More than a decade has passed since the concept of human security was coined by the UNDP's Human Development Report. This article attempts to illustrate how the emergent ‘norm’ of human security has been developed in discourse of various actors, and how it has been adopted in policies and practices of human security. Main questions are how human security was invented and elaborated as a new ‘norm’ by ‘norm entrepreneurs, ’ and what main characteristics of the human security ‘norm’ are and how such characteristics and prescription of the ‘norm’ appear in practice of global governance.
The first section of this article attempts to demonstrate human security as ‘norm-complex’ that consists of preexisting norms encompassing related issue-areas and other new norm elements. Human security is also a reconciliatory norm that amalgamates competing or contradicting norms under a common principle. Then it hypotheses detailed stages of norm creation: invention of an original norm, adaptation (remodeling) of presented norm by various interested and motivated actors, and then editing and publication of the norm by, for example, independent international commissions. Editor's role can be intrinsically important for selecting and combining relevant norms or in reconciling and amalgamating competing norms.
The human security ‘norm’ was invented by NGOs and UNDP who tried to advocate human-centered development at the beginning of the 1990s. It was actively introduced into Canadian and Japanese governments' policy slogans. In the process, Canadian government rewrote (remodeled) the ‘norm’ by targeting on an aspect of ‘freedom from fear’ in order to legitimize its recent international policies such as its advocacy against anti-personal landmines. Although the emergent norm of human security began to be accepted by many international organizations, NGOs, and governments, human security at the same time caused a serious concern that it challenges a constitutive norm of non-intervention or national security. Then the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Commission on Human Security took the initiative to edit the ‘norm’ so that it can more easily be accepted by various actors.
The article then describes particular patterns of global governance that emerges from the property of human security norm-complex. The first pattern is a public policy network that connects various actors of NGOs, firms and governments. The second distinctive pattern is international territorial administration in post conflict situations, which is based on hierarchical governance. Lastly a concept of ‘complex global governance’ that combines different modes of governance will be explored as an indispensable element of human security governance. Complex global governance needs a mechanism of ‘meta-governance, ’ which should draw more attention in future research.

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The fourth round of the Arab-Israeli War was started on 6 October 1973 by the Arabs. Before the War, the Arabs deliberately prepared their military build-up. Israeli intelligence noted these preparations along the ceasefire lines. But the military elite misinterpreted the intentions of the Arab leaders, believing that the Arabs would never renew the fighting because of their poor military capabilities and the opposing Israeli superiority in the military balance. Should the Arabs intend to surprise Israel, Israeli early-warning systems would founction, a standing army would hold the enemy forces, and the rapid mobilization would be carried out.
In the early morning of 6 October, the decisive information that the war would break out that evening reached the military elite. Chief of Staff Elazar took the necessary steps immediately. He met the Defence Minister and proposed a pre-emptive strike and general mobilization of reserves. The political elite, such as the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Vice Prime Minister, however, turned down the former proposal, but concerning the latter one they authorized Gen. Elazar to mobilize 100, 000 men. These two decisions were based on a political consideration. The factors which induced the political elite to adopt these decisions were mainly their image of the external environment and the political decision-making system itself. The Israeli political elite had viewed their environment as follows: (1) regionally, Israeli military supremacy and the maintenance of the ceasefire in the border areas ruled out any possibility of warfare; but (2) globally, her political position in the international area was symbolized by her isolation. Especially in 1973, two dramatic incidents, the downing of a Libyan airplane by Israeli warplanes in February and the hijacking of an Iraqi jet liner in August, deepened the isolation. In the latter case, the US Government condemned the Israeli action. The decisions not to pre-empt and not to call up all the reserves are explained by Israel's deteriorating pnlitical environment. Moreover there was no machinery in the decision-making organization to check the evaluations presented by the military intelligence.

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