The purpose of this study is to clarify the ideal foundation for reproducing sports club activities as activities that find meaning in "doing" sports, and for deconstructing them as truly desirable activities for current and future club members, through the reform of sports club activities. In particular, regarding "play" and "competition" as essential elements of sports, J. Huizinga, based on Sekine's view of overcoming the conflict between "play" and "seriousness" by reinterpreting Huizinga, he regarded the ideal form of "competition" in sports as "pure competition" and attempted to posit the ideal meaning of sports club activities. At that time, based on the view of "coaching circuits" presented by Kubo (1998), we took the position of presenting the ideal viewpoint at the "philosophy" stage of the coaching circuit when leaders, club members, parents, and others who participate in sports club activities ask "for what?"

As a result, the sports club activities could be posited as follows.

Sports club activities are sports activities in which all children who wish to play sports can voluntarily participate according to their own tastes, interests, and interests. In addition, all children who participate in the activity immerse themselves in "pure competition" in "another world" that generates extreme concentration on the act of "playing" sports, and generate the enjoyment of "fun" and "joy" that are the values of sports as "true fun" and "true joy" within themselves.

This study believes that it was able to present the viewpoint of value judgment when the people concerned look back on their daily activities toward improving these problems and reproducing them as the place where they can enjoy "fun" and "joy" through "pure competition" by taking advantage of the period of concentration on reform of sports club activities.

The purpose of this study is to clarify the concept of embodied knowledge based on the theory of body in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.

As a result of considering the conceptual distinction between embodied knowledge and tacit knowledge, the author revealed that embodied knowledge included tacit knowledge. In embodied knowledge, there are tacit knowledge as unexternalizable and intransmittable knowledge, and unexternalizable and transmittable knowledge.

In the theory of body in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the body is phenomenal body, there are the habitual body and the actual body in the phenomenal body. And, the objective body is defined as the second-order expression of the phenomenal body. As a result of considering embodied knowledge and tacit knowledge based on the theory, the author clarified that embodied knowledge was knowledge in the phenomenal body, tacit knowledge was knowledge in the habitual body, unexternalizable and transmittable knowledge was knowledge in the actual body, and externalizable and transmittable knowledge was knowledge in the objective body.

Thus, it is needed to focus on phenomenal body as a subject to clarify embodied knowledge of ball games of team sports. And, this study showed the theoretical basis of embodied knowledge in the situation that embodied knowledge and tacit knowledge had been confused. The future topic is to clarify embodied knowledge of sports based on this study.

The purpose of this study is to attempt a reflection on the relationship between the mediatization/technologization of sports and violence.

The emergence of sport in the modern era was accompanied by a union between “suppression of violence” and “viewing enjoyment”; however, media technology, which has sought to impose rigor in sporting decisions, has led the public to realize that, as typified by decisions by video assistant referees (VAR), truth can be verified by machines but cannot be captured by the human senses.

Yet, according to Arendt, people’s humanistic activity is neither the “production” that creates technology nor the “labor” (industry) that is accelerating the technologization process. “Labor” is an activity that is necessary to live, and in today’s world, “production” has also been subsumed in that “labor.” In public spaces, which are free from such necessity, human beings are recognized by others, and acquire reality as existence, through sensus communis of the body, by means of “actions” (exchanging words, etc.) performed in places of direct exchange (the common world) involving multiple people.

Viewed in this way, the mediatization/technologization of sport is inherently “violent” in that it reduces the sensus communis of the body into “vision” and deprives people of the “power” to form the common world and public space. What is important in modern sport, where the progress of technologization is inevitable, are direct places of exchange involving multiple persons (public spaces), such as the social intercourse and general meetings seen in the context of sports clubs, as well as the power to create such spaces.