本研究では、西洋人の低コンテクスト文化と東洋人の高コンテクスト文化の違いを、2 つの測度、すなわちの受容度と、省略の中の大前提の熟知度への感受性を使用して検証する。この研究では、日本人、韓国人、台湾人、フランス人、イギリス人の参加者がを好むかどうか、また熟知度に敏感かどうかを調査した。参加者には、 (Modus Tollens タイプ) と省略が与えられ、より説得力、論理的、自然、詩的、賢明さについて、7件法で評価するよう求められた。結果は、東洋人が西洋人よりもを好むというものではなかった。ただし、熟知度に対する感度は、日本人、韓国人、フランス人の方が高かった。 日本語、韓国語、フランス語は、高文脈言語に分類され、この感受性が、言語特性の影響を受けたと考えられる。

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The 'personhood' argument is one of the basic principles of bioethics. But various forms are possible within this principle. The high evaluation of the patient's will is one form of personalism. The superiority of a person's value over a life's value is another form. But the famous 'personhood' argument today maintains a personhood is 'a necessary condition for the right to life'. This argument is linked with 'the denial of the right to life for potential persons' and 'the criticism against the speciesism'. This argument indeed provides some guidelines for abortion and the vegetative state, but it will admit almost any cases of the recent reproductive technology, especially ES cells. So, I want to define the person again from the viewpoint of 'moral personalism'. In this paper, I want to introduce my interpretation of Kant's 'categorical imperative', and then try to define a person on the basis of it. 'A categorical imperative' can be interpreted as 'a practical categorical syllogism'. We can discover two conditions for valid categorical syllogisms. And from these conditions moral practical laws can be deduced. Then, I define 'a person' as 'one who can perform such practical reasoning and act according to it'. A person means a moral being. This definition makes a new understanding on 'autonomy' possible, too. This definition of person is made from the viewpoint of the 'faculty', not the 'actual will'. Therefore we can consider the difference between 'a human being' and 'a chimpanzee', and also can view 'a potential person' as a person potentially possessing this faculty. This argument is not based upon a necessary condition for right to life, but upon the moral value we must esteem. I believe that from this point of view we can give some guidelines to the recent reproductive technology, ES cells.

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新型コロナウィルスが流行して以降、国家から個人のレベルまで情報の妥当性評価は重要になっている。信念バイアスはそれらを合理的なものから逸脱させる認知バイアスの一つである。先行研究では主に

で確認されているが、実際に人々が評価を行う情報とには大きな違いがあり、その違いが信念バイアスの個人傾向に違いを生む可能性がある。そこで今回は実際の生活で人々が評価する形式に近い文章課題を作成し、と合わせて評価をさせることで、信念バイアス傾向に違いが生まれるのかを検証した。結果、課題と文章課題での信念バイアス傾向の間に関連は見られず、それぞれで信念バイアスが発生するメカニズムが異なることが示唆された。次に文章課題で信念バイアスが生まれるメカニズムを探索するために、人は文章の情報が正しい確率を評価し、その確率を用いてベイズ的に自分の信念の更新を行い、更新後の信念を妥当性評価として回答していると仮定したモデルを立て、実際の妥当性評価や信念バイアスを予測するか検証を行った。モデルは一部必要な情報を暫定的な数値に置き換えているにも関わらず、信念バイアスの50％近くを予測した。

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    It is known that Aristotle tackled the problems concerning akrasia. But how he solved them has not been made clear. I propose an interpretation of his idea.
    Aristotle presents two types of arguments. One is the 'grammatical' argument, where he shows that in some sense of 'know', acting against one's knowledge is possible. The other is the 'factual' argument, where he shows that an akrates does not need to have inconsistent judgments.
    Some scholars say that Aristotle does not refute Socrates' thesis that akrasia is impossible. But I argue that they are wrong, and that Aristotle succeeds in solving the problems concerning akrasia.

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アリストテレスの様相を記号論理学的に研究することはベッカー〔1〕に始まり,ロス〔8〕,ボヘンスキー〔2〕,ルカシエヴィツ〔5〕,マッコール〔6〕,リシャー〔7〕,杉原〔9〕などによって次第に精緻な考察が加えられるようになった.このうち最初の3人はアリストテレスをできるだけ忠実に記号化し,彼の難点はそのまま難点として指摘する態度をとっている.杉原もほぼこの立揚にある.これに反してルカシエヴィツは彼独自の様相論理学に基づいてアリストテレスをはげしく攻撃している.しかるにマッコールとリシャーはアリストテレスに対して弁明的である.本稿は,一方においてルカシエヴィツの行き過ぎに反批判を与え,他方マッコールとリシャーの弁明の不備を検討し,アリストテレス解釈の中正な立揚を述べたいと思う.

