「力の基礎を欠いた外交は破綻する」─．欧州の外交当局者に永く語り継がれてきた言葉である．自らの理念を国際政局のなかで実現する力を欠いた外交は，その理想が高邁なものであればあるほど，国際政治の最前線では波乱要因になってしまう．欧州の老練な外政家たちは，彼らの経験則からそうした現実を知っていたのだろう． 超大国アメリカは，冷戦期を通じて，その強大な軍事，経済，文化の力を通じて「アメリカの世紀」を演出してきた．だが，冷たい戦争の幕がおりて十数年，アメリカはいま，自らがその威力を信じてきた「力の外交」が，新たな壁に突き当たっていることを直視しなければならなくなっている． 北朝鮮の金日成政権は，「核計画の完全な申告と核施設の無能力化」という対米約束を容易に履行しようとしていない．日米同盟が想定してきた「朝鮮半島の有事」にとって，死活的に重要な意味を持つ北朝鮮の核放棄．だがブッシュ共和党政権は，従来の「力の外交」が機能しなくなっている現実に直面している． こうした超大国アメリカの凋落は，対イラク戦争での躓きによって顕著となり，その負の影響は，東アジアにも影を落としている．本稿では，誤ったイラクへの力の行使によって，東アジアの秩序を安定させてきた日米の安全保障体制に生じた揺らぎを検証し，「日米同盟の空洞化」が東アジアにいかなる情勢をもたらしつつあるかを考えてみたい．

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It is widely accepted that policy for women in peacebuilding is a crucial issue, yet there are some academic discussions that policy for women by the UN (United Nations) tends to be marginalised. This note attempts to discuss and reveal the UN's flawed implementation of policy for women in peacebuilding operations focusing on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR1325). The resolution was adopted in 2000 for improving female active involvement in conflict resolution, conflict prevention, peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping operations. The literature review on SCR1325 and its implementation describes that the resolution gave women a positive role in peacebuilding operations; however, other literature also criticises the fact that SCR1325 was used as a convenient loophole for the UN to marginalise and ghettoise policy for women from peacebuilding operations.

To examine the attitude of the UN towards policy for women in peacebuilding operations based on SCR1325, DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation) for ex-female combatants in UNMIL, (the United Nations Mission in Liberia) was investigated. In DDRR, some consideration by the UN for female participants has been shown; however, there were some difficulties for women. Moreover, there are some criticisms that some difficulties was caused due to lack of consideration by the UN.

The study revealed the reason why the policy by the UN for women is afforded such low priority can be explained using the power relationship between the UN and the aid recipient country, Liberia, in peacebuilding operations. Developed countries, including those within the UN, are likely to introduce a western-oriented liberal economy, rational institutions and policies to conflict-affected countries in the context of the peacebuilding. In the process, it seems that post-conflict society, e.g. Liberia, is forced to accept the institution due to the power relationship. Moreover, the ‘gender hierarchy’, that is the system that privileges maleness and underestimates the female status, is also embedded in the transplanted system; and ‘gender hierarchy’ is also latent in the discourse within SCR1325. In conclusion, it is possible for the article to suggest that due to the power relationship on peacebuilding operations between the UN and the aid recipient country, and ‘gender hierarchy’, the policy for women by the UN tends to be afforded low priority in peacebuilding operations.

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　原子力は，平和利用による恩恵と大量破壊兵器の脅威という相反するものを与え得るものである。このため，原子力平和利用の恩恵を享受するには，核兵器の不拡散の観点から的確な対応が求められる。NSG（Nuclear Suppliers Group：原子力供給国グループ）とは，原子力資機材や技術の輸出管理を通じて核兵器の不拡散に寄与していこうとする各国政府の集まりを指すものである。本稿では，このNSG発足の経緯や制度の概要，最近の動向等について概説することとしたい。（本稿における見解は，筆者個人のものであり，日本国政府や筆者が所属する組織のものではない。）

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The conflict that occurred between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1955 was resolved through the O. A. S. The process of resolution of this conflict seemed to be the same as that of the conflict between these two republics in 1948. But the international environment surrounding these two conflicts differed very much. Why on the surface did they seem to be the same?
There was a struggle between democracy and dictatorship in Central American and the Caribbean Basin area at that time. It was very difficult for the Eisenhower Administration to formulate and govern its' policies. Especially after the Guatemalan Crisis in 1954 when the intervention of the United States was very well known. In 1955, the Department of State under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had to take sides with and support the legitimate “liberal and democratic” government of Costs Rica in consideration of the world-wide reaction.
The conflict in 1955 showed the complicated structure of the international environment. In such an environment even the officials of superpowers including Secretary Dulles never have “free hands”. No one can dance alone in the world arena.

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This article examines why and how the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) introduced due process into targeted sanctions. The focus is on the relations between different international organizations, namely “inter-organizational relations”. Particular attention is paid to the relations between European regional organizations (ROs), such as the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE), and the UN. The UN SC introduced some procedures for delisting individuals or entities from the terrorists list in reaction to the political and legal resistance by the ROs against the possibility of the infringement of fundamental rights of those who are listed.

