This paper tries to clarify the judicial system of the Tokugawa period by focusing particularly on the Osaka rice exchange market. It is well known that the Tokugawa Shogunate exercised jurisdiction over market trades not exclusively, but in a discretionary fashion. For example, while the claims of merchants in Osaka were fully guaranteed by the Shogunate court, the claims of merchants in Edo were sometimes handled in a discretionary manner by the Shogunate court. The important question is how did the Shogunate guarantee the claims of merchants operating in the Osaka rice exchange market, and why? Rice, collected as tax in kind and shipped by the feudal lords, was stored in warehouses ("kura-yashiki") located in Osaka, and sold at auction. Rice brokers who made successful bids received rice bills ("kome-kitte"), each worth 1,500kg of rice. In the 17th century, each rice bill corresponded to a particular amount of rice that the broker obtained at auction. Later, this correspondence broke down and rice bills took on the characteristics of securities. Issuing a rice bill not backed by inventory had not been permitted by the Shogunate since 1761. However, the Shogunate did not entirely suppress this kind of rice bill. While the governor of Osaka ("Osaka-machi-bugyo") implicitly allowed warehouses to issue unbacked rice bills, he forced the warehouses to respect the claims of the rice bill holders. This meant that claims over rice in kind, as represented by the rice bill, were protected by the court of the city of Osaka. This understanding is supported by the analysis of a "run on the warehouse." In 1791, the Chikugo warehouse ("Chikugo-Gura") failed to convert rice bills into rice in kind. In response, rice bill holders filed a lawsuit with the court of the city of Osaka. The governor of Osaka found for the rice bill holders, protecting the claim over rice in kind as represented by rice bills. As shown in this case, dishonoring a rice bill could lead to a systemic risk. For this reason the Shogunate strictly exercised jurisdiction over the Osaka rice exchange market. Supported by the judicial system provided by the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Osaka market functioned both as a rice exchange market and as a financial market through the latter half of the Tokugawa era.

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Despite the huge body of research on the rice market of late premodern Japan, we still have not obtained a sufficient understanding of transactions involving rice warrants (komekitte 米切手), receipts issued to successful rice bidders (intermediaries) by warehouses. Given the current understanding of the instrument, it remains unclear about how cases in which receipts issued by the warehouse (dekitte 出切手) and warrants for rice not confirmed by warehouse inventory (karamai-kitte 空米切手) were differentiated and transacted in the marketplace. Without a clarification of this point, it would be impossible to ascertain the significance of the ban placed on karamai-kitte instruments by the Tokugawa Bakufu in 1761. In this article, the author uses the case study method to clarify the actual practice of rice warrant transactions to show that degitte and karamai-kitte were traded without distinction between their content. The only distinction that was made was when the warehouse refused to honor a warrant or there was anticipation that it would not. Based on this understanding, the author reexamines the Bakufu's decision to ban the use of karamai-kitte from the mid-eighteenth century until the last years of its rule, concluding that the ban paradoxically encouraged the issuance and sale of warrants for warehouse rice exceeding the actual inventories, thus strengthening the function of the Osaka rice market as a financial institution. That is to say, the ban on karamai-kitte meant a Bakufu guarantee that no warrant traded on the rice market could possibly suffer from default. In effect, even in the case of default, the ban enabled the holder of the warrant to petition the Bakufu functionary of Osaka to order that the warehouse honor the warrant with every means at its disposal.

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ここで言うソフトとは対人間行動における行為と理解して欲しいのであるが、詰まらぬことから問題意識を抱いたので随筆的に記述するが、後の質問に関係部門からの回答が得られれば幸いである。それはある大手の地方銀行での話から始まる。

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In 1971 Deposit Insurance Corporation was established as a Governmental institution to insure bank deposits preventing breakdown of the financial system. A new Governmental institution called The Resolution and Collection Corporation was established after the burst of bubble economy in 1999. The function of the new institution was to purchase bad loans held by private financial institutions. In 2003 another Governmental institution called Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan was established with an aim to administer debts and credits of failing corporations. Thus a deposit insurance institution has turned out to be a quasi- banking institution managed by the Government.

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A Lyon, une crise financiere eclata a cause de non-payement des lettres de S. Bernard et J. Nicolas, 38 millions livres, dans les premier jours d'avil 1709, pendant la guerre de Succession d'Espagne. Cette crise est un evenement financier le plus remarquable anterieurement au systeme de John Law. N. Desmaretz, Financier General, presenta au roi, le 26 aout 1709, ce tableau desespere, <<Depuis quatre mois, toute la circuration de l'argent est cesse. Les peuples ne payent point la taille ni la capitation.>> et <<La chute des sieurs Hogguer, Bernard et Nicolas, celle des sieurs Tourton et Guiguer et des autres qui exercoient la banque avec le plus de credit, ont mis en desordre les places de Lyon, de Paris, de Geneve et toute les autres.>>. Dans les premieres annees de 18^e siecle, Chamillart, Financier General, emit beaucoup de papiers depuis l'ouverture de la guerre (1701). L'accroissement rapide de l'emprunt d'Etat, qui avait exerce une grande influence sur les mouvements financiers et monetaires et sur les fluctuations economiques, apporta des difficultes a l'administration financiere et monetaire. Quand N. Desmaretz succeda a Financier General en fevrier 1708, les difficultes financieres et monetaires, le discredit du papier et la rarete de l'espece, s'etaient manifestees. Le but principal de cet essai. <<L'analyse du mouvement financier et monetaire en France...>>, est d'eclaire la relation entre ces difficultes et la crise financiere a Lyon, de remarquer les influences des difficultes sur la conjoncture economique nationale et d'eclaire le fond economique de <<Project de dime royal>> par Vauban.

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Recent political economy has put stress upon the significance of cash inflow through return payment as the bases of the banking business. However, the role that reserve as bank's own capital plays in bank credit should not be ignored. Even if social idle-money is centered on the bank as deposit, and major part of the bank capital is advanced on the costs of circulation related to monetary phenomena, the proportion of the bank capital in reserve cannot become zero. Credit system makes no contribution to the bank's need for equity capital and this limit has to be cleared by other kind of market organization : capital market.

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