Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is
deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he
is deceiving me [...]” (CSM-II, 17; AT-VII, 25). But what is the basis for the insistence
that I exist if a deceiver deceives me? At first sight, the Second Meditation seems to
say that I exist as an object of the deception, and some earlier studies interpret it
as such.
Kenny
, for example, insists that I exist “as the object of deception, not as
the subject of thought.”* On the other hand, however, Wargner insists that I exist
“as the active subject whose causal power is being exercised in generating the idea
of the demon and all his other ideas.”**
The object of this article is to discuss this interpretative problem, examining
the earlier studies of Gouhier,
Kenny
, Pariente, and Wargner. I reject the traditional
interpretation (i.e. by
Kenny
and Pariente) based on the relation between an act and
its object, and analyze what is concluded from being deceived, by focusing on the
act of deceit itself. Furthermore, the paper shows: 1) it is not my
existing but my
thinking that is concluded from the supposition that a deceiver is deceiving me; 2)
the abilities to
understand, affirm, and
deny (cf. AT-VII, 28) are discovered in the situation
that I am deceived.
* Anthony
Kenny
,
Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random
House, 1987), 57.
** Stephen I. Wargner, Squaring the Circle in Descartes’ Meditations: The Strong
Validation of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 110-112.
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