This paper shows some issues around “health and pathology”/“normal and abnormal” in the modern medicine from various angles, as follows: I) the bacteriology of the 19th century, the specific etiology and natural healing power; II) three ways of the definition of health: that health means absence of disease, everyday life with no difficulties and the balance both inside and outside of the body; III) the psychosomatic concept: there are two kinds of patients, one is optimistic, the other is pessimistic. the former could heal faster than the latter; IV) a cut-off point on a bell-curve that divides the population into normal and anormal parts; V) ‘mi-byo’ or a risk and ‘preemptive medicine’ that might attack the ‘mi-byo’ and prevent diseases; and VI) that correlation does not mean the causation: the cyborgization and enhancement; and the private or public language discussing a possibility of the person with dementia living in his/her private and inner world.

Our illness narratives can be understood as one of archaic talk forms of indicating, demonstrating, explaining, and manifesting our oral experiences. Even though patients explaining ongoing their sufferings, this type of talk is coincidentally similar with post hoc narrative or in afterlife (Fortleben) form per se. Like chemical chain reaction, the endless form of narratives can be also seemed in the polyphonic talk forms, that Mikhail Bakhtin had formulated in his literary criticism on series of the Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s novels. The author has discussed on structural strengths of illness narratives that attract for numerous students of health & medical sociology, and anthropologists.

The “Problems of medical sociology in Japan” pointed out in this paper is that there are many studies without recognizing the diversity and polymorphism of modern medicine. In this paper, I explain the problem with the following four pitfalls. (1) a mistake of “medicine(medical practise)=medicine(medical science),” (2) neglect of pluralistic medical system in modern society, (3) illusion of “modern medicine=scientific monolith,” (4) the belief as “modern medicine=clinical practise.”

Traditionally the medical profession in modern neo-liberal societies has been seen as highly virtuous, subordinating its own interests to the public interest. As such, it has been viewed as an archetypal profession not only in the health sphere, but also amongst other professions. However, in the wake of the 1960/70s counter culture, there has been contestation and controversy as the medical profession has come under attack for being self-interested, placing its own interests above those of the wider population under the guise of an altruistic ideology. It has variously been seen as being involved in deleteriously engaging in everything from imperialistically expanding the scope of medicalization to the unwarranted persecution of alternative health practitioners. This has been reflected in shifts in mainstream social theory from the more supportive trait and functionalist approach to the now dominant and more critical neo-Weberian perspective.

Drawing on empirical examples, this presentation highlights the debate about whether the medical profession can be considered altruistic or self-interested, underlining the importance of having a clear methodological framework for the assessment of this issue, as well as the often misconceived complexity of the debate—epitomized by the fact that self-interests and the public interest are not always counterposed. This discussion is also treated critically from a theoretical viewpoint as neo-Weberianism has been challenged by other perspectives—not least by Foucauldianism and Marxism. While they have their own weaknesses, these perspectives highlight that the medical profession cannot be seen simply as an island, but is linked to the broader socio-political structure of governmentality and capitalism.

However, if the altruism claims of the medical profession need to be examined in a wider context, this is most strongly accentuated by the neo-institutionalist approach which views medicine and other professions as one institution amongst others fighting for survival in an ecology of institutional forms. Understanding the altruistic or self-interested orientation of the medical profession in this environment is very important not only sociologically, but also from the viewpoint of health policy. This is particularly the case in terms of the regulation of the medical profession where in several neo-liberal countries there has been a recent shift from self-regulation underwritten by the state to regulated self-regulation in which there is more formal external control of bodies of medical practitioners to protect the public.

From 1990s to 2000s, the storm of evidence-based medicine (EBM) had attacked heavily on Japanese medical societies. Under the conviction of reflecting the medical principle from collective clinical data to each individual patient, EBM trumpeted itself as a paradigm shift of modern medicine implying a crusade against L’homme Machine theory which see human body as mere machine. But EBM is not a paradigm shift of modern medicine from the viewpoint of science studies only attributable to scientific medicine. Early EBM had some fundamental flaws which seeded scientific misconducts in medicine and ceased as early as 2000s in Japan. In this article, the author overviewed the history of EBM in Japan and argued issues around importing EBM concepts into Japan.

We analyze the paradigm of American psychiatry after the third edition of the diagnostic manual by the American Psychiatric Association published in 1980 (DSM-III), as “DSM-reason,” and summarize its history to its fifth edition (DSM-5) in 2013. In particular, by tracing the contestation over the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, we clarify what kind of conditions are relevant for generating contestation in the making/revision process of DSM. Results suggest that the contestations are partly produced by the following characteristics of DSM-reason; the majority-vote procedure in deciding diagnostic criteria, the involvement of diverse actors other than the psychiatric community who might be driven identity recognition and/or economic interest, the operational definition of psychiatric disorders which blurs the distinction between the normal and disease, and the DSM-reason’s difference from the standard biomedical model. Medicine is not an independent unified entity, but is susceptible to and dependent on diverse social power relations.

In this papar we explore one of different forms of practical activities that are known as tojisha kenkyu, which are group sessions for persons with difficulties in their daily lives, mental disabilities in our data, and especially focus on status and actions of a tojisha as a facilitator in interaction of tojisha kenkyu sessions. We examine how it is possible that, and how smoothly it is achieved that the facilitator sometimes “shifts” his/her foreground category to become a participant, and find that membership of tojisha is established by self-presentation of the illness whose name is made by each of the participants themselves. We also analyze how this kind of facilitator design his/her talk to structure members’ contribution in the sessions, and find that a facilitator takes most of his/her turns using self-selection technique as well as often select next speaker, while he/she acts depending on each situation even when he/she does not select the next.

This study aims to clarify the influence of Japan introducing newborn screening in 1977 on the development of special formula for treating inborn errors of metabolism. A review of the Secretariat of Special Formula bulletins, medical journals, and the history of dairy enterprises shows how the introduction of newborn screening affected the development and medicalization of special formula. However, follow-up examinations revealed that some cases cannot be treated by dietary management or special formula, while others require no treatment at all. During this study, it therefore became evident that the development and medicalization of special formula alone cannot prevent the occurrence of disorders.