1960年代日本の学生運動についても，若者の逸脱や風俗現象として捉えるのではなく，同時代の社会のあり方，とくに同時代の社会運動との関わりのなかから学生運動が形成された具体的過程を分析する重要性を示している．

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Laos was thrown into civil war in late 1960, and when the Kennedy administration took over the Laotian crisis from the Eisenhower administration, the possibility of U. S. intervention in Laos created much controversy within the administration. In March 1961, the Kennedy administration adopted a two-track policy toward Laos. One course was pursuing negotiations for a political settlement among the Laotians or the “neutralization” of Laos. The other was providing military support to the anti-communists in Laos as well as planning for military intervention in case the negotiations failed. It has been generally believed that Kennedy opted for a neutral Laos abandoning the military option as soon as he became president. In fact, the military option was deemed no less important than the political option for some time, and there was much heated discussion within the U. S. government during the first several months of 1961 over executing some sort of intervention plan for Laos.
As part of its military intervention planning for Laos, the U. S. sought support from its major international ally—Great Britain. Two things have become clear that were little known in the past. First, the British government was formally and strongly committed to planning for intervention in Laos within the framework of SEATO and, however reluctantly, felt obliged to intervene into Laos with the U. S. when the negotiations for political settlement failed. At his meeting with President Kennedy at Key West, Florida, on March 26, 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made such a commitment, and consultations ensued between the American and British military. The consultations centered on detailing SEATO Plan 5—a military intervention plan for Laos. Second, despite the U. S. -U. K. agreement on SEATO intervention planning for Laos, subsequent discussions over U. S. military action in Laos within the Kennedy administration went far beyond what the British agreed to or SEATO Plan 5. A variety of intervention plans were proposed within the administration from April through August 1961. The nature of these plans and the discussions on them between President Kennedy and his officials throw into question their real understanding of the U. S. -U. K. alliance and foreshadow unilateral U. S. intervention in Southeast Asia.

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With the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed in coercing far weaker states – such as Serbia,Afghanistan and Iraq – to comply with its demands, despite its overwhelming military superiority. Conventional wisdom holds that a stronger state’s superiority ensures the credibility of its threat, and that the weaker state will accept the demands because the ex-ante uncertainty of any conflict’s outcome (namely,the target’s defeat) almost does not exist. In reality, however, weaker states frequently resist stronger states’ threats, sometimes fighting hopeless wars instead of complying with their demands peacefully. This paper explores this puzzle of asymmetric compellence failure and asymmetric war.

Commonly, asymmetric compellence failures are explained by focusing on other states’ interventions or the domestic factors which reduce or extinguish asymmetry. Alternatively, they are regarded as reassurance failures, in which commitments to future self-restraint are deemed incredible. The weaker state resists the threat to defend its reputation for resolve. In contrast, this paper argues that power asymmetry undermines the credibility of the threat itself.

Why do such counter-intuitive phenomena occur? This paper argues that an asymmetry in relative capability necessarily implies an asymmetry in mutual threat perception. When power is symmetrical,each state’s power represents a serious threat to the other. If conflict occurs, the threat is automatically prioritized by both states. Therefore, in securing their existence (and as the vital interests of both are at stake), they will symmetrically display the maximum levels of resolve and willingness. In the instance of power asymmetry, however, the stronger state’s existence is unquestioned, with lesser conflicts not receiving priority. Contrastingly, the weaker state’s resolve will be stronger, as its existence is at stake. This asymmetry undermines the stronger state’s compellent threat, constructing it as incredible, precisely because the coercer’s resolve is in doubt.

In instances of power symmetry, it is not a balance of resolve but capabilities that affects the conflict’s outcome – the balance of resolve remains symmetrical. Ex-ante uncertainty is chiefly concerned with the competitor’s relative capability, not resolve. However, in instances of power asymmetry, the balance of resolve is uncertain. Ex-ante uncertainty is here principally concerned with relative resolve – capability is materially objective, while resolve is psycho-subjective, and thus less measurable. This variability/flexibility and invisibility leads to mutual misperceptions, which contribute to the failure of negotiations in cases of power asymmetry.

For example, while a stronger state’s increase in resolve – which originates from changes in its perception of the threat presented by a weaker target – may be clear to itself, this may remain unclear to the opponent. Consequently, the coercer may overestimate its own credibility (because it knows its true resolve) while the target underestimates its credibility (because it sees the coercer’s resolve as weak). These differences in credibility perception lead to asymmetric compellence failures. This logic is illustrated with reference to the 2003 Iraq War.

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