Why do authoritarian regimes sometimes fail to prevent revolutions? To answer this question, this paper proposes the novel concept of “repression mismatch.” Under the condition in which there is already an opposition group (Group A) that the government perceives to be a threat both in terms of mobilizing capacity and political ideologies, the government does not regard as threatening an emerging opposition group (Group B) whose mobilizing capacity and political ideologies are less threatening compared with Group A. As a result, the government represses Group B much less than Group A, thereby encouraging Group B to trigger the revolution.
This paper examines the case of Egypt in the latter half of the 2000s, as the January 25 Revolution in 2011 led to the demise of then-president Ḥusnī Mubārak. Analyzing articles from the Egyptian Arabic newspaper al-Ahrām and reports by local human rights organizations, this paper reveals that the government perceived the Muslim Brotherhood as the major threat while regarding the activists who led the political demonstration at that time as a minor threat. As a result, the government did not repress those activists much, which gave them more time and space to prepare for the revolution.
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