Recently, international organizations have increasingly contact with each other. This trend began to be reflected in academic literature, but studies in inter-organizational relations are still embryonic. In order to contribute to this field, this article analyzes the case study on targeted sanctions, for, inter-organizational relations between the UN and the ROs are vertical ones, both politically and legally (Section 1). Nevertheless, existing literature has largely ignored, or at least underestimated, this vertical aspect. Thus,this article elaborates and presupposes vertical relations between the UN and the ROs and counters some existing researches on inter-organizational relations. Based upon the review of existing literature, the article suggests using the concept of resistance in the analysis of targeted sanctions, and hypothesizes that the political and legal resistance by the ROs urged the SC to introduce due process (Section 2). In order to prove this, the case study on targeted sanctions focuses on: (1) how did the ROs resist the SC? (2) how did the SC identify and accept the resistance? (Section 3)

As for the first question, although the ROs have cooperated on the implementation of targeted sanctions, there are some instances of resistance against the SC. For instance, the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights criticized the problems on the protection of human rights and raised the possibility of annulling the laws implementing targeted sanctions. As well, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE passed the resolutions on the problem. As for the second question, this article reveals that the SC became aware of the resistance through its subsidiary organs and member states. As a result, the procedures for delisting such as the “focal point” or the “Office of the Ombudsperson”were established and the wording of the resolutions was modified in favor of human rights protection.

This study implies that the ROs may influence the decision-making of the UN that is legally superior to the ROs, and contribute to correcting the global injustice although they are only “regional” organizations.

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This article analyses policies considered within the British government in 1946 on two issues concerning Iranian oil—a new oil concession and a labour dispute against the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)—to investigate how Britain tried to secure access to oil immediately after World War II.
Within the process of policy definition surrounding these two issues, it is possible to see both a search for new policy approaches and traditional ideas. In relation to these two issues, the British search for new policy approaches intended a new form of relations with the United States and Iran. At the same time, traditional ideas retained currency within British thinking and had a great impact on the policy definition process.
Britain intended co-operation with the United States to confront the potential threat of the U. S. S. R. in the process of obtaining a new Iranian oil concession. The Anglo-American co-operation which Britain aimed at, however, was one that would damage neither her independence nor her leadership position in the region, as Britain still perceived Iranian international relations within the traditional framework of spheres of influence in which Britain and the U. S. S. R. were the main actors. Further, as Britain regarded the role of the United States as no more than supplemental, rather than making use of the framework of Anglo-American co-operation in the labour dispute against the AIOC, Britain gradually inclined to unilateral policies employing bare power.
On relations with Iran, the British government on the one hand required the AIOC to give Iranian employees “equal treatment” with the British. On the other hand, plans for a joint Anglo-Iranian company symbolising “equal partnership” were soon rejected when she began discussions for the acquisition of a new oil concession. These apparently inconsistent attitudes can be explained by considering Britain's true intentions regarding equality. The real intention behind Britain's insistence on equal treatment by the AIOC was for the purpose of retaining the existing concession which had made it possible for Britain to secure access to oil. The equality pursued by Britain did not change the existing framework when it came to new concessions. Furthermore, the traditional image of relations with Iran can be seen in the despatch of an army brigade to Iraq and plans for direct involvement in the internal affairs of Iran.
It should not be overlooked that Britain was already searching for new policy approaches immediately after WWII. However, traditional ideas prevented her from implementing policies that would have brought about a drastic change in the international relations surrounding Iranian oil.

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This article aims to analyze the responses of the Visegrad Four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to the Iraq War which started on March 20, 2003. Central and East European countries, including these four countries, were considered to be“pro-American, ”particularly as demonstrated by their leaders' signatures to“the Letter of Eight”or“the Declaration of the Vilnius Ten, ”issued at the end of January, and at the beginning of February 2003, respectively.
U.S. unilateralism was particularly notable during the period between November 2002, when the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1441, and May 2003, when the US declared an end to major combat in Iraq, and the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483. Specifically during this period responses of the Visegrad Four countries to the crisis in Iraq differed significantly from one another. Poland, for example, sent its special forces unit (GROM) to Iraq at the beginning of the War. The Czech and Slovak Republics deployed their NBC weapon response units in Kuwait, however they did not engage militarily in Iraq. Hungary allowed the U.S. to use an airbase located in its territory as a training ground where Iraqi opposition members were trained by U.S. forces as police officers and interpreters, but it did not send any military units to the Middle East during this period.
The military measures taken by the four countries varied in accordance with the different agendas of their respective key parties in parliament. Generally speaking, the main pro-American factions were the Trans-Atlanticists within the center-right parties, who oriented themselves toward mainstream European Christian democrats or liberal democrats. Realism among center-left social democratic parties, especially the parties in power, was another factor which encouraged conciliatory attitudes toward U.S. policy and the crisis in Iraq. At same time, however, a considerable group of social democrats opposed U.S. unilateral military actions in Iraq because of their high regard for maintaining multilateralism in respect to agreements established by international institutions, such as the UN, NATO or the EU. Therefore, center-left parties faced a dilemma in evaluating whether or not to support military action in the Middle East.
Extreme leftists, nationalists and Catholic traditionalists were almost universally opposed to dispatching troops to the Middle East. However, most of these were only“protest parties”which did not have the actual ability to influence decision-making in parliament. One of the key factors which inhibited Central and East European participation in the U.S. military's intervention in Iraq was in fact heavy criticism leveled by populist opposition parties. These parties were sensitive to public criticism of U.S. unilateral military activity in Iraq and thus blocked local involvement therein.
Thus, the differing responses of each country to the Iraq War can be viewed as a reflection of local political dynamics between the Pro- and Anti-American forces within each country's internal politics.

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