Ajia Keizai
Online ISSN : 2434-0537
Print ISSN : 0002-2942
Current issue
Displaying 1-8 of 8 articles from this issue
Articles
  • Toshiki Nakatsu
    2024 Volume 65 Issue 1 Pages 2-28
    Published: March 15, 2024
    Released on J-STAGE: March 27, 2024
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS FULL-TEXT HTML

    The Vatican and China have engaged in informal and intermittent negotiations aimed at establishing diplomatic relations since the early 2000s, with occasional progress, including “the provisional agreement,” which covers the Catholic Church’s religious activities in China. However, formal diplomatic relations between the Vatican and China have yet to be established. The reason why is thought to be related to differences in perception regarding religion between the Vatican, which is considered one and the same with the Catholic Church and the Holy See (Roman Curia, Curia Romana), and China, whose religious policy is based on atheism. In addition, “the Chinization of religion” (Zongjiao zhongguo hua), a new religious policy promoted by president Xi Jinping, makes the situation more complicated and difficult. Under these circumstances, the Vatican strives to advance their diplomatic policy regarding China based on “principle” and “consensus.” The former encompasses the ideas symbolized in the Catechism as the religious and traditional norms of the Catholic Church, while the latter is aimed at realizing a common understanding that accommodates the religious and traditional norms of the Catholic Church.

  • Akira Ueno
    2024 Volume 65 Issue 1 Pages 29-56
    Published: March 15, 2024
    Released on J-STAGE: March 27, 2024
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS FULL-TEXT HTML

    Why do authoritarian regimes sometimes fail to prevent revolutions? To answer this question, this paper proposes the novel concept of “repression mismatch.” Under the condition in which there is already an opposition group (Group A) that the government perceives to be a threat both in terms of mobilizing capacity and political ideologies, the government does not regard as threatening an emerging opposition group (Group B) whose mobilizing capacity and political ideologies are less threatening compared with Group A. As a result, the government represses Group B much less than Group A, thereby encouraging Group B to trigger the revolution.

    This paper examines the case of Egypt in the latter half of the 2000s, as the January 25 Revolution in 2011 led to the demise of then-president Ḥusnī Mubārak. Analyzing articles from the Egyptian Arabic newspaper al-Ahrām and reports by local human rights organizations, this paper reveals that the government perceived the Muslim Brotherhood as the major threat while regarding the activists who led the political demonstration at that time as a minor threat. As a result, the government did not repress those activists much, which gave them more time and space to prepare for the revolution.

Book Reviews
feedback
Top