The purpose of this paper was to clarify the existence of an ideal language of instruction (<teaching language>) based on the author’s own experiences. In the case study experienced by the author, the instructor used several words when trying to get the athletes to learn sports techniques. The author was intrigued by the variety of expressions used to improve certain movement actions, but also wondered what words the best words for athletes could be. Based on the example above, I attempted to examine the existence of <teaching language> relying on Frege’s theory. Specifically, I have attempted to describe how each of the cases is expressed, both when the existence of <teaching language> as the sole “Sinn” is posed and when it is not. From the consideration of this paper, it is considered that there is a <teaching language> as the sole “Sinn” to indicate the object that can be directly indicated, such as the object pointed to by the scientific language. However, it was submitted that the words do not necessarily lead to “I want you to move like this”. Based on this, I focused on “Vorstellung”, which is an internal image that everyone can generate for a sensory perceivable object. As a result, the view that the common part of “Vorstellung” is an element of <teaching language> was presented.

In the field of sport philosophy, there is a concept of making a distinction regarding sport rules between constitutive rules and regulative rules. This distinction is borrowed from the categorization by Searle, J.R., known for his work in the philosophy of language. In most cases, however, these terms are not used in a consistent manner in discussions of sport philosophy. Scholars give different definitions to the same terms or create new terms or categories to meet their own needs.

While the categorical distinction has a certain significance, it represents only a part of the function of rules. The categorical distinction, therefore, does little to capture the relationship between the reality of games and rules.

Carlson and Gleaves suggest that the categories and terms should be transformed to contextual descriptions. They state that the “functions” of the terms used in previous studies should be re-described according to the various contexts. No matter how the rules are interpreted in the specific context of a game, however, it is difficult to address the shortcomings and inadequacies of rules that emerge in actual games. It may be necessary for sport philosophers to go beyond categorization and interpretation of the “existing” rules and go deeper into designing “optimal” rules in the future.