This paper discusses the duties of controlling shareholders under the Brazilian Corporate Law of 1976 (the “BCL”) which has been in force for 36 years. It is the unique feature of the BCL to stipulate the duties of shareholders, especially those of controlling shareholders. First, Article 115 of the BCL mentions that each shareholder should exercise the right to vote in the interest of the corporations. According to Article 115, it shall be deemed as abusive if the voting right is exercised with intent to cause damage to the corporation or to the other shareholders, or of obtaining an advantage for the shareholder or for a third party. Second, Article 116 of the BCL defines duties of controlling shareholders. It also states that controlling shareholders should use their power in order to make the corporation accomplish its purpose and performs its social role, and shall have duties and responsibilities for the stakeholders of the corporation. Finally, Article 117 of the BCL states that controlling shareholders should be liable for any damage caused by the abusive conduct of their power in the corporation. An example of such abuse which the BCL illustrates is to guide the corporation towards an objective other than in accordance with its corporate purpose clause or harmful to national interest, or to induce it to favor another corporation to the detriment of the other shareholders’ interest or of the Brazilian economy. Under the BCL, it is believed that corporations have their proper interests which are distinct from the interests of shareholders, and the controlling shareholders should guide the corporations towards their proper corporate objectives. This principle was founded based on the German theory of “unternehmen an sich”. In contrast, shareholders in other jurisdictions, including Japan, are not obliged to exercise their rights in the interest of corporate objectives. The controlling shareholders, including foreign shareholders, should fully recognize their duties under the BCL in exercising their power as controlling shareholders of Brazilian corporations.
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