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Many scholars emphasize the importance of prohairesis in Aristotle's Ethics as a key concept in explaining human action However, its precise nature remains obscure In this paper I will attempt to explicate Aristotle's answer to a fundamental question concerning prohairesis-viz "How should we individuate prohaireton?", and then locate it in the practical syllogism This task is of importance, since we cannot understand Aristotle's views on action as energeia without understanding his conception of action as chosen for its own sake As a preliminary, in section I I defend and develop constituent-innterpretation of ta pros to telos A clue to the solution of this dispute is the fact that the bodily movement performed pros to telos must be an action in itself It must be telos in a sense, otherwise the relation of telos and ta pros to telos would be external Aristotle may be a consequentialist in a broad sense, but not a utilitarian (As a corollary of this point I suggest that we cannot use description of bodily movement as a tool of action mdividuation ) In section II I propose my interpretation of prohairesis by examining Cooper's excellent explanation of deliberation My contentions are as follows 1)We cannot accept his assertion that to kath' hekaston means not the individual, but the atomon eidos We do not deliberate on individuals, as Aristotle says, but use recognition of individuals as premisses of deliberation 2) We should admit that the deliberation ends at prohairesis to perform an act of some suitably specific type Prohairesis is not mere desire, but a unity of desire and belief, which is caused, via deliberation, by having a wish and some appropriate beliefs as to circumstances, but it is not an action We identify (future) action as such not by rinding a uniquely applicable description, but by specifying its type Future action cannot be referred to. 3) We must think that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action It seems to me that Cooper's and Mele's argument are not convincing 4) Prohaireton is the major premiss of the practical syllogism Aristotle's examples of the major premisses, however, are not always prohaireton Some of them do not fully specify the types of action to be performed 5) Therefore we must distinguish between the practical syllogism, conceived as including deliberative process, and the so-called "practical" syllogism, which has only two premisses As for human action, the latter is the last step leading to action, and in animal movement it is the only step In section III I criticize and modify Nussbaum's anankastic model of so-called practical syllogism 1) As Nussbaum says, misfire of action is explained either by not wanting G or by not believing it necessary to do A But the hypothetical necessity of A-ing is not relevant to the necessity for action, since if an agent does not want G, he will never do A, even if he believes it necessary for G We should take a parallel with the theoretical syllogism more seriously If one does not believe in premisses because of their falsity, one will not assert (phanai) the conclusion, even if one recognizes it as validly reasoned An action is performed only when both premisses are actualized, as akrates illustrates it negatively Aristotle's contention in asserting the necessity of action lies in the rejection of the third element, e g will, to explain action 2) As to a chosen act, the anankastic model should be modified As argued above, prohairesis is a unity of desire and belief Nonetheless, it is not an action, but a desire I suggest the following modification pN [{wanting G & believing (A for G)} and (believing now & here to A)→acting A] Akrates has both premisses, but he does not use his major premiss he does not stay in prohairesis (Elsewhere I argued for this unorthodox interpretation of akrasia) My arguments in this

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Aristotle's theory of the so-called 'Practical Syllogism' is, though approached from a different point of view in several passages in Eth. Nic., supposed on the whole to be a psychological account of action in accordance with principles, viewed by analogy with the demonstrative syllogism. A deliberate action starts from the desire for a certain object; the intellect deliberates (βολειν) and reasons (λογιζεσθαι) on the images of this, and makes a decision according to 'ορθο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav;.' The Practical Syllogism is considered to be the formalization of the result of this deliberate choice. The major premise of such Practical Syllogism is a universal proposition stating the purpose or principle of action. It is obtained by the intuition of νου&b.sigmav; through επαγγη from particular instances. The author maintains Eth. Nic. VI 11, 1143 ^a35-^b5, one of the most disputed passages in this book, to state this, and maintains especially that 'η ετερα προτασι&b.sigmav;', which is usually supposed to be the minor premise of the Practical Syllogism, indicates the premise of the syllogism arising from induction (ο εξ επαγωγη&b.sigmav; συλλογισμο&b.sigmav;), and the conclusion from this 'other premise' forms the major premise of the Practical Syllogism. The minor premise, on the other hand, is the application of this purpose or principle to real and particular instances, and consequently is a particular proposition, unlike that of the demonstrative syllogism. It is obtained by φρονησι&b.sigmav;, the function of which is to deliberate on the means to the good, the purpose of practice. It is the result of this that we choose and desire, and the proximate cause of action is this desire. The author maintains that the minor premise is a summary form of this process. φρονηι&b.sigmav; is concerned not only with the means but with the end, and is the εξι&b.sigmav; that cannot exist without virtue. Hence the minor premise shows two kinds of relation to the major premise, a means towards an end and an instance of a rule. This is because the Practical Syllogism is the logical expression of the action, the purpose of which, το πρακτον αγαθον, is the whole of the virtuous life, and the means to it is also an action, having itself a value, and is a constituent part of the purpose.

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中学生を対象に、定言が、どの程度まで適切に行えるかを調べる調査問題を作成し実施した。この問題は、理科学習に関連した論理形式について理科の内容から作られ、理科学習時の論理的思考を考察する際の尺度に利用するためのものである。調査結果より次の知見が得られた。1:メンタルモデル数が多い推理形式を持つ問題程、正答率が低かった。2:問題の種類による正答率の差には、格効果の影響が認められた。3:中学三年生の正答率が高かった。しかし、中学二年生、一年生の間では、論理的能力を示す得点に顕著な差はみられなかった。4:理論的推理能力と理科の色々な学力画との比較をし、推理能力に関連するものとしないものを探ることが出来た。